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Abstract 
Leveraging purchasing power through collaborative purchasing arrangements is 
widely used to deliver efficiency savings in public procurement.  The success of such 
arrangements requires the purchasing behaviours of individual members of the 
collaborative organisation to change in order to realise the benefits of lower prices.  
However the actual purchasing behaviours of organisations within a collaborative 
purchasing arrangement have not been widely researched. 
 
The research uses a stationary stochastic model of buyer behaviour, the NBD-
Dirichlet, to describe and predict the purchasing behaviours of buyers of coronary and 
ureteral stents in a collaborative purchasing organisation in the English National 
Health Service.  The three year analysis period is a period of major change for each 
category, the result of supplier promotional activity in the ureteral stent case and 
purchasing management activity in the case of the coronary stents.   
 
Deviations between the observed patterns of behaviour and the model predictions 
point to violations of the basic Dirichlet requirements of stationary markets and lack 
of partitioning.  In both the ureteral and coronary stent cases the research identifies a 
segment of frequent purchasers whose behaviour differs from the rest of the 
population.  The impact of framework agreements in restricting the purchasing 
repertoire of buyers is also identified as a deviation from typical purchasing patterns.   
 
Both interventions result in changes to established loyalty patterns, whereby the initial 
high observed levels of loyalty towards particular suppliers are replaced by a greater 
willingness to purchase from alternative suppliers.  The data analysis also provides 
preliminary evidence for purchase deceleration as buyers defer purchases during a 
negotiation period in anticipation of improved pricing. 
 
Keywords: NBD-Dirichlet, Collaborative Purchasing, Purchasing Consortia, Loyalty, 
Organisational Buyer Behaviour 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
This research aims to describe, model and predict purchasing behaviours of 
member organisations in a collaborative public procurement environment.  
Collaborative procurement is seen by governments as a way of reducing 
purchase costs and delivering value for taxpayer’s money.  Increased supplier 
leverage results in price reductions and transaction costs can be reduced by 
pooling resources.  However these cost savings usually decline year on year as 
the opportunities for improvement diminish (Johnson, 1999).  The delivery of 
further savings requires product standardisation and vendor rationalisation 
(Chapman et al, 1998), and for purchasers to change their behaviours concerning 
supplier choice.   
 
The importance of purchasing behaviour in achieving the goals of collaborative 
procurement indicates a need for further research in this area.  The collaborative 
procurement literature is focused on describing, defining and theoretically 
modelling cooperative purchasing.  It addresses the motivation for collaboration, 
the structures of collaborative procurement organisations, the evolution of these 
structures and the conditions for successful collaborative procurement.  
However there is a relative lack of research into how member organisations in 
collaborative purchasing arrangements actually purchase and the effect of 
membership of a purchasing group on members’ purchasing behaviours, in 
particular patterns of supplier loyalty. 
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This research therefore seeks to identify to what extent members of collaborative 
procurement organisations exhibit regular patterns of buyer behaviour.  An 
established steady state stochastic model of consumer buyer behaviour, the 
NBD-Dirichlet, is used to describe and predict the observed buyer behaviour in 
order to assess the impact of collaborative purchasing arrangements on the 
buying behaviour of member organisations. 
1.2 Background to the Research 
“Collaboration and saving taxpayer's money has never been so 
important. The current economic climate means that public spending is 
coming under increased pressure and scrutiny with all parts of the public 
sector expected to work together and contribute to significant procurement 
savings now and in the future.”  
(Office of Government Commerce, 2010) 
Collaborative procurement is seen by central government as a key mechanism to 
achieve efficiency targets (Gershon, 2004; Bakker & Walker, 2008).  
Aggregating demand to increase purchased volumes can improve leverage with 
suppliers and deliver short term price reductions as well as reducing transaction 
costs by pooling supplier management activities.  Members of collaborative 
procurement organisations also gain access to resources and capability that they 
may not be able to access on their own and also benefit from improved 
marketplace information (Essig, 2000; Bakker et al, 2006a).  Financial savings 
of up to 20% per year through transaction cost reductions, access to expertise 
and leveraging demand have been reported from English local government 
councils coming together to share purchasing resources (Murray et al, 2008). 
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Delivered cost savings tend to decline as the procurement organisation matures 
and the opportunities for supplier leverage diminish (Johnson, 1999).  Longer 
term savings require buyers to change their purchase behaviours in order to 
benefit from supplier rationalisation and product standardisation (Chapman et al, 
1998).  As the managing director of a purchasing consortium notes “Most people 
who do joint purchasing focus too much on negotiating discounts.  They need to 
control the whole process and concentrate on behaviour management … 
otherwise we cannot move purchases from one vendor to another” (reported in 
Cohen, 2002, p.29). 
 
Much of the research into collaborative purchasing organisations has attempted 
“to explain, predict and understand behaviour concerning the intent, purpose and 
actual use of cooperatives in procurement” (McCue & Prier, 2006, p. 46).  The 
literature addresses why organisations pool their purchasing requirements, how 
they pool these requirements (the structure and form of purchasing consortia), 
how these consortia develop and the factors critical to the successful 
implementation of collaborative procurement.  Among the critical success 
factors are the commitment and compliance of member organisations to the 
requirements of the collaborative organisation, usually in terms of enforced 
contracts involving minimum spend targets with particular suppliers.  Failure to 
comply with these targets can result in the imposition of punitive penalties 
(Elhauge, 2002; Nollet & Beaulieu, 2005). 
 
When the control of member behaviours is not coercive but relies on the 
commitment of the members, the challenge for the purchasing manager is to 
overcome the established purchase loyalty patterns by introducing and 
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encouraging the use of new or alternative suppliers or discouraging the use of 
others.  To do this effectively, they need to understand the buying behaviours of 
the member organisations in order to identify current loyalty patterns.  For 
example, a high incidence of members buying from a single supplier, so-called 
sole loyalty, can result in a localised lack of competition such that suppliers may 
become complacent and there is an increased risk of supply chain disruption.  
An understanding of the current behavioural patterns can help the purchasing 
manager to determine to what extent buyer behaviour can be changed, to design 
intervention strategies and to ensure the sustainability of such interventions by 
monitoring progress and compliance. 
 
There has been no research into purchasers’ buying behaviour in collaborative 
procurement organisations, either to establish whether any regular patterns can 
be identified or to assess any changes in behaviour before and after a purchasing 
invention, for example a supplier development initiative or implementation of 
preferred supplier framework agreements.  It is against this background that the 
aims and objectives of the research were developed. 
1.3 Objectives of the Research 
This research addresses the gap in the purchasing literature by analysing and 
modelling purchase behaviours in a collaborative procurement organisation.  
The research has three main objectives: 
i. To determine if organisational buyers in a collaborative purchasing 
organisation exhibit regular patterns of purchase behaviour in terms 
of purchase incidence and supplier choice, 
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ii. If such patterns exist, to model the observed behaviours using an 
established model of buyer behaviour, the NBD-Dirichlet and to use 
this model to assess the impact of the collaborative purchasing 
arrangements on observed buyer behaviours, 
iii. To provide purchasing managers with metrics and benchmarks to 
assess and monitor buyer behaviour. 
1.4 Contribution of the Research 
The collaborative purchasing literature is mainly concerned with the motivation 
for the use of collaborative purchasing arrangements (Tella & Virolainen, 2005), 
the structure and form of purchasing consortia (Bakker et al, 2006a), the 
evolution of collaborative purchasing organisations (Laing & Cotton, 1997) and 
the critical success factors that influence the successful implementation of 
collaborative procurement (Schotanus et al, 2010).  However there is a lack of 
research that describes and explains how organisations in collaborative 
purchasing groups actually behave.   
 
In addition, the NBD-Dirichlet literature has primarily been concerned with fast 
moving consumer goods with few applications in organisational purchasing 
behaviour (Uncles & Ehrenberg, 1990; Bowman & Lele-Pingle, 1997; Pickford 
& Goodhardt, 2000).  Although concerned with buying behaviour in 
organisations, these studies have all featured independent organisations that are 
not operating within the constraints of a collaborative purchasing framework.   
 
This research contributes to the understanding of organisational markets by 
describing and explaining patterns of purchasing behaviour in a collaborative 
public procurement organisation.  It is also is the first time that the NBD-
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Dirichlet has been used in a purchasing and supply chain context.  The impact of 
framework agreements on restricting buyer purchasing repertoires and in 
changing established loyalty patterns is observed and discussed.   
 
The research is a substantial extension of the NBD-Dirichlet model into a new 
situation.  The complex conditions of collaborative public procurement in a 
regulated surgical supplies market represent a differentiated replication, further 
extending the generalisability of the NBD-Dirichlet model of buyer behaviour. 
 
The research also makes a contribution to marketing and purchasing theory by 
arguing that stochastic modelling of buyer behaviour and the markets-as-
networks tradition of the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) group of 
researchers have much in common and can be complementary approaches to the 
study of organisational marketing and purchasing behaviour. 
 
For marketing and purchasing professionals, the research provides an 
understanding of public procurement market structures.  The model provides 
norms and benchmarks of such measures as the extent of sole loyalty (the 
proportion of purchasers who use one supplier only) and the rate that these 
solely loyal purchasers actually buy.  Such benchmarks can be used to assess the 
effectiveness of procurement policies, for example the implementation of 
framework agreements, supplier development or supplier rationalisation.  
Loyalty metrics such as Share of Category Requirements can highlight the 
extent of supplier competition and identify if any suppliers are enjoying 
“excess” loyalty.  If preferred supplier or framework agreements are 
implemented, the same loyalty measures can be monitored to see if the 
interventions are having any effect.  By detailing which alternative suppliers are 
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used by purchasers of a particular supplier (using duplication of purchase 
tabulations), credible alternatives can be identified for supplier development.  
By the same token highly duplicated suppliers which are purchased mainly by 
buyers who fulfil most of their category requirements with other suppliers are 
potential candidates for supplier rationalisation. 
1.5 Research Questions 
The objectives of the research give rise to three research questions: 
i. Do organisational buyers in a collaborative purchasing organisation 
exhibit regular patterns of purchase behaviour in terms of purchase 
incidence and supplier choice? 
ii. Can the NBD-Dirichlet accurately describe and predict the observed 
purchasing behaviours? 
iii. Can the NBD-Dirichlet theoretical predictions provide benchmarks 
for purchasing managers to assess and monitor interventions to bring 
about sustainable changes in buyer behaviour? 
1.6 Methodology 
The research is a differentiated replication of the NBD-Dirichlet model of buyer 
behaviour.  Under the Empirical then Theoretical (EtT) approach, empirical 
regularities or patterns prompt the establishment of empirically grounded theory.  
The theory is tested more widely under different conditions to extend its 
generalisability and develop it conceptually (Ehrenberg, 1994).  Previous 
research has located the epistemology of replication and empirical generalisation 
as a Lakatosian research programme (Stern, 1994),  based on sophisticated 
methodological falsification within the research programme (Lakatos, 1978).   
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Sophisticated methodological falsification holds that empirical testing alone is 
necessary but not sufficient for the refutation of a theory.  Falsification can only 
occur with the emergence of better theories.  Research within the research 
programme thus proceeds according to a “positive heuristic”, a set of guiding 
research questions and theoretical forms.  Within the research programme, 
theories can be disproved but not proved and the refutation of a single theory is 
not sufficient for rejection of the entire programme.  The Lakatosian perspective 
recognises that science is a creative process, occurring within the context of a 
research programme established by the norms, beliefs and values of the 
scientific community.  It demands consistency within the guiding principles of 
the research programme as a means of preserving scientific rationality although 
it makes no claim for the objectivity or “truth” of science.   
 
In the EtT approach (Ehrenberg, 1994) theory is tested more widely under 
different conditions to extend the generalisability of the theory and develop it 
conceptually.  The cycle of replication and conceptual theory development 
creates the “guiding questions” that shape a positive heuristic in a Lakatosian 
research programme.  The theory is judged not by how well it fits a single 
instance but by how generalisable it is over a range of different circumstances 
(Ehrenberg, 1995).  The essence of replication is to find “significant sameness” 
across many sets of data, preferably covering a wide range of conditions 
(Barwise, 1995).  Conditions that are not described by the theory do not 
represent a refutation of the theory but rather establish boundary conditions for 
application of the theory.  If such situations are repeatable then new theory may 
be developed to address the new conditions. 
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Data for the current research is collected from a Collaborative Purchasing Hub 
in the English National Health Service (NHS).  Collaborative procurement is 
relatively mature in the NHS and aggregation of data from individual purchasing 
organisations is well established.  Exploratory discussions and analysis of pilot 
data from a single NHS hospital trust identified coronary stents as a suitable 
category for analysis.  Coronary stents represent a significant expenditure for the 
NHS and have been the subject of purchasing interventions in both the single 
trust and the collaborative hub.  The pilot study also established data 
requirements and data availability for the research and served to test proof of 
principle for the subsequent longitudinal study.  This covers a three year period 
during which a set of framework agreements for coronary stent supply were 
discussed, negotiated and implemented.  The dynamic development of the 
market structure during this period is observed and modelled.  Purchasing 
patterns for ureteral stents are also analysed.  This category has not been the 
subject of any purchasing interventions and acts as a control against which to 
compare performance in the coronary stent category. 
 
The research employs an established stationary model of buyer behaviour, the 
NBD-Dirichlet to describe and predict the observed patterns of purchasing 
behaviour. By building on theory that is already proven, the research contributes 
to the Dirichlet research programme and is more likely to generate findings that 
are generalisable over a range of purchasing situations and purchase categories 
than an isolated study that is specific to a single data set.  The NBD-Dirichlet is 
an extremely parsimonious model, requiring only data that is readily available 
from purchase order or accounts payable systems.  Although a steady state 
model, the Dirichlet is used to analyse dynamic conditions through a series of 
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snapshots that track the changes in purchasing patterns over a period of time.  
The method used to determine the Dirichlet parameters follows the method set 
out in Ehrenberg (1988) and Goodhardt et al (1984) and coded in the BUYER 
software package (Uncles, 1989).   
 
Interviews are conducted with two purchasing professionals involved in the 
coronary stent intervention in order to share the findings of the statistical 
analysis and to confirm the observed purchasing patterns.  The interviews 
provide context and background to aid the interpretation of the observed 
purchasing patterns. 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters with supporting appendices and 
references.  Chapter 1 discusses the background to the research, its aims and 
objectives and its contribution to theory and practice. 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the extant literature in organisational marketing and 
purchasing, in particular that which considers purchasing in collaborative 
procurement organisations and conceptualisations of purchasing behaviour and 
loyalty.  These include relational models such as the IMP approach, econometric 
models and stochastic models such as the NBD-Dirichlet.  The generalisability, 
practical use and track record of the methods are compared.   
 
The methodology for the research is developed in Chapter 3.  This discusses the 
epistemological approach for the research.  The chapter proceeds to describe the 
data required for the analysis, the data sources and the methods used to analyse 
the data.  The methods for determining the parameters of the NBD-Dirichlet 
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model, the use of the model to predict repeat purchasing behaviour patterns and 
the goodness of fit tests used to assess the fit of the predicted behaviours to the 
observed behaviours are discussed.  The pilot data is used in worked examples 
to demonstrate the operationalisation of the NBD-Dirichlet model. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the purchasing organisation in the NHS and the role of the 
Collaborative Purchasing Hub in delivering best value in purchasing for the 
trusts within it.  The chapter highlights the tensions that exist between the design 
and specification of clinical solutions and their sourcing.  It explains why stent 
purchases within the NHS is a suitable case to analyse in the context of the 
research objectives 
 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the pilot study carried out on data collected 
from a single NHS hospital trust.  The chapter presents a description of the data, 
the fitting of the model and the use of the model to predict purchasing behaviour 
in subsequent periods.  The analysis shows that even with a relatively short 
analysis period, the NBD-Dirichlet describes supplier performance measures 
such as penetration, purchase frequency and share of category requirements with 
good accuracy.  A heavy (high frequency) purchasing segment is identified and 
shown to purchase from a restricted set of suppliers, demonstrating the operation 
of preferred supplier framework agreements.  The pilot study identifies coronary 
stents as a suitable category for analysis and demonstrates that stent purchasing 
patterns in a single hospital over a limited time period can be modelled using the 
NBD-Dirichlet.  This provides a sound basis for extension of the analysis to the 
more complex longitudinal study of the purchasing patterns in the collaborative 
purchasing hub. 
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Chapter 6 deals with a longitudinal analysis of ureteral stent purchases in a 
collaborative procurement hub.  This category has had no purchasing 
management intervention and provides an opportunity to compare performance 
against the coronary stent category which has had some intervention.  A 
description of the data set is followed by the parameterisation of the model and 
testing for goodness of fit.  It is shown that the NBD-Dirichlet is able to 
satisfactorily describe and predict the observed purchasing behaviours.  The 
model provides behaviour benchmarks against which the observed behaviours 
are assessed.  There is a major change in the relative market positions of the two 
dominant suppliers during the analysis period, a change attributed to supplier 
activity.  Deviations between the observed behavioural patterns and those 
predicted by the model are explained by the existence of a high purchase 
frequency (heavy purchasers) segment and a low purchase frequency segment 
(light purchasers) with distinctive and different purchasing behaviours.   
 
Chapter 7 presents and discusses the analysis of the coronary stent category.  
The 2006 – 2008 data set covers the formalisation of a major purchasing 
intervention in a negotiated set of framework agreements in September 2008.  It 
is shown that the NBD-Dirichlet can provide satisfactory predictions of 
observed purchasing behaviour, including a change in loyalty behaviours 
immediately after implementation of the framework agreements.  A marked 
reduction in purchase activity during the period immediately preceding the 
implementation of the frameworks is observed and may be evidence of 
inventory reduction before more attractive pricing comes into force. 
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Chapter 8 draws together the findings of the research and reviews to what extent 
the research questions have been met.  The chapter presents the theoretical 
contributions of the research and discusses the managerial implications of the 
findings.  The limitations of the research and recommendations for future 
research are discussed. 
 
The thesis concludes with the presentation of the appendices and references.  
Appendix A contains a methodological paper published during the research, 
“Stochastic modelling and industrial networks - complementary views of 
organisational buyer behaviour”.  Appendix B presents a summary of the 
abbreviations and notation used throughout the thesis. 
 
The next chapter considers the extant literature in organisational marketing and 
purchasing, including purchasing in collaborative procurement organisations and 
conceptualisations of purchasing behaviour and loyalty. 
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2 Buying Behaviour in Collaborative Procurement 
Organisations 
2.1 Introduction 
Recent years have seen a marked increase in the attention given to collaborative 
or cooperative purchasing arrangements in the purchasing and supply literature.  
Much of this literature has set out to describe, define and theoretically model 
cooperative purchasing – “to explain, predict and understand behaviour 
concerning the intent, purpose and actual use of cooperatives in procurement” 
(McCue & Prier, 2006, p. 46).  The literature addresses the motivation for the 
use of collaborative purchasing arrangements, the structure and form of 
purchasing consortia, the evolutionary development of such consortia and 
factors critical to the successful implementation of collaborative procurement.   
 
While aggregated demand can increase leverage with suppliers and deliver short 
term price reductions, longer term savings will accrue from supplier 
rationalisation and product standardisation (Chapman et al, 1998).  This requires 
less focus on negotiating discounts and more focus on behaviour management in 
order to change the current patterns of supplier choice and get best value from 
any negotiated purchase frameworks (reported in Cohen, 2002, p.29). 
 
Even the savings from aggregated demand can be lost if members of the 
purchasing group fail to purchase contracted volumes from particular suppliers 
(Doucette, 1997).  Compliance, commitment and effective monitoring are 
identified as success factors for collaborative purchasing organisations 
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(Doucette, 1997; Rokkan & Buvik, 2003; Harland et al, 2007), yet nothing in the 
collaborative purchasing literature addresses the way in which member 
organisations actually purchase and how their purchasing behaviours change 
when they respond to procurement initiatives within a purchasing consortium. 
 
There is however a wide body of organisational buying behaviour literature in 
both the purchasing and supply chain literature and the marketing literature that 
does provide insights into purchasing behaviours and in particular the notion of 
supplier loyalty.  Compliance within a collaborative purchasing organisation 
means loyalty to the group rather than a particular supplier.  The extent to which 
member organisations stay loyal to their incumbent suppliers rather than 
adopting new suppliers promoted by the consortium should be a measure of 
success for the collaborative procurement organisation.   
 
The literature review will proceed with an overview of the collaborative 
procurement literature in order to locate the research question within the 
knowledge base.  A brief overview of concepts of loyalty in organisational 
purchasing will follow.  The literature relevant to loyalty and repeat 
purchasing in business markets will be discussed using the taxonomy 
proposed by Barclay (1992) which makes the distinction between research 
that focuses on a single (usually the buying) organisation and research that 
considers buyer/seller interactions.  As can be seen in Figure 2.1 below, 
Barclay’s second dimension considers organisational buying within either 
a single decision or a series of decisions.   
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  Organisational Focus 
  Intra Inter 
Within a 
decision 
A decision within the 
buying organisation 
(Cell 1) 
A discrete buyer/seller 
transaction 
(Cell 2) 
Decision 
Process 
Focus 
Over a 
series of 
decisions 
A series of related 
decisions within the 
buying organisation 
(Cell 3) 
Buyer/seller relationship 
(Cell 4) 
Figure 2.1 Taxonomy of organisation buying research (Barclay, 1992) 
 
By definition, the analysis of repeat purchasing involves successive 
decision points.  In this context the distinction between single decisions 
and a series of related decisions is less useful than the intra / inter 
dimension.  The earliest models of organisational buyer behaviour 
recognised that even a single purchase event required multiple decisions to 
“identify, evaluate and choose” (Webster & Wind, 1972) and that the 
event would be influenced by the “satisfaction with past buying 
experiences” (Sheth, 1973).  
 
Consequently the following discussion adopts the organisational focus 
dimension of this framework to present an overview of the organisational 
buying behaviour literature.  In the “intra” category the review will 
consider how loyalty and repeat purchasing behaviour within purchasing 
organisations has been conceptualised.  In the “inter” category the focus 
will be on the interactions between organisations and will consider the 
work of the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) group as well as 
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the growing literature on relationship marketing and cooperative 
purchasing arrangements. 
 
The review proceeds with a review of quantitative modelling approaches 
in buyer behaviour including econometric models of attitudinal and 
contingent loyalty and stochastic models of behavioural loyalty.  This 
includes an extended review of the NBD-Dirichlet model of buyer 
behaviour. 
 
The review of the literature will locate the research question within the 
existing knowledge base, showing how the research will contribute to the 
understanding of purchasing behaviours in collaborative purchasing 
organisations and to the broader buyer behaviour literature. 
2.2 Collaborative Procurement 
Collaborative procurement involves two or more organisations at the same or 
similar position in the supply chain, coming together, formally or informally, to 
aggregate purchasing volumes and share information or resources.  The 
objective is to gain procurement advantages over and above those that could be 
obtained if each organisation acted alone (Hendrick, 1997; Schotanus & Telgen, 
2007).  Membership of a collaborative procurement organisation is typically 
expected to deliver improved effectiveness (enhanced capability through pooling 
of knowledge and access to resources) and improved efficiency (through 
increased leverage over suppliers, reduced transaction costs and better access to 
markets) (Tella & Virolainen, 2005; Bakker et al, 2006a).  This approach should 
not be confused with the concept of the collaborative supply chain where the 
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collaboration is vertical (between buyer and supplier) rather than horizontal 
(between buyers) (Patterson et al, 1999). 
 
Collaborative procurement arrangements (also referred to as cooperative 
purchasing, group purchasing, pooled purchasing or consortium purchasing) are 
particularly popular in the public sector (Essig, 2000) and have been used in UK 
local government since 1957 (Murray et al, 2008).  In recent years their use has 
become more widespread, largely as a response to a central government 
efficiency review in which collaborative procurement is seen as a key 
mechanism to achieve efficiency targets (Gershon, 2004; Bakker & Walker, 
2008).  Although private sector purchasing consortia are becoming more 
important, participation rates among private sector companies are reported to be 
25% or below (Hendrick, 1997; Vigoroso, 1998; Tella & Virolainen, 2005).  
The reluctance of the private sector to make more use of collaborative 
purchasing arrangements has been attributed to anti-trust issues, concerns over 
disclosure of confidential information and a perception that collaboration would 
not deliver any improvements to the firm’s existing supplier agreements 
(Hendrick, 1997).  In addition, public sector organisations do not generally 
compete with one another, there is often mutual trust and shared objectives, 
similar organisational culture and common external pressures, notably central 
government efficiency targets (Schotanus & Telgen, 2007). 
 
Increased adoption of collaborative purchasing in practice has been 
accompanied by an increase in the academic literature on the use of 
collaborative purchasing groups.  A theoretical framework has been developed, 
drawing on transaction cost economics, the resource based view of the firm, 
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agency theory, network theory and game theory (Schotanus & Telgen, 2007; 
Tella & Virolainen, 2005).  Schotanus and Telgen (2007) present a 
comprehensive literature review of the field as part of their attempt to develop a 
typology for purchasing groups.  They categorise collaborative procurement 
research in five areas: 
- motivation (advantages and disadvantages of cooperative 
purchasing) 
- forms of collaborative purchasing (coordination structure / 
typology) 
- evolution (development) of purchasing groups over time 
- critical success factors (enablers and barriers) 
- formation of purchasing groups in electronic markets. 
 
The literature includes interpretive and descriptive accounts of collaborative 
purchasing group formation and operation (Laing & Cotton, 1997) and 
normative models of optimum group structure based on a range of factors 
including member characteristics (range of sizes, geographical spread, 
homogeneity of requirements, procurement maturity), the size of the group (i.e. 
the number of members), the degree of maturity of the collaboration initiative 
and the intensity of cooperation and scope of group activities (Bakker et al, 
2006a).  Empirical research predominates, using both case study and survey 
methodologies to describe and explain cooperative procurement behaviour. 
2.2.1 Motivation for Collaborative Purchasing 
Cost savings are usually cited as the main motivation for joining a collaborative 
purchasing group although improved information about supply markets has also 
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been identified as a factor (Tella & Virolainen, 2005).  Individual organisations 
that lack the knowledge, resources or capabilities to operate effectively in the 
supply market may collaborate to improve effectiveness (Bakker et al, 2006a).   
 
Savings of between 10% and 30% are reported to be generated by purchasing 
groups (Hendrick, 1997; Vigoroso, 1998; Johnson, 1999; Nollet & Beaulieu, 
2005) although very few studies report actual savings.  Cost savings are 
delivered along the dimensions proposed by Anderson and Katz (1998) – “Buy 
for Less, Buy Better and Consume Better”.  “Buy for Less” savings (i.e. lower 
purchase prices) are achieved through aggregating purchases to realise 
economies of scale and increased leverage over suppliers.  “Buy Better” savings 
result from reduced transaction costs as activities such as bidding, supplier 
evaluation, negotiation and contract management are carried out at group level 
rather than by individual buyers (Essig, 2000; Murray et al, 2008).  In some 
cases reduced transaction costs have been delivered through staff reductions 
(Johnson, 1999).  “Consume Better” savings are expected to come from supplier 
rationalisation and product standardisation.  Although these factors can be more 
powerful than scale in delivering savings, they are problematic to deliver, 
especially in a healthcare context where clinicians have considerable power and 
autonomy in product specification and procurement decisions (Chapman et al, 
1998; Cox et al, 2005).  Restricting the autonomy of expert specifiers to choose 
suppliers requires a change in behaviours (Cohen, 2002) and for the members of 
the purchasing group to remain committed to the new behavioural patterns 
(Cleverley & Nutt, 1984; Doucette, 1997). 
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This commitment can be achieved through enforced contracts (Cleverley & 
Nutt, 1984), punitive penalties or forfeiture of loyalty rebates if members do not 
meet contracted minimum percentage performance targets, which may involve 
purchasing more than 90% of requirements for a category from a single supplier 
(Elhauge, 2002; Nollet & Beaulieu, 2003) or monitoring of compliance (Rokkan 
& Buvik, 2003).  Maverick purchasing, opportunism and other forms of non-
compliance are a problem in many collaborative purchasing agreements, 
particularly when the information infrastructure does not allow adequate 
monitoring (Harland et al, 2007). 
 
As changes to purchasing patterns are important mechanisms in the delivery of 
sustainable cost savings from collaborative purchasing, it is important to 
understand how members purchase both before and after participation in a 
purchasing consortium.  However, there has been no research into purchasing 
patterns in collaborative purchasing organisations to determine how members 
buy and what they buy, either to inform supply base interventions or to monitor 
the outcomes of such interventions.      
2.2.2 Critical Success Factors for Collaborative Purchasing 
The factors that contribute to successful collaborative purchasing arrangements 
include trust between the group members, formality of the group, uniformity of 
the group members, common objectives, communication between group 
members, enforcement of cooperation, influence of group members, allocation 
of gains and costs, cooperation of group members and commitment and internal 
support (Schotanus et al, 2010).  In some studies these are identified as enablers 
or in the negative sense, barriers or constraints.  While many of the factors 
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address issues such as governance, form, group dynamics and communications 
within the group, there is a strong thread of commitment, compliance, cohesion 
and trust – of loyalty to the group that transcends loyalty to a particular supplier 
or group of suppliers (Cleverley & Nutt, 1984; Doucette, 1997; Cohen, 2002; 
Nollet & Beaulieu, 2003; Rokkan & Buvik, 2003; Nollet & Beaulieu, 2005; 
Bakker & Walker, 2008).   
 
There is an acknowledged lack of consensus as to what constitutes success in a 
purchasing group, with various measures such as longevity, contribution to the 
underlying competitive advantage of the member organisations or financial 
performance (Schotanus et al, 2010).  In their study of critical success factors, 
Schotanus et al. (2010) use as a measure of success the extent to which members 
of the purchasing group perceive that their group is successful.  Others measures 
of success employed include discounted cash flow (i.e. cost savings net of 
consortium costs) (Essig, 2000), cost savings and return on consortium 
“investment” (Hendrick, 1997) and price paid for products bought through the 
consortium (Cleverley & Nutt, 1984). 
 
Following on from the previous section, if changes to purchasing behaviours are 
important elements in the sustainable delivery of cost savings, a further measure 
of success could be the extent to which the organisational purchasing patterns 
are changed as a result of the collaboration.  As before, assessing the extent of 
the change requires an understanding of the members’ purchasing behaviours, 
including supplier loyalty and how buyers spread their purchases of a category 
among the pool of suppliers.  There has been no research conducted into how the 
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loyalty dynamics of particular markets operate in collaborative purchasing 
arrangements or how they change after entry into a purchasing consortium. 
2.3  Concepts of Loyalty 
“What they call their loyalty, and their fidelity, I call either their lethargy of 
custom or their lack of imagination.” 
(Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray) 
Jarvis and Wilcox (1977) echo Wilde when they draw a distinction between 
“true vendor loyalty” and “simply repeat purchase behaviour”.  In addition to 
issues of definition (loyalty to technology, product class, manufacturer’s brand, 
distribution channel or individual) (Cunningham & Kettlewood, 1976; Morris & 
Holman, 1988) and of extent (does “loyal” refer to those customers who only 
buy from a single supplier or allow for those who divide their loyalty?) (Yim & 
Kannan, 1999), there is a philosophical distinction between those who perceive 
loyalty as an attitudinal antecedent of repeat purchasing and those who see 
loyalty as a behavioural outcome of repeat purchasing (Morris & Holman, 1988; 
Uncles & Laurent, 1997).  From the purchasing and supply perspective, the 
question is one of strategic sourcing – to source from a single supplier or 
multiple suppliers (Owens Swift & Coe, 1994; Quayle, 2001) 
 
In this context, Uncles et al (2003) identify three conceptualisations of loyalty: 
(a) Attitudinal – loyalty driven by a disposition to continuing buying from 
the same supplier 
(b) Behavioural – loyalty as observed in historic purchasing patterns 
(c) Contingent – loyalty affected by disposition and the purchasing situation. 
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Jacoby (1971) defines loyalty as “the overt act of selective repeat purchasing 
based on evaluative psychological decision processes” and views repeat 
purchase behaviour as a necessary but not sufficient condition for loyalty.  This 
implies that attitudes should be stable, enduring and deterministic.  However, it 
has been shown that the attitudinal beliefs held by consumers towards suppliers 
(or brands, as much of the research in this area has been in consumer markets) 
can be rather volatile, perhaps because they are not very deeply held or because 
they are a consequence of average purchase behaviour (Dall'Olmo Riley et al, 
1997).  Rather than “the more they like it, the more they will buy it” (Baldinger 
& Rubinson, 1997) this would appear to be a case of “I use it, therefore I like it” 
(Ehrenberg, 1997).   
 
Repeat purchasing may occur in the absence of any positive attitude towards a 
supplier where customers may be “trapped” by high switching costs or 
“purchased” through promotional pricing or reward programmes (Seth et al, 
2005).  It has also been noted that repeat purchase behaviour may be habitual, 
occurring in the absence of a psychological commitment to the vendor (Jarvis & 
Wilcox, 1977).  Dick and Basu (1994) argue that loyalty combines both 
attitudinal and behavioural elements and identify four specific conditions as 
described in Figure 2.2 below. 
  Repeat Patronage 
  High Low 
High Loyalty Latent 
Loyalty Relative Attitude 
Low Spurious 
Loyalty 
No Loyalty 
Figure 2.2 Loyalty conditions (Dick & Basu, 1994) 
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Loyalty is not a concept that features highly in the purchasing literature except 
to the extent that supply chain collaboration implies deepening relationships 
between buyers and a small number of suppliers (Patterson et al, 1999; 
Emberson & Storey, 2006; Vereecke & Muylle, 2006).  Such relationships are 
often conceptualised as long-lasting (Hakansson & Wootz, 1979) but empirical 
evidence suggests that there may be high levels of turnover in the buyer’s 
portfolio of relationships (Gadde & Mattsson, 1987; Dubois et al, 2003; Kamp, 
2005).  Portfolio models of purchasing encourage buyers to avoid becoming 
dependent on individual suppliers (Kraljic, 1983).  The literature distinguishes 
between sole sourcing (where there is only one supplier to choose from), single 
sourcing (where a choice is made to only buy from one supplier), dual sourcing 
(two suppliers) and multiple sourcing.  Single sourcing can deliver higher 
quality and lower total costs but may expose the buyer to a greater risk of supply 
chain disruption (Burke et al, 2007).  Dual or multiple sourcing can spread risk 
but at the expense of higher coordination costs.  A buyer may choose to satisfy 
most category requirements from a single supplier, just buying enough from the 
others to keep the relationship going (Costantino & Pellegrino, 2010).  Although 
single sourcing is often presented as the result of a rational decision-making 
process, embedded costs, earned trust and idiosyncratic routines established 
through repeat interaction and buyer’s organisational inertia can result in de 
facto single sourcing (Li et al, 2006).   
 
It is often assumed that a high level of source loyalty is the norm in 
organisational markets (Jarvis & Wilcox, 1977; Hakansson & Wootz, 1979).  
This assumed loyal behaviour is the basis of the IMP approach (a long term 
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relationship implies loyalty) and in most conceptual models of buyer behaviour 
one of the attribute variables is previous experience or satisfaction with the 
supplier (Reichheld & Sasser, 1990).  The assumed stability is perhaps one 
reason why there has been little empirical research into actual patterns of 
organisational purchase behaviour (Gadde & Mattsson, 1987).  Such research 
often shows dynamic behaviour with a cyclical linkage between relationship 
strength and relationship performance (Autry & Golicic, 2010) but has not 
addressed what is purchased and from which suppliers. 
 
In consumer research, panel data has been used to study the patterns of repeat 
purchase behaviour and model these patterns stochastically.  Loyalty is 
measured in terms of actual purchase behaviour.  Such studies have shown that 
the extent of brand loyalty can vary widely and that a high degree of loyalty is 
not necessarily a good thing as solely loyal customers tend to be less frequent 
purchasers than those with divided loyalties (Norman et al, 2005).  Sharp et al. 
(2002) note the distinction between repertoire markets, where consumers satisfy 
their requirements from a repertoire of brands, and subscription markets where 
high levels of source loyalty are the norm.  The few empirical studies carried out 
in organisational markets have shown similar patterns of repeat purchasing, 
mainly in fast moving industrial goods and services such as aviation fuel 
(Uncles & Ehrenberg, 1990), ready mixed cement (Pickford & Goodhardt, 2000) 
and financial exchange services (Bowman & Lele-Pingle, 1997).   
 
Uncles & Ehrenberg (1990) analysed a selection of aviation fuel contracts held 
by airlines across different locations (airports).  The analysis was static in that it 
only considered the contracts with a particular fuel supplier at a particular point 
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in time and did not take into account any repeat purchasing.  Patterns of split 
loyalty, few 100% loyal buyers and no segmentation were observed.  Similar 
patterns are observed in foreign exchange services (Bowman & Lele-Pingle, 
1997) using survey data from corporations using financial services.  The model 
over-predicts penetration with demand concentrated in a small number of heavy 
purchasers.  Some non-stationarity is also observed such that when the Dirichlet 
model is parameterised using 1990 data it does not give accurate predictions for 
1991 observed data.  The ready mixed concrete study (Pickford & Goodhardt, 
2000) uses survey methodologies to collect recall based purchase histories 
(previous three months) and Juster scale based purchase likelihoods (next three 
months).  These purchasing records were then used to operationalise the 
Dirichlet model.  The analysis demonstrated regular patterns of split loyalty with 
the only major deviation being an under-estimation of penetration (and over-
estimation of purchase frequency) for the market leading supplier. 
2.3.1 Purchasing Behaviour within the Buying Organisation 
Much of the intra-organisational literature focuses on attitudinal and contingent 
loyalty (Bubb & van Rest, 1973; Jarvis & Wilcox, 1977; Dick & Basu, 1994).  
Wind (1970) identified the following four sets of variables to be determinants of 
source loyalty: product/service attributes (price, quality); buyer’s past 
experience with suppliers; buyer’s organisational constraints (policy, 
organisational objectives); factors that simplify the buyer’s work.   
 
The earliest examples of research into organisational purchasing behaviour built 
on existing consumer behaviour research to develop conceptual models of the 
organisational buying process (Robinson et al, 1967; Webster & Wind, 1972; 
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Sheth, 1973).  While not explicitly focused on repeat purchasing or loyalty, 
these conceptual models addressed the phases of the buying process, the nature 
of the buying centre and the tasks carried out by the buying centre and the 
decision making processes used in organisational purchasing (Moller, 1985).   
 
Robinson et al. (1967) proposed three categories of buying situation to describe 
heterogeneity in this aspect of organisational purchasing.  Their “straight rebuy, 
modified rebuy and new task” classification addresses the issues of repeat 
purchasing in routine and non-routine contexts.  It recognises the role played by 
uncertainty in purchasing decisions and how purchasing organisations respond 
to this uncertainty in terms of buyer search behaviour, information needs and 
decision processes.  Sheth (1973) and Webster and Wind (1972) also note the 
importance of routine and the type of purchase as a moderator of purchasing 
decisions.  The nature of the product has also been used as a basis for 
classification (Lehmann & O'Shaughnessy, 1974) with four categories 
identified: routine order products; procedural problem products; performance 
problem products; political problem products.  The assumption is that product 
attributes will be valued differently by the organisational buyer depending on the 
categorisation of the product.  Similar contingency models have been proposed 
in the purchasing and supply literature including portfolio models that categorise 
purchase situations and propose purchasing strategies based on dimensions such 
as the importance of purchasing and the complexity of the supply market 
(Kraljic, 1983) or the specific investments made by both buyer and supplier into 
a buyer-supplier relationship (Bensaou, 1999). 
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Uncertainty and risk reduction is identified by other authors as contributing to 
repeat purchasing and the establishment of long-term relationships (Sheth, 1973; 
Vyas & Woodside, 1984).  Jarvis and Wilcox (1977) argue that most repeat 
purchase behaviour is determined by organisational constraints: the cost of 
evaluating new vendors, uncertainty reduction, perceived absence of choice and 
“automatic” repurchasing.  From the purchasing perspective such constraints 
lead to purchasing interventions to reduce the number of suppliers employed and 
strengthen the relationships with the remaining suppliers (Hahn et al, 1986; 
Krause & Ellram, 1997; Ogden, 2006). 
 
The integrated models of Webster & Wind (1972) and Sheth (1973) both 
conceptualise the organisational purchasing process in terms of exogenous 
(situational or environmental) factors and characteristics of the purchasing 
organisation, the decision making unit (buying centre) and the individuals that 
make up the buying centre.  In each case the buyer’s previous experiences with 
the supplier were noted as key factors influencing subsequent decisions.  Other 
factors that have been identified as determinants of loyalty include satisfaction 
(Preis, 2003; Spiteri & Dion, 2004), involvement and brand equity (Bennett et 
al, 2005).  
More recent research stresses the importance of long term relationships in 
organisational marketing (Doyle, 1995; Sheth, 2002).  With the exception of the 
IMP Group of researchers (see next section), the marketing literature has 
generally regarded these relationships from the perspective of either supplier or 
buyer, with the relationship as “just a development within the marketing mix 
approach” (Mattsson, 1997).  Satisfaction, service quality, relationship building 
and dissonance reduction are key elements of the loyalty literature (Barclay, 
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1992; Pine et al, 1995; Bennett et al, 2005).  Relationship quality as measured by 
perceived service quality, commitment, trust and satisfaction has been proposed 
as a predictor of loyalty in organisational purchasing (Rauyruen & Miller, 2007).  
The purchasing and supply chain literature also emphasises the importance of 
long term collaborative relationships (Patterson et al, 1999; Emberson & Storey, 
2006; Vereecke & Muylle, 2006). 
 
Several studies have related future purchasing behaviour to past purchasing 
behaviour and suggest that the extent to which previous purchases influence 
future purchases may be due to constraints such as market structure (lack of 
suitable suppliers), adaptation to a specific supplier (switching costs), bounded 
rationality, technological heterogeneity, buying process centralisation or high 
personal involvement (Heide & Weiss, 1995; Soderlund et al, 2001; 
Yanamandram & White, 2006).  High levels of buyer inertia have been observed 
(Hakansson & Wootz, 1979; Li et al, 2006) and it has been noted that 
relationships “may endure despite deterioration of service/product and/or despite 
monumental, even catastrophic, mistakes by suppliers” (Young & Denize, 
1995).  Attempts have been made to relate buyer behaviour to dimensions such 
as longevity and quality of relationship as measured by constructs such as buyer 
attentiveness, buyer dependence and flexibility (Bonner & Calantone, 2005).   
 
These attitudinal and contingent models are often criticised for their lack of 
parsimony (Choffray & Lilien, 1978), difficulties in operationalising the 
concepts and variables involved (Campbell, 1985), the underlying assumption of 
rationality in professional purchasing (Smith & Taylor, 1985) and for their focus 
on description rather than explanation (Anderson & Chambers, 1985).  Given 
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the complexity of the organisational buying process and the limits on freedom of 
action within the process, it is perhaps not surprising that attitudinal measures 
(preference or predisposition towards a particular supplier) have been shown to 
be less good predictors of future purchase behaviour than analysis of past 
behaviours (Soderlund et al, 2001).   
2.3.2 Purchasing Behaviour between Organisations 
The inter-organisational research tradition views loyalty as a product of buyer-
seller interaction and focuses on the relationship as the unit of analysis (Morris 
& Holman, 1988).  This strand of the literature focuses mainly on buyer-supplier 
vertical relationships and features in both the purchasing and supply chain 
literature (Vereecke & Muylle, 2006) and the marketing literature, in particular 
the work of the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) group (Hakansson, 
1982).   
 
The IMP approach stemmed from a growing dissatisfaction with seller-
dominated research that treated buyer and seller separately, focusing on ways in 
which an active seller could manipulate the marketing mix to stimulate a passive 
buyer to respond.  A growing body of empirical evidence was showing that 
industrial marketing and purchasing was dominated by stable long term 
relationships between individually significant buyers and sellers (Hakansson & 
Wootz, 1979) and the intra-organisational tradition did not appear to be 
reflecting the way that industrial marketing and purchasing practitioners actually 
behaved.  By focusing on new buying situations and discrete purchase decisions, 
often of capital equipment, routine purchasing behaviour was neglected 
(Campbell, 1985).  The result of this dissatisfaction was a wide-ranging study to 
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explore and describe the nature of almost 900 buyer-seller relationships across 
five European countries (Cunningham, 1980), resulting in the interaction 
approach.   
 
The interaction approach emphasises the buyer-seller dyadic relationship as the 
unit of analysis and differs from the intra-organisational research tradition in 
three main ways (Turnbull et al, 1996; Ford, 2004): 
(a) buyers are heterogeneous and individually significant to their suppliers, 
(b) buyers and sellers interact to develop an offering which may be complex 
and highly adapted, 
(c) transactions are not isolated events but episodes embedded in a 
relationship where previous experiences and expectations have a 
significant impact. 
 
The IMP tradition takes as its point of departure the behavioural model of 
loyalty where loyalty is defined in the historic purchasing record, or in this case 
the pattern of interactions that are present in a long-lasting relationship.  The 
measure of loyalty is the characterisation of the relationship.  The early 
inductive IMP research sought to describe “the pattern of dependencies between 
companies, the evolution of their dealings over time, the adaptations that each 
made to meet the requirements of the other party, and the inter-organizational 
person contact that took place” (Turnbull et al, 1996).  The resulting interaction 
model (Cunningham, 1980) provides a framework for analysing relationships in 
terms of: 
(a) The interaction process, 
(b) The participants in the interaction process, 
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(c) The environment within which the interaction takes place, 
(d) The atmosphere affecting and affected by the interaction. 
 
Hakansson and Wootz (1979) rationalised the existence of long term buyer-
supplier relationships to be a response to uncertainty of need, market or 
transaction.  Other authors have noted the role of buyer uncertainty (especially 
in dynamic high technology markets); switching costs due to established 
relationships, adaptations in products or processes, incompatibility; situational 
factors including purchase importance; a perceived absence of choice; and the 
nature of the buying centre (Gadde & Mattsson, 1987; Hallen et al, 1991; Heide 
& Weiss, 1995) in determining the likelihood of staying with an existing vendor. 
 
Stability or longevity are often suggested as indicators of commitment in long-
term business relationships although empirical studies have questioned the 
notion of stability as a feature of business networks (Gadde & Mattsson, 1987; 
Kamp, 2005).  It has also been noted that close relationships (and hence implied 
loyalty) may become burdensome through the costs of servicing the relationship, 
through high interdependency that prevents one party exiting the relationship or 
the opportunity costs foregone when one party to the relationship prevents 
another from developing other relationships.  Such circumstances have been 
described as the “golden cage” becoming an “ugly prison” (Hakansson & 
Snehota, 1998). 
 
The markets as networks approach has developed from the interaction model as 
the analysis moved beyond the buyer-seller dyadic relationship to consider the 
network of relationships within which a focal firm or individual relationship is 
located.  The Actors – Activities – Resources (AAR) model is the primary 
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analytical framework encountered in the study of industrial networks 
(Hakansson & Johanson, 1992).  Actors are those who interact within 
relationships, perform activities and control resources.  Activities refer to the 
combination, development, exchange or creation of resources by actors.  
Resources are the means by which actors carry out network activities.  The AAR 
model has also been extended to recognize that the mental models (schemas, 
network pictures) held by individuals and organisations have a key role in the 
understanding of behaviour in networks (Welch & Wilkinson, 2002; Henneberg 
et al, 2006). 
 
A detailed discussion of the IMP research and the Interaction Model can be 
found in Hakansson (1982).  The model has been criticised for its looseness 
(McLoughlin & Horan, 2002) and lack of consistency (Turnbull et al, 1996) 
with some confusion over the very definition of the term “relationship” 
(Mattsson, 1997).  In their review of the literature of inter-organisational 
relationships, Cheung and Turnbull (1998) observe that the “findings are 
scattered” (p. 47) with research addressing the multi-dimensional, directional, 
structured, varied and evolutionary nature of relationships. 
 
The model has also been criticised for being overly descriptive, for the implicit 
assumption that relationships are always good and should be strived for and for 
the focus on the dyadic relationship with little regard to the embeddedness of the 
relationship in the network context (Anderson et al, 1994; Hakansson & 
Snehota, 1998; McLoughlin & Horan, 2002). In addition, the approach has been 
criticised for its over-reliance on qualitative and interpretive research 
methodologies (Moller, 1994; Wensley, 1995).  The theoretical concepts are not 
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well developed with recognised difficulties in the definitions of relationship, 
interaction and network position (Easton, 1995b).   
 
Several authors have questioned the evidence for the persistence of long-term 
stable relationships (Easton, 1992) and indeed some have presented empirical 
evidence suggesting high levels of turnover in the portfolio of relationships held 
by a buying organisation (Gadde & Mattsson, 1987; Dubois et al, 2003; Kamp, 
2005).   While the IMP approach provides a rich description of change in a 
dynamic network of relationships, it lacks a quantitative dimension to describe 
and predict patterns of loyalty and defection in networks of relationships.   
 
2.4 Quantitative Models of Organisational Behaviour 
The research question seeks to understand the pattern of purchases in terms of 
what is bought, from which supplier, over a series of purchase decisions.  The 
literature reviewed so far has mainly been concerned with explaining the 
constructs that develop around purchasing behaviour such as loyalty and its 
antecedents and persistent buyer-seller relationships rather than describing and 
explaining the actual patterns of purchases.  For example, studies of customer 
“defections” report that 68 percent of customers leave for no special reason 
(Gee et al, 2008) and that 65 to 85 percent of satisfied customers will defect 
(Oliver, 1999).  By quantifying and modelling patterns of behaviour, a 
foundation can be built for further explanatory theory.  As Cunningham (1956) 
observes, “… the why of brand loyalty behaviour can be effectively attacked by 
field interviewing only after we know its “what”, “where” and “how much””. 
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In contrast to the field of consumer marketing there has been relatively little 
quantitative modelling of organisational purchase behaviour in the form of 
econometric or stochastic models of supplier choice behaviour (Sheth, 1977; 
Brand & Leeflang, 1994).  Moller (1985) notes the difficulty in developing 
generalisable models that apply across the heterogeneous business marketplace.  
In addition to heterogeneity, difficulties in modelling industrial markets also 
arise because there may be a small number of market participants, precluding 
meaningful cross-sectional analysis.  Industrial marketing data are typically less 
available than consumer data and the complexity of organisational buying 
processes can make such models complicated, difficult to understand and 
operationalise (Brand & Leeflang, 1994; Brinkmann & Voeth, 2007). 
 
Quantitative modelling applied to repeat purchasing can be categorised as 
econometric (aligned to the attitudinal dimension of loyalty), stochastic (aligned 
to the behavioural dimension of loyalty) or a combination of both.  The 
econometric models attempt to a greater or lesser extent to explain or predict 
buyer behaviour using measured attributes, perceptions or intentions, to seek to 
answer the question “why do which buyers purchase what they do, where they 
do, when they do, and how they do?” (Hunt, 1983).  The focus on determinism 
leads to the introduction of more variables, improved measurement and more 
explanations that are specific to a particular situation (Bass, 1974).  In contrast, 
the stochastic modelling tradition in buyer behaviour research aims to describe 
how organisations actually buy before seeking to explain the observed 
behaviour.  This approach is based on models that generalise across many 
different market situations.  Stochastic modelling is also widely used in supply 
chain forecasting although these models are typically time dependent and 
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focused on inventory and material flow models rather than supplier choices 
(Beamon, 1998). 
 
As Bass (1974) notes, perhaps not all behaviour can be understood completely.  
When it is impractical to include all relevant variables in an analysis or when 
variables may not be measured precisely, it is to be expected that no exact 
relation will hold between the measured variables.  In such circumstances a 
stochastic relationship can be established by including a random variable 
described by a probability distribution (Arrow, 1968). In this perspective, repeat 
purchasing is assumed to arise at least partly independently of any attitudinal 
disposition or strong commitment towards the supplier (Uncles et al, 2003).  In 
their editorial to the International Journal of Marketing Special Edition on 
Loyalty, Uncles and Laurent (1997) suggest that consumer loyalty to brands can 
be thought of as stochastic, not deterministic and can be conceptualised as a 
propensity to re-purchase.  
 
The following discussion considers both econometric models and empirical 
generalisations in organisational and consumer repeat buying behaviour 
research. 
2.4.1 Econometric Models 
Multi-attribute choice models can range from simple weighted point models to 
more sophisticated logit regression models (Brand & Leeflang, 1994).  
Weighted point models have been used in organisational purchasing research to 
investigate the relation between satisfaction, involvement and attitudinal brand 
loyalty (Bennett et al, 2005), the relation between price, attitude, organisational 
variables and work simplification variables and source loyalty (Wind, 1970), the 
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relation between relationship strength and subcontractor performance, 
experience, size and job complexity (Autry & Golicic, 2010) and the impact of 
product, performance and relationship satisfaction on repurchase intentions 
(Preis, 2003).  These models assume that buyers can be classified into 
homogeneous segments that respond in similar and predictable ways to a variety 
of attribute variables. 
 
The multinomial logit regression model determines the probability that a buyer 
chooses to purchase from a particular supplier as a function of a selection of 
attributes of all the other alternatives.  It combines stochastic probabilities with 
econometric decision variables, allowing the incorporation of marketing mix 
variables into the model (Guadagni & Little, 1983; Wagner & Taudes, 1986).  
There are few examples of the use of such models in organisational repeat 
purchase behaviour research.  Heide and Weiss (1995) specified a logit model to 
describe the probability of inclusion in a buyer’s consideration set of suppliers 
and the probability of switching supplier in high technology markets.  
 
Li et al (2006) use a discrete choice analysis (DCA) approach to demonstrate the 
prevalence of switching inertia in the U.S. industrial-automation industry.  An 
experimental alternative supplier was presented to respondents who were asked 
to choose between the attributes of the experimental supplier and their 
incumbent supplier.  Supplier selection multinomial logit models were estimated 
from the DCA to determine the effect of the attribute on supplier choice.  This is 
used to determine the relative weight (importance) for the attributes and to 
estimate the switching inertia i.e. the likelihood of switching to the 
experimentally generated supplier.   
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Gensch  (1987) uses a maximum-likelihood-hierarch (MLH) model and a logit 
model to predict organisational purchasing behaviour in a two stage 
disaggregate model.  The first stage is a screening process to short list the 
available alternatives, modelled by MLH.  The second stage is the supplier 
choice process modelled by logit.  Predictions are made at the individual level, 
i.e. that individual i will select a particular alternative.  These individual 
predictions can then be averaged to give an aggregate probability for the chosen 
alternative.  Gensch (1987) reports prediction accuracy of 65% (i.e. the model 
accurately predicted the stated intention of 65% of the sample) compared to 30% 
for a simple weighted model.  Some of this increase is attributed to the two-stage 
nature of the model, in that compared to the single stage model the two-stage 
variant has twice the parameters and two passes at the data.  The analysis looked 
only at purchase intention and did not attempt to examine actual purchasing 
behaviour. 
 
While these models are often evaluated in terms of goodness of fit and 
predictive accuracy, the behavioural logic underpinning the model and the 
normative managerial implications should not be overlooked (Gensch, 1987).  In 
his analysis, Gensch (1987) identified two dominant attributes in the screening 
phase; manufacturing quality and problem solving.  The dominant attributes may 
change between the phases.  However he identifies the limited generalisability of 
this method by noting that “one can only say that the two-stage model better 
approximates the actual choices of the individuals in this particular data set” (p. 
234). 
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In their review of the state of the art in global purchasing research, Quintens et al 
(2006) question the added value of advanced theory-testing structural equation 
models and note that the purchasing field requires more profound and 
longitudinal case-based studies that allow a more in-depth exploration of the 
phenomenon under study. 
2.4.2 Empirical Generalisations 
The best-fit single set of data approach for testing advanced theories is 
contrasted with a modelling approach based on empirical generalisations that are 
validated by replication on multiple sets of data.  Regularities in both purchase 
incidence and brand choice have been observed and documented in consumer 
and, less frequently, in organisational buyer behaviour research (Ehrenberg, 
1959; Easton, 1980; Uncles & Ehrenberg, 1990; Stern & Ehrenberg, 1995).  
These regularities have been shown to occur over a wide range of purchase 
situations, product classes and time periods, to the extent that they become 
empirically generalisable, that is they become “a pattern or regularity that 
repeats over different circumstances and that can be described simply by 
mathematical, graphic or symbolic methods” (Bass, 1995). 
 
Empirical regularities or patterns prompt the establishment of empirically 
grounded theory.  The theory is tested more widely under different conditions to 
extend its generalisability and develop it conceptually.  Ehrenberg (1994) has 
dubbed this approach “Empirical then Theoretical” (EtT) in contrast with 
“Theoretical in Isolation” (TiI), the more traditional hypothetico-deductive 
econometric approach where a theory is proposed and then tested empirically.   
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The Empirical then Theoretical (EtT) approach is described in typically 
parsimonious fashion by Ehrenberg himself (Ehrenberg, 1994). 
(1) Establish a generalisable empirical pattern 
(2) Develop a (low-level) theoretical model or explanation 
 
Bass and Wind (1995) present a selection of empirical generalisations ranging 
from the Bass diffusion model describing adoption of new technologies in terms 
of the number of previous adopters (Bass, 1969) to the NBD-Dirichlet model 
describing repeat buying behaviour in a stationary, non-partitioned market 
(Goodhardt et al, 1984). 
2.4.2.1 Negative Binomial Distribution 
One of the longest established empirical generalisations describing buyer 
behaviour is the Negative Binomial Distribution (NBD) model for purchase 
incidence and repeat buying behaviour (Ehrenberg, 1994).  The 
operationalisation of the model is described in more detail in Chapter 3.  The 
NBD  is based on two assumptions relating to purchase incidence (Ehrenberg, 
1959): 
(a) An individual’s successive purchases of the product category are 
distributed as-if-randomly over time with a constant long term mean 
purchasing rate for a specific time period.  A zero-order process is 
assumed, i.e. the timing of successive purchases is independent of when 
the previous purchase was made. The number of purchases made in 
successive time periods then follows a Poisson distribution.   
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(b) Customer heterogeneity in the long run mean purchasing rates are 
assumed to be distributed through the population of buyers according to 
a Gamma distribution. 
 
The gamma assumption of the NBD model has been theoretically justified using 
probability theory (Chatfield & Goodhardt, 1975), and based on two empirically 
supported assumptions that the long run mean purchasing rates are independent 
between individuals (i.e. one individual’s purchasing rate does not affect 
another) and that the proportion of purchases devoted to a particular supplier is 
independent of the total rate of buying.  
 
The Poisson distribution is justified under the assumption that the specific time 
periods are not too short, such that the zero-order assumption holds.  A number 
of extensions of this model have questioned the Poisson assumption and these 
will be discussed below. 
2.4.2.1.1 Zero-order Assumption 
The assumption that the timing of subsequent purchases is independent of the 
timing of previous purchases (the zero order assumption) has been questioned 
(Jeuland et al, 1980; Dunn et al, 1983).  They argue that just after a purchase is 
made, the probability of rebuying is small, and less than the long run purchasing 
rate of the Poisson.  A second order Erlang distribution is proposed as an 
alternative to the Poisson.  This has been named the Condensed Negative 
Binomial Distribution (CNBD) as it implies that individual purchasing 
behaviour is more regular (condensed) than the exponential form of the Poisson 
distribution (Chatfield & Goodhardt, 1973).  For heavily purchased products, the 
beta binomial distribution (also known as Polya or negative hypergeometric 
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distribution) has been proposed to model the probability that a consumer makes 
a purchase in any one week (Chatfield & Goodhardt, 1970). 
 
Morrison and Schmittlein (1988) also raise concerns about the zero order 
(“memoryless”) assumptions of the Poisson.  They argue that changing the 
distribution of inter-purchase times of the NBD from Poisson (Erlang-1) to 
Erlang 2 is a “good first step toward “improving” the NBD”.  Neverthless, the 
“plain vanilla” NBD model has worked well in numerous situations and has 
been shown to be an accurate predictor of future purchasing patterns (Morrison 
& Schmittlein, 1988).  Chatfield and Goodhardt (1973) conclude that changing 
from Poisson to Erlang does not lead to any great improvements in the accuracy 
of the model and that the Poisson assumption should be favoured because it is 
simpler to use.  They argue that for individuals with low average purchasing 
rates, the Poisson and Erlang 2 distributions are very similar.  With low weekly 
purchase probabilities, the probability of buying in successive weeks is near zero 
and it is not necessary to make any special assumptions to treat behaviours 
immediately after making a purchase (Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  For most 
consumer goods, these light-buying individuals form the majority of consumers 
(Chatfield & Goodhardt, 1973).   
2.4.2.1.2 Extensions to the NBD 
Several authors have proposed extensions to the basic NBD model of purchase 
incidence.  These extensions variously incorporate brand choice (Bass et al, 
1976; Goodhardt et al, 1984), segmentation and econometric variables (Bass & 
Pilon, 1980; Dillon & Gupta, 1996; Stern & Hammond, 2004) and modelling of 
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“inactive” customers in customer base analysis (Schmittlein et al, 1987; Peter et 
al, 2005; Fader et al, 2005). 
2.4.2.1.2.1 Customer Base Analysis 
Customer Base Analysis builds on the NBD by including the probability that a 
customer is still active as well as the purchasing frequency of active customers.  
In circumstances where customers may become inactive without the supplier 
organisation being notified, customer base analysis provides a way of modelling 
active customers and predicting future purchase behaviour (Schmittlein et al, 
1987).  The Pareto-NBD model proposed by Schmittlein et al (1987) is based on 
the NBD (Poisson purchase rates distributed according to a gamma distribution 
across the population) with two additional assumptions relating to “death” rates, 
i.e. the probability that a customer becomes inactive after a particular time 
period.  It is assumed that the lifetime of each customer follows an exponential 
distribution and that these lifetimes are distributed across the population of 
customers according to a gamma distribution.  The final assumption of the 
Pareto-NBD is that the purchase rates and death rates are independent. 
 
The parameters of the Pareto-NBD model are determined from historical 
purchasing data.  As sales and order data are usually readily available within the 
supplier’s information systems, this model can be used in circumstances where 
panel data is not collected or where data collection is expected to be 
problematic.  The model can then be used to predict the number of current 
customers that are expected to still be active at some future time. The future 
purchasing activity of these customers can also be predicted to determine a 
Customer Lifetime Value (CLV).  Schmittlein et al (1987) acknowledge that 
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more work is needed to develop effective methods for estimating the four 
parameters of the Pareto-NBD.  Perhaps as a consequence of this, there are very 
few reported empirical applications of the model (Fader et al, 2005).  Fader et al 
(2005) identify one application using maximum likelihood parameter estimation 
and one using a three-step method of moments estimation procedure.  They 
propose a new model, the Beta-Geometric-NBD (BG-NBD) that is easier to 
implement. 
 
The Pareto model assumes that a customer can become inactive at any time.  In 
contrast, the Beta-Geometric model assumes that “death” occurs immediately 
after a purchase (Fader et al, 2005).  The probability that a customer becomes 
inactive immediately after the purchase is distributed across the transactions 
according to a geometric function and across the population of customers 
according to a beta distribution.  The four parameters of the distribution can be 
estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure.  Fader et al (2005) test the 
BG-NBD model and the Pareto-NBD model on retail data in what they claim is 
only the second empirical validation of the Pareto-NBD model.  The first 
reported empirical validation was carried out using order date and dollar volume 
per order for an office products suppliers serving business customers 
(Schmittlein & Peterson, 1994).  A further validation has been carried out on 
grocery retail data, using the Pareto-NBD, the BG-NBD and a Modified BG-
NBD (MBG-NBD) to allow for customers that become inactive immediately 
(Batislam et al, 2007).  Although the Pareto-NBD model may be suited to 
industrial applications where scanner data is not available but sales records do 
exist (Easton, 1980), it provides no information about supplier choice and has 
had very limited empirical application. 
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2.4.2.1.2.2 Econometric Variables 
It is a frequent criticism of stochastic models that they do not explicitly contain 
any marketing variables and thus are said to provide no information about 
underlying causal mechanisms (Bemmaor, 1994; Popkowski Leszczyc & Bass, 
1998) and have few findings of managerial significance (Wagner & Taudes, 
1986).  Similarly, econometric models that only include decision variables have 
often been criticised for ignoring the underlying heterogeneity in the customer 
population (Bass & Pilon, 1980).  Popkowski Leszczyc and Bass (1998) present 
an analysis of the treatment of heterogeneity in marketing models, highlighting 
the distinction between heterogeneity included outside the likelihood function 
(i.e. additional to the distribution of purchase probabilities) and heterogeneity 
included within the likelihood function (either by including a dummy variable 
for each member of the population or by assuming a mixing distribution for the 
parameters).  
 
Several models combine logit models to explain brand choice probability in 
connection with the NBD model of purchase incidence (Jones & Zufryden, 
1980; Wagner & Taudes, 1986).  An alternative approach to modelling 
heterogeneity is to adopt a latent class approach by partitioning the population 
into homogeneous segments that are defined by the customer’s response to 
marketing variables (Dillon & Gupta, 1996).  While many such models claim an 
improvement in goodness of fit, this is perhaps unsurprising as the models are 
parameterised to fit the data, using maximum likelihood estimators.  What 
would be more surprising would be if the models were to fit well to a new set of 
data.  The improved fit usually comes at the expense of parsimony.  For 
example, Dillon and Gupta (1996) compare their latent class model (151 
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parameters, percentage error 1.5%) to the NBD-Dirichlet (9 parameters, 
percentage error 2.4%).  It is debatable whether the extra 0.9 percentage point 
accuracy justifies the additional 142 parameters.   
 
All the empirical testing of these models has been carried out in a fast moving 
consumer good environment where data on purchase rate, product choice and 
marketing variables (including demographics, price, promotional activity) are 
available.  The lack of industrial applications of the models may be linked to the 
lack of data relating to explanatory variables including knowledge of competitor 
offerings and customer purchases of other firm’s products.  This lack of data 
“rules out the logit-type analyses of customer product choice” (Schmittlein & 
Peterson, 1994).  
 
In addition, the incorporation of econometric variables into stochastic models 
introduces the limitations associated with the single set of data approach.  The 
models are relevant to a particular data set and do not exhibit the generalisability 
that characterises stochastic models like the NBD that so many of the combined 
models are based upon.  Morrison and Schmittlein (1988) note that it makes 
more sense to use established stochastic models to set a baseline from which to 
assess the effect of marketing mix variables.  Econometric techniques can then 
be used to explain discrepancies from the baseline.  It has also been noted that 
steady state models can provide a useful comparison for more complex dynamic 
models (Jeuland et al, 1980).  This approach will be seen later in explanations of 
deviations from Dirichlet norms (Fader & Schmittlein, 1993; Bhattacharya, 
1997; Stern & Hammond, 2004). 
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2.4.2.1.2.3 Supplier (Brand) Choice 
Other researchers have extended the NBD model of purchase incidence to 
include brand choice by incorporating a multinomial probability law for the 
shares of a particular brand.  A multi-variate beta distribution is often assumed 
to describe the distribution of choice probabilities (Chatfield & Goodhardt, 
1975; Bass et al, 1976).   
 
Bass et al (1976) start from an assumption that individual utilities for each 
consumer for each brand are distributed over the population according to a 
gamma distribution.  They show that for a given purchase occasion, the brand 
choice probabilities resulting from this distribution of utilities are distributed as 
beta.  By considering a series of purchase occasions they derive a compound 
beta-binomial (Polya-Eggenberger) distribution that describes brand switching, 
penetration and duplication.  The model parameters are the market shares of the 
brands and the “product class loyalty factor”, a measure of the correlation 
between successive purchases of a brand.  As the number of purchase occasions 
becomes very large, the limit of the Polya-Eggenberger distribution is shown to 
be the NBD. 
 
Chatfield and Goodhardt (1975) use probability theory to mix the binomial 
distribution of purchase frequencies for each brand with a beta distribution to 
give a beta-binomial distribution.  This distribution is used to predict the 
probability that a particular brand is purchased r times, given n purchases of the 
product category.  This follows from the assumption that the distribution of 
purchases for each brand follows the NBD, and that the NBD for each brand is 
independent of the NBD for other brands.  In addition, the brand choice 
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probabilities are assumed to be independent of purchase rate.  This independence 
means that the individual NBDs can be combined to create a joint distribution of 
purchase frequencies of brands in the product category, and hence the model of 
multibrand buying behaviour.  Chatfield and Goodhardt (1975) indicate the 
limitations of some of the simplifying assumptions made in their model and 
propose the use of a multivariate beta distribution of brand choice (the Dirichlet 
distribution) rather than the multivariate NBD.   
 
The assumption of the Dirichlet distribution for brand choice was developed by 
Shoemaker et al. (1977) who proposed the Frequency Dependent Dirichlet 
(FDD) to model the dependence of purchase probabilities on purchase 
frequencies.  They found that some brands exhibited independence between 
choice probabilities and purchase frequencies and others (often major brands) 
exhibited dependence.  However they concluded that the independence 
assumption was a “good first approximation”.  Jeuland et al. (1980) also adopted 
the Dirichlet distribution in their integrated brand choice and purchase timing 
model, using an Erlang-2 model of purchase timing.  They provide expressions 
for typical market statistics including repeat buying, brand switching, 
penetration and duplication.  The empirical application of the model on 
consumer panel data showed some discrepancies between the expected and 
observed results for repeat buying.  Jeuland et al. (1980) concluded that the 
assumption of a zero-order model did not hold and proposed that some 
dependence on previous purchases be incorporated into the choice model.  
Chatfield and Goodhardt’s (1975) model was also developed into the NBD-
Dirichlet model of buyer behaviour (Goodhardt et al, 1984).  This model will be 
described in more detail below. 
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2.4.2.2 NBD-Dirichlet Model 
Of all the models combining purchase incidence and brand choice, the NBD-
Dirichlet is perhaps the best known and certainly the most extensively validated.  
Since its development, it has been applied in studies across over fifty varied 
product or service categories including fast moving consumer goods, store 
choice, medical prescriptions and television choice (Uncles et al 1995) and for 
product variants within fast moving consumer good brands (Singh et al, 2008).   
Although there has been limited research into the application of the model to 
organisational purchase situations, the few studies that have been carried out 
represent more research than has been done for all of the other models discussed.     
 
The NBD-Dirichlet rests on five assumptions relating to purchase rates and 
brand choice (Goodhardt et al, 1984; Dacko, 2008).  The first two assumptions 
are those of the NBD: 
(a) Individual purchases distributed Poisson 
Successive purchases by each individual are spread over time “as if 
random”, independent of each other (zero order) with a constant 
mean rate in a specified unit length time period. 
(b) Gamma distribution for individuals’ different mean purchase rates  
 
The validity of the NBD assumptions has been discussed above and will not be 
repeated here.  In the model the NBD is used to model the number of purchases 
of the whole product category made by all individuals in the time period chosen 
as the unit of analysis (Goodhardt et al, 1984; Ehrenberg et al, 2004). 
 
The next two assumptions concern brand choice: 
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(c) Zero order multinomial distribution for brand choice on a specific 
purchase occasion 
Brand choices made by an individual over a series of purchases are 
spread randomly with a fixed probability of choosing a particular 
brand.  These probabilities are independent of previous purchase 
choices (zero order). 
(d) Brand choice probabilities distributed according to a multivariate 
Beta distribution (Dirichlet) 
 
These assumptions will only be valid for conditions of stationary markets (i.e. 
fixed purchase probabilities) and no market partitioning (Goodhardt et al, 1984; 
Sharp & Driesener, 2000).  Challenges to these assumptions will be addressed in 
the next section. 
 
The fifth assumption considers the relationship between brand choice and 
purchase incidence: 
(e) The brand choice probabilities are distributed over the population 
independently of the average purchase frequencies of individual 
purchasers. 
 
The assumptions of stationary and non-partitioned markets and of the 
independence of brand choice and purchase incidence have been challenged 
often (Shoemaker et al, 1977; Fader & Schmittlein, 1993; Bhattacharya, 1997; 
Sharp & Driesener, 2000; Stern & Hammond, 2004).  Much marketing research 
is focused explicitly on dynamic and partitioned markets with the emphasis on 
manipulation of marketing mix variables to influence the behaviour of 
particular, distinct market segments and hence to assume stationary and 
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unsegmented markets may seem unrealistic and uninteresting (Ehrenberg et al, 
2004). 
 
For frequently purchased, low involvement products the zero order and 
stationary market assumptions have generally been accepted as good 
approximations.  In such circumstances customers are generally highly 
experienced and their long run brand preferences are not easily influenced by 
further purchases or promotional activity.  Typically the brand choice decision is 
made quickly with little information processing.  This behaviour has been 
described as habitual and routinised (Popkowski Leszczyc & Bass, 1998; 
Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  Short term responses to promotions are observed but the 
main impact appears to be to bring forward purchases by existing purchasers of 
the brand.  After the promotion brand preferences typically return to the long run 
average propensities (Ehrenberg et al, 1994).   
 
The extension of these assumptions to high involvement purchases would appear 
to be less intuitive as infrequent purchasing is unlikely to lead to habit-forming 
behaviour and high involvement implies a more complex decision making 
process.  However it has been noted that infrequent purchasers may have more 
opportunity to “forget”, hence the zero order assumption may be justified (Stern 
& Hammond, 2004).  In addition the empirical evidence shows that the Dirichlet 
model holds over a wide variety of purchasing situations including consumer 
durables and cars (Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  Repertoire markets, where consumers 
purchase from a repertoire of familiar brands, might be expected to be 
characterised by routine behaviours but it has been shown that the Dirichlet also 
holds for subscription markets where sole loyalty is the norm (Sharp et al, 2002).  
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It has been suggested that the model is so general that it will hold in all 
circumstances.  Sharp and Driesener (2000) show that systematic violations to 
the Dirichlet assumptions, in particular the non-partitioned assumption, do result 
in a poor fit for the model. 
 
The assumption of unsegmented markets means that brands competing in the 
same market space are mostly alike and directly substitutable.  Where segments 
do exist, they are generally the result of functional differences, for example 
ground coffee or instant, caffeinated or decaffeinated (Ehrenberg & Sharp, 
2000).  In the case of Sharp and Driesener’s (2000) study of café choice, they 
noted functional partitioning in terms of restaurant type (pizza, sandwich, 
organic vegetarian) and a niche segment that had a few highly loyal purchasers.  
The Dirichlet model holds for directly substitutable brands and it can be used to 
identify clusters by examining duplication of purchases i.e. the proportion of 
purchasers of one brand who also purchase another brand.  The “Duplication of 
Purchase Law” is an approximation that states that the proportion of buyers of 
one brand who also buy a second brand in the analysis period is proportional to 
the penetration of the second brand (Ehrenberg, 1988).  The duplication 
coefficients will be different for each distinct segment (Ehrenberg & Sharp, 
2000). 
 
The final assumption that brand choice is independent of purchase incidence has 
also been challenged by identifying segments based on purchase frequency 
(Shoemaker et al, 1977; Fader & Schmittlein, 1993; Stern & Hammond, 2004).  
Shoemaker et al. (1977) conclude that the independence assumption is a good 
first approximation although they note a strong dependence between purchase 
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probability and purchase frequency for several major brands.  This finding was 
also noted by Fader and Schmittlein (1993) who examined the “repeat 
purchasing premium” enjoyed by large (i.e. high market share) brands.  They 
compare the deviations between actual Share of Category Requirements (SCR) 
and observed SCR to identify any relation with market share.  They observe a 
correlation (r = .317, p < 0.10) between purchase frequency and the repeat 
purchase premium.  Excess repeat purchasing is also connected to the existence 
of segments that may be highly loyal to the high share brands or the existence of 
distinct sub-markets (functional segments).  Stern and Hammond (2004) analyse 
purchase incidence heterogeneity as an explanation for the “repeat purchasing 
premium”.  By comparing loyalty across an equal number of purchases (rather 
than an equal time period) they observe clear differences between groups of 
buyers segmented by rate of category purchase with consistently lower loyalty 
exhibited by lighter buyers.  Calculated loyalty measures are dependent on the 
number of purchases used to operationalise the model such that over short 
purchase runs (up to about 15 purchases) loyalty is underpredicted.  At low 
purchase rates the Dirichlet predictions are closer to the actual values for light 
buyers than for heavier buyers.  As heavier buyers make a larger contribution to 
the sales of a particular supplier, this effect can lead to the observed market 
share or repeat purchasing premium noted above.   
2.4.2.2.1 Implications and Uses of the NBD-Dirichlet 
The Dirichlet model describes and predicts patterns of purchasing behaviour that 
have been observed in many different markets.  These include the following 
(Goodhardt et al, 1984; Ehrenberg & Sharp, 2000; Ehrenberg et al, 2004): 
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(i) The average rate of purchase of the brand is approximately constant 
across all the brands with a slight decrease from larger to smaller 
brands (the “Double Jeopardy” effect) 
(ii) Market shares and penetrations decrease greatly from high share to 
low share brands 
(iii) Buyers of a particular brand tend to buy other brands quite often 
 
The significant implication for marketing managers is that an increase in sales 
must be delivered by an increase in the number of customers.  If average rates of 
purchasing are roughly constant across all brands then it seems futile to expect 
sales growth to come from getting existing customers to buy more (Goodhardt et 
al, 1984).  In unsegmented markets a kind of competitive equilibrium prevails 
where competition means “running hard to stand still” to ensure that the brand 
remains in the repertoire of split-loyalty customers (Ehrenberg et al, 2004; Singh 
et al, 2009).  The Dirichlet incorporates marketing mix variables by assuming 
that they are subsumed into the brand’s market share (or penetration).  Loyalty 
measures (for example SCR) are dependent on consumer preferences, 
positioning, marketing mix and competitive activity, all factors that will also 
determine market share (Bhattacharya, 1997).  The dominance of market share 
as the determining variable for brand performance reflects the observation of 
Jarvis and Wilcox (1977) that “much of what appears to be true vendor loyalty is 
chance loyalty” (p. 10). 
 
The “Double Jeopardy” effect means that smaller brands not only have fewer 
buyers but those buyers also purchase less often.  This effect was noted (and 
named) by McPhee (1963) who observed that the more popular radio DJs and 
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comic books had more listeners (readers) and those listeners listened for longer 
each day.  In a market with two brands, one large and one small, the small brand 
will have a few users most of whom will know of and may use the larger brand.  
By contrast the large brand will have a lot of users, many of whom may not be 
aware of and have never used the smaller brand.  This is the statistical selection 
effect that leads to Double Jeopardy  (Dall'Olmo Riley et al, 1997).  The 
Dirichlet predicts the Double Jeopardy effect quite accurately although the 
under-prediction of brand loyalty for high share brands has been discussed 
above (Fader & Schmittlein, 1993). 
 
McPhee (1963) also notes the phenomenon of Natural Monopoly whereby the 
most popular products “monopolise” light buyers of the category while heavy 
buyers tend to choose a mix of larger and smaller brands.  Even those buyers 
who choose the smaller brands regularly will tend to satisfy most of their 
requirements with larger brands and will tend to appreciate the larger brands 
more than the less popular alternatives (Elberse, 2007).  This leads to Double 
Jeopardy as smaller brands are chosen by experienced purchasers who are 
knowledgeable with the competing alternatives while light purchasers are less 
aware of the choices available.  Double Jeopardy arises from the lack of 
awareness of competing brands combined with a tendency for smaller brands to 
be bought mainly by consumers who have the highest standards (McPhee, 
1963).  In a study of DVD rentals Elberse (2007) confirms that consumers of 
“obscure” products (equivalent to smaller brands) are more likely to be heavy 
consumers of the category.  She observes that heavy consumers or those with 
more knowledge of a category may face fewer obstacles in identifying 
alternative brands. 
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As a well-established empirical generalisation that has been validated over many 
different markets, the Dirichlet can be used as a benchmark or baseline for 
researchers (Fader & Schmittlein, 1993; Bhattacharya, 1997; Uncles & Laurent, 
1997) so that deviations can be identified and researched more fully.  The 
Dirichlet norms can also be used to assess the performance of existing brands 
(Ehrenberg & Sharp, 2000; Ehrenberg et al, 2004) to identify and explain any 
discrepancies or to analyse dynamic market situations, for example short term 
promotional response.  An often quoted example concerns the prescription of a 
cardio-vascular drug, Capoten.  10 new prescriptions a year were being written 
for Capoten compared to the norm of about 5.  It was noted that doctors were 
being provided with a free personal computer if they prescribed Capoten often 
enough for monitoring purposes.  The prescribing rate returned to normal after 
the promotion ended (Stern & Ehrenberg, 1995). 
 
Extending the Dirichlet norms to new markets also provides a basis for analysis.  
The first step is to establish whether the new conditions follow the Dirichlet 
norms, and to identify and explain any discrepancies.  For example, as has 
already been noted, the Dirichlet can be used to identify clusters by examining 
duplication of purchases i.e. the proportion of purchasers of one brand who also 
purchase another brand. The introduction of a new brand into an established 
Dirichlet market can also be modelled to estimate repeat purchase rates for the 
new brand (Ehrenberg & Sharp, 2000). 
2.4.3 Model Selection 
Barwise (1995) presents five characteristics of a good empirical generalisation: 
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(a) Scope.  A good empirical generalisation is known to hold over a wide 
range of different conditions 
(b) Precision.  A good empirical generalisation describes the observed 
phenomena accurately 
(c) Parsimony. 
(d) Usefulness.  A good empirical generalisation is one that practitioners 
find useful. 
(e) Link with theory. 
 
On all five characteristics the Dirichlet scores well over any of the other models 
assessed in this literature survey.  It has been validated in over fifty discrete 
marketing situations, including several in an organisational setting.  It describes 
the observed patterns of purchasing, including Double Jeopardy, accurately.  It 
does this with a relatively small number of parameters (n+2, where n is the 
number of brands under study).  The input parameters are the penetration and 
average purchase frequency for the product category and for one or more of the 
brands in the category.   
 
The model has found wide application as a baseline for assessing market 
dynamics and brand performance (Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  Finally, it is well 
supported by the theory of stochastic preference.  The assumptions underpinning 
the model have been challenged extensively, yet they continue to be used as 
“good first approximations” (Shoemaker et al, 1977).  As Uncles et al. (1995) 
note “the Dirichlet model may be the best-known example of an empirical 
generalisation in marketing”. 
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2.4.3.1 Extension of B2C to B2B 
Although the Dirichlet has been extended to industrial purchasing cases in a few 
examples, most of the work has been carried out in consumer markets.  It is 
reasonable to question to what extent the B2C findings are compatible with a 
B2B context and to what extent a replication study in B2B can be considered a 
differentiated replication of a model of consumer buying behaviour.   
 
Several authors have argued that the distinctions between B2C and B2C 
are becoming blurred or are unjustified (Fern & Brown, 1984; Wilson, 
2000; Wind, 2006).  Consumer purchases may involve several influencers 
in a protracted decision process (for example family decisions), may be 
subject to derived demand (for example gift purchases), may involve 
knowledgeable and experienced purchasers and are moderated by cultural 
and societal norms (Fern & Brown, 1984). 
 
However, while there may be some observed blurring of the boundary for 
particular buying situations or buyers, most marketing textbooks continue to 
draw a distinction between B2C and B2B.  For example, (Kotler, 1991) has a 
chapter focused on “the industrial market” that identifies several characteristics 
setting organisational markets apart from consumer markets.  These include a 
smaller number of larger buyers, the existence of closer supplier-customer 
relationships, geographically concentrated buyers, derived demand (i.e. 
industrial purchasers buy to satisfy the demand of their own customers), 
inelastic demand, fluctuating demand (especially for capital equipment 
purchases) and professional purchasing organisations with more influencers 
involved in the buying process. 
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 “Organisational buying is an example of multi-phased, multi-person, multi-
departmental, and multi-objective processes.  It is composed of individual, 
departmental and company-level interactions.” 
(Moller, 1985) 
 
Notwithstanding these characteristics, many organisational purchases are 
frequently purchased straight rebuys, routine and proceduralised 
(Robinson et al, 1967; Wilson, 2000).  Purchasing of these “fast moving 
industrial goods” is similar to the purchasing of fast moving consumer 
goods (Easton, 1980) and indeed the previous applications of the Dirichlet 
to B2B, in aviation fuel, foreign exchange services and ready mixed 
concrete, are examples of such routine purchases.   
 
The long term buyer-supplier relationships that form the basis of the IMP 
view of B2B may seem to conflict with the “as if random” purchasing 
behaviour that underpins stochastic modelling.  This may be true when 
companies have exclusive relationships but for many frequently purchased 
goods, companies will maintain relationships with two or more suppliers 
(Kraljic, 1983).  In such circumstances, particularly when the purchases 
are routinised and purchasing behaviour becomes habitual, buyer 
behaviour can be described in terms of split loyalty purchasing within a 
repertoire of supplier relationships in an “as if random” manner. 
 
The extension of the NBD-Dirichlet to organisational purchasing, 
particularly for frequently or routinely purchased categories, is a logical 
and proven extension of a B2C model into a B2B context.  Although there 
may be similarities between purchasing of fast moving industrial goods 
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and fast moving consumer goods, the specific differences between 
organisational and consumer markets set out above remain.  These 
differences: fewer and larger buyers; derived demand; professional 
purchasers, mean that the extension of the NBD-Dirichlet to B2B can be 
considered a differentiated replication  and an attempt to identify a 
proposition that is generalisable across industrial and consumer marketing 
(Fern & Brown, 1984).   
2.4.3.2 Complementarity with other research traditions 
The previous discussion has shown the limitations of the intra-organisational 
tradition in explaining and predicting buyer behaviour in terms of attitudinal and 
supplier-controlled (marketing mix) variables.  The models derived are difficult 
to operationalise and lack generalisability and predictive power.  The inter-
organisational tradition provides a richer view of the reality of much 
organisational purchasing by acknowledging and focusing on network 
relationships.  However, the approach lacks a quantitative dimension to describe 
and predict patterns of loyalty and defection in networks of relationships. 
 
The NBD-Dirichlet model has been identified as a well established, robust and 
parsimonious model to describe and predict organisational repeat purchasing 
behaviour.  The Dirichlet norms provide a baseline against which deviations can 
be investigated using either the econometric or the relationship-based techniques 
described previously.  In this way the stochastic modelling approach using the 
Dirichlet is complementary to the other research traditions.  This builds on the 
work of Gadde and Mattsson (1987) who propose longitudinal analyses similar 
to the repeat buying analyses carried out on consumer panel data in order to 
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describe stability and change in network relationships – “to study the proportion 
of newly established, continuing and disrupted relationships”.  Despite calls for 
an integrative approach and greater direction to the study of industrial buying 
behaviour (Anderson & Chambers, 1985; Johnston & Spekman, 1982; Moller, 
1985), research into organisational purchasing behaviour remains highly 
fragmented.   
 
The value of steady state models as a baseline for comparison for dynamic 
market conditions is widely recognised (Jeuland et al, 1980).  These 
comparisons are important when the baseline norms are known to be reliable 
and when deviations are systematic (Bhattacharya, 1997).  Other techniques can 
then be used to explain the discrepancies outside the Dirichlet rather than 
making a widely generalisable and parsimonious model more complex 
(Morrison & Schmittlein, 1988; Bhattacharya, 1997).  As Jeuland et al. (1980) 
note “there are too many instances in which more complex models do not 
outperform simpler ones”. 
 
2.5 Summary 
The review of the extant collaborative procurement literature has revealed a lack 
of research that describes the actual purchasing behaviour of organisations that 
are members of purchasing groups.  When so much of the savings potential that 
can be derived from group purchasing relies on changing purchasing behaviours, 
in particular influencing members to change their distribution of purchases 
between particular suppliers, this lack of understanding of how member 
organisations actually purchase is a significant gap in the literature. 
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Changing purchasing behaviour will require overcoming the loyalty that 
particular purchasers will exhibit towards particular suppliers.  The literature 
review has examined different concepts of loyalty, including long term buyer-
supplier relationships and quantitative modelling approaches that seek to explain 
buyer loyalty (or inertia) in terms of product, supplier, buyer, environmental or 
relationship attributes.  However when considering how buying behaviours in 
collaborative procurement organisations will change as a result of collaborative 
purchasing efforts, it is clear that loyalty will be dynamic and that changes in 
behavioural loyalty (i.e. what is actually bought) may be mandated and therefore 
may not reflect underlying attitudinal preferences.  Attitudinal loyalty may catch 
up with the behaviours after the buyers have gained familiarity with the supplier.  
It is important to consider what is actually bought when considering changes in 
purchasing, and in particular repurchasing behaviour. 
 
This focus on describing and modelling actual purchase behaviour leads to the 
selection of the NBD-Dirichlet empirical generalisation as the model to be used 
in the research.  It has been replicated in over fifty distinct purchasing situations 
and provides accurate predictions of buyer behaviour with a small set of inputs, 
readily available to purchasing managers.  This study will involve an extension 
into a complex collaborative public procurement environment, a substantial 
contribution to the Dirichlet literature.  In addition, the Dirichlet is used by 
consumer marketers to benchmark brand performance; applying the model in a 
purchasing context is a novel approach and a major contribution to the theory 
and practice of purchasing and supply chain management. 
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The following chapter sets out the epistemological assumptions underpinning 
the research and the research methodology to be followed, including the data 
collection and analysis, the parameterisation of the NBD-Dirichlet model and 
the interpretation of the results.  
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3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has highlighted the importance of describing the “what”, 
“when” and “how much” of organisational purchasing behaviour before 
attempting the “why” (Cunningham, 1956).  This approach has informed 
research into the macro-structures of collaborative purchasing organisations but 
there has been no accompanying research into the behaviours of the 
collaborating organisations – how the members of the group actually buy and 
how these patterns are transformed by being part of the purchasing group. 
 
This focus on describing and modelling actual purchase behaviour leads to the 
selection of the NBD-Dirichlet empirical generalisation as the model to be used 
in the research.  The previous chapter has discussed why this model is a good 
choice for the study of behaviours in purchasing consortia; this chapter presents 
the epistemological assumptions that underpin the research, in particular the role 
played by replication within the Empirical then Theoretical (EtT) approach 
advocated by Ehrenberg (1994).  The research is located within the Lakatosian 
concept of sophisticated methodological falsification within a research 
programme (Leong, 1985). 
 
The research methodology is also presented, including data collection, 
operationalisation of the model and testing the model.  Data is collected from a 
Collaborative Procurement Hub (CPH) within the English National Health 
Service (NHS).  As has been noted, the extension of the model into a 
collaborative public procurement environment is a differentiated replication, an 
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extension into a very different set of conditions from those usually encountered 
in Dirichlet applications (Lindsay & Ehrenberg, 1993).  This replication extends 
the generalisability of the model and its practical applicability, in this case into a 
new discipline as well as a new market.  The longitudinal nature of the study, 
covering a period during which the market undergoes dynamic change, means 
that the suitability of the model to describe and predict market changes as well 
as to monitor the impact of collaborative purchasing interventions is also 
investigated.  Worked examples using data from a pilot study are used to 
demonstrate the calculation methods.   
3.2 Empirical then Theoretical 
The research is a differentiated replication of the NBD-Dirichlet model of buyer 
behaviour in order to test its generalisability by confirmation and extension 
(Frohlich & Dixon, 2006).  Replication, and in particular differentiated 
replication, is an essential component of the Empirical then Theoretical (EtT) 
approach advocated by Ehrenberg (1994).  Under this approach observed 
regularities in data prompt the establishment of empirically grounded theory.  
This theory is tested more widely under different conditions to extend the 
generalisability of the theory, develop it conceptually and establish boundary 
conditions for its application.  Data and theory are interdependent, combining in 
a creative process to produce new understanding and knowledge.  The cycle of 
replication under different circumstances and conceptual theory development 
results in an empirical generalisation, defined by Bass (1995) as: 
“a pattern or regularity that repeats over different circumstances and that can 
be described simply by mathematical, graphic or symbolic methods”. 
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The EtT approach is contrasted with the Theory in Isolation (TiI) approach 
(Ehrenberg, 1994).  TiI emphasises theory first, starting with the construction of 
a theoretical concept before testing the new theory on a set of data.  The primary 
difference between these approaches is in the role of replication and the 
importance attached to wide-ranging empirical support for the developed theory. 
 
In EtT the criterion for testing a theory is embedded in its generalisability – how 
well does the model hold for different sets of data, different purchasing 
situations, different products (Ehrenberg, 1995).  The relationship is judged to 
hold if there is no systematic bias and if the magnitudes of any deviations 
between observed and predicted data are in line with previous studies 
(Ehrenberg & Bound, 1993).  By contrast, the generally accepted “best-fit” type 
models of statistical significance are tests of singularity – how well does this 
model fit this particular set of data.  
3.3 Epistemological Location of the Research  
For the past half century the philosophy of marketing science has been 
dominated by the debate between schools of thought that can loosely be labelled 
positivist and anti-positivist.  Positivist ontology assumes an external reality, the 
true nature of which is only discovered by rigorous scientific method and 
empirical testing.  Anti-positivism assumes that science is subjective and 
abandons the notion of a knowable truth in favour of creating what we come to 
know as “reality” within the context of the research environment.  Peter and 
Olson (1983) describe these contrasting traditions as Logical 
Positivism/Empiricism and Relativism/Constructivism.  Similarly “Scientific 
Realism” (Hunt, 1983) is contrasted with “Critical Relativism” (Anderson, 
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1986) yet each author bases his attack on a caricature of the other’s position: the 
nihilism of “truthlessness” in relativism versus the singular scientific method of 
positivism.  This retreat into opposing corners does nothing to uncover common 
ground between the traditions and it has been left to other writers to attempt to 
steer a course between these traditions, rejecting the extremes of both.  Leong 
(1985) proposes the Lakatosian concept of sophisticated methodological 
falsification within a research programme (Lakatos, 1978) as a synthesis of 
positivism and relativism.  Previous research has presented replication and the 
establishment of empirical generalisations in Ehrenberg’s EtT approach as a 
Lakatosian research programme (Stern, 1994).  The following sections discuss 
the strengths of the Lakatosian epistemology with particular regard to the 
accommodation of a plurality of method, progressiveness of scientific discovery 
and empirical testing. 
3.3.1 EtT as a Research Programme 
The Lakatosian research programme is similar to a Kuhnian paradigm (Kuhn, 
1970) in that it sets the context and environment that govern the rules of 
research but differs in the extent to which it accepts multiple theories within the 
programme.  The research programme is based around a hard core of givens 
accepted by the research community – fundamental assumptions and theories.  
Within the research programme, theories can be disproved but not proved and 
the refutation of a single theory is not sufficient for rejection of the entire 
programme.   
 
Sophisticated methodological falsification holds that empirical testing alone is 
necessary but not sufficient for the refutation of a theory.  Falsification can only 
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occur with the emergence of better theories.  Research within the research 
programme thus proceeds according to a “positive heuristic”, a set of guiding 
research questions and theoretical forms.  The Lakatosian perspective recognises 
that science is a creative process, occurring within the context of a research 
programme established by the norms, beliefs and values of the scientific 
community.  It demands consistency within the guiding principles of the 
research programme as a means of preserving scientific rationality although it 
makes no claim for the objectivity or “truth” of science.   
 
The EtT approach (Ehrenberg, 1994) accepts this creative nature of the scientific 
process, where data and theory are interdependent.  Observed regularities in data 
prompt the establishment of empirically grounded theory.  Replications under 
different conditions extend the scope of the theory and develop it conceptually 
by establishing conditions under which the theory does not hold (Lindsay & 
Ehrenberg, 1993).  The cycle of replication and conceptual theory confirmation 
and development creates the “guiding questions” that shape a positive heuristic 
in a research programme.  The theory is judged not by how well it fits a single 
instance but by how generalisable it is over a range of different circumstances 
(Ehrenberg, 1995).  The essence of replication is to find “significant sameness” 
across many sets of data, preferably covering a wide range of conditions 
(Barwise, 1995).  
3.3.2 Plurality of Method – A Rich Picture 
Multiple methodologies are present within current purchase and supply chain 
and marketing research.  In the field of research into buyer behaviour these may 
include stochastic modelling of patterns of purchase behaviour in the aggregate 
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population of buyers, archival studies of the interactions between participants in 
long term dyadic or network relationships, ethno-methodological studies of 
decision making processes within organisations, quantitative or qualitative 
studies of individual buyer motivations, influences and experiences during the 
process of exchange with suppliers or collaboration with other buyers.  Each of 
these methodologies will provide a distinctive representation of the reality of a 
given exchange process / purchase decision.  Accepting the validity of these 
representations within the context of the research programme allows cross-
fertilisation of ideas with observations from one methodology leading to 
hypotheses or insights in another.  Rivalry between competing theories avoids 
“conceptual myopia” (Leong, 1985) - overdependence on particular 
methodologies.   
 
However, the very plurality that is the strength of the Lakatosian synthesis may 
also be its weakness.  In accommodating a variety of methodologies within a 
research programme the concept may be accused of trying to “have its cake and 
eat it”.  One criticism levelled at sophisticated methodological falsification is 
lack of focus.  Kuhn (1970) expounded the benefits of theoretical monopoly – a 
single dominant paradigm in a discipline.  By accommodating a variety of 
methodologies, the Lakatosian concept permits researchers to shift allegiances 
from one research programme and one theory to another.  However as Leong 
points out (Leong, 1985), transitions between research programmes are not 
trivial.  In addition the sophisticated methodological falsification framework 
allows for researchers to focus on a theory in the face of adverse evidence for 
longer than either naïve falsification or a dominant paradigm would permit.  A 
plurality of method allows the appropriate research tool to be chosen for a 
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particular research question without becoming overly dependent on a particular 
method.  
 
A number of further issues may arise from the existence of multiple 
methodologies.  The distinct positions may be incommensurable, resulting in 
difficulties in realising the cross fertilisation that has been identified as a benefit 
of the approach.  Differences in explanatory variables and differences in the 
“meaning” of terms may result in researchers talking past each other (Anderson, 
1986) without finding any common ground.  However Anderson’s notion of a 
research programme bears more similarity to the monolithic single research 
perspective paradigm of Kuhn than Lakatos’ research programme with its 
multiple theoretical foundations.  In the Kuhnian paradigm incommensurability 
will eventually result in crisis and revolution or assimilation into the dominant 
paradigm.  In the Lakatosian concept the heuristic power of the research 
programme provides a unifying mechanism and sound criteria as a means of 
evaluating concepts without threatening refutation.  Taken to extremes, the 
plurality of methodologies implies Feyerabendian methodological anarchy.  
However we have already seen that the Lakatosian approach does not allow an 
epistemological free-for-all but rather demands that research methods are 
critically evaluated such that any methods adopted can be rationally defended as 
likely to achieve the research objectives.  Indeed, the existence of alternative 
methodologies within the research paradigm opens the opportunity for 
triangulation on the basis that one method’s weakness is complemented by the 
strengths of another (Leong, 1985). 
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3.3.3 Progression of Scientific Discovery 
Within the sophisticated methodological falsification framework, theories are 
not rejected in the face of adverse evidence alone but only when a better theory 
is available.  Lakatos claims that the heuristic power of the framework ensures 
the progression of science, avoiding “a mere patched up pattern of trial and 
error” that results in minor modifications to theories in the light of empirical 
anomalies (Lakatos, 2003).  However it has also been noted that in an 
environment of falsification, competition and rivalry between theories becomes 
destructive (Easton, 1995a) and it may become difficult to measure scientific 
progress.  Sophisticated methodological falsification does provide a framework 
for evaluation of competing theories and research programmes in terms of the 
progressivity they offer.  “Good” science is identified by consistency of 
approach, empirical testing and what Easton refers to as “social acceptability” – 
acceptance by the scientific community within the research programme. Indeed 
Easton acknowledges the difference between sophisticated methodological 
falsification and the red in tooth and claw variety of naïve falsification, referring 
to the former as “falsification with a social face” (Easton, 1995a). 
3.3.4 Empirical Testing 
One of the main arguments against the primacy of hypothesis testing in the 
search for objective truth, particularly in the open systems frequently 
encountered in marketing and purchasing, is the difficulty in isolating dependent 
and independent variables i.e. ensuring that the initial assumptions and auxiliary 
assumptions underpinning a hypothesis are indeed subject to the constraint “all 
other things being equal” (Anderson, 1986).  In fact this very point is made by 
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Lakatos who notes that there is no such thing as a “pure” observation (Leong, 
1985).  Within sophisticated methodological falsification there is recognition 
that science can never achieve absolute truth but only increasing verisimilitude 
within the context of the research programme and its guiding heuristic of 
“relevant technique”.  Empirical testing is a necessary but not sufficient reason 
for refutation and falsification cannot occur without the emergence of a better 
theory.  The importance of replication studies within EtT overcomes some of the 
problems associated with “pure” observations by testing the theory on different 
samples, using different data collection methods in different industries, times 
and locations and by involving different observers to reduce single observer bias 
(Wright & Kearns, 1998). 
 
The sophisticated methodological falsification approach has been shown to 
provide a synthesis of positivism and relativism and a framework for marketing 
research that recognises and accommodates the plurality of method in common 
use in the current study of marketing and buyer behaviour in particular.  In a 
field of research as complex and broad as marketing and purchasing it seems 
reasonable to assume that dogmatic adherence to a single research method will 
not be sufficient to uncover all elements of what Hunt has described as “the 
behavioural science that seeks to explain exchange relationships” (Hunt, 1983).  
In the context of a research programme with positive heuristic power, rival 
theories can co-exist, inform and complement each other.  The researcher is free 
to choose those methods that will be most effective in uncovering new findings, 
provided that the chosen methods can be defended within the normative 
guidelines of the research programme, will lead to the discovery of novel 
findings and will be accepted within the scientific community.   
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3.4 Research Study Design 
The current research aims to investigate the behaviour of purchasers in a 
collaborative procurement environment, in particular to seek to identify whether 
the behaviours follow any regular pattern, if the observed patterns can be 
described and predicted using a robust model of buyer behaviour, the NBD-
Dirichlet, and whether such modelling can be used to inform management 
decision making in a collaborative purchasing context. 
 
The research is a differentiated replication of the NBD-Dirichlet model of buyer 
behaviour into conditions quite different to those encountered in other Dirichlet 
studies.  In this case the purchasing situation is procurement of surgical supplies 
in a public sector collaborative procurement organisation.  Frohlich and Dixon 
(2006) observed that the contribution of a replication depends on the outcomes 
with an important contribution resulting from refutation or extension of the 
original study.  They categorise replications based on whether the data used is 
similar or different and whether the methods used are similar or different.  A 
similar distinction is drawn by Lindsay and Ehrenberg (1993) when they discuss 
“close” replications (similar data and methods) and “differentiated” replications 
(different data and/or different methods). 
 
The following sections of this chapter set out the design of the replication study, 
including the sampling frame (panel size and structure), required data and data 
sources, data handling and analysis and parameterisation of the Dirichlet model.  
The method used to determine the Dirichlet parameters follows the method set 
out in Ehrenberg (1988) and Goodhardt et al (1984) and coded in the BUYER 
software package (Uncles, 1989).  The Dirichlet parameters are calculated 
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manually from purchase occasion data and compared to the BUYER outputs to 
validate the software performance.  Purchase patterns and performance measures 
are predicted using the model and these are then compared to observed measures 
from the base period and a holdout sample to determine the extent to which the 
model holds.  The method is illustrated by use of worked examples using data 
acquired from a single NHS Trust in a pilot study. 
 
The pilot study is conducted in a single hospital trust to identify suitable product 
categories, to determine the availability of useable information and to test the 
operationalisation of the model using the data for the selected categories.  When 
suitable categories are identified, data related to the selected categories is 
collected from the collaborative procurement hub in order to perform the 
longitudinal analysis.  The pilot study is reported in Chapter 5 and the 
longitudinal analysis of collaborative hub data is reported in Chapters 6 and 7. 
3.4.1 Data Sources 
Dirichlet analyses are typically carried out on data collected from established 
consumer panels.  Panel data is effectively a purchase history for a particular 
purchaser and product i.e. the number of occasions that an individual panel 
member purchased the product from a particular supplier in a specific time 
period.  In an organisational context, such panel data is not generally available 
and historic purchase data must be collected from secondary sources (company 
records) or primary sources (direct from individual purchasers).  Collaborative 
procurement organisations act as aggregators of data as well as purchase 
volumes and their purchase order records are a suitable substitute for panel data. 
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For this research the National Health Service (NHS) has provided limited access 
to purchasing data from one hospital trust and one Collaborative Procurement 
Hub (CPH).  The complexity of the procurement function in the NHS, including 
the relationships between the CPH and individual hospitals, the influence of 
clinicians and the constraints of public-sector procurement make this a highly 
differentiated replication and a new application of the NBD-Dirichlet in the 
purchasing discipline.   The NHS Purchasing & Supply Agency (PASA) has a 
research function and has been very supportive in the current research.  A 
detailed description of procurement in the NHS is given in the next chapter. 
3.4.1.1 Pilot Study 
Expenditure in the NHS covers a wide variety of product categories.  To identify 
categories of interest for the research and to determine the availability and form 
of the data available, a pilot study was carried out in a single hospital trust.  A 
suitable category should be easily identifiable in the data, either from category 
coding or a clear product description and there should be sufficient purchasing 
activity and variety in terms of suppliers and requisitioners to make the analysis 
meaningful.  In order to research the dynamic behaviours before and after an 
intervention, there should also have been some active purchasing management 
intervention in the category. 
 
The pilot data collected was a complete download of all the requisitions raised 
by a single NHS hospital trust during the month of May 2008.  This included the 
following data items: 
PO_No The Purchase Order number is the unique identifier for 
the purchase occasion.  Where a purchase order includes 
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several line items, these are aggregated and treated as a 
single purchase occasion. 
Supplier The Supplier named in the Purchase Order is the supplier 
chosen for that particular purchase occasion. 
Order Date The Order Date is the date on which the Purchase Order 
was raised.  This is used to determine the chronological 
sequence of purchases in order to identify repeat 
purchasing behaviour. 
Description The Description is usually a free text field where the 
requisitioner describes the goods or services to be 
purchased.  This is important when screening the data as 
item codes may be missing or incorrect and the 
description can then be used to validate the coded data. 
Charge Account The Charge Account is the cost centre or department that 
is making the purchase.  The cost centre is often the 
lowest organisational resolution in the analysis and is 
usually used as the Purchaser in the analysis. 
Category The Category is the coding used for the purchase category 
and is used to isolate specific category codes for analysis.  
Items may be miscoded and codes are checked against 
item descriptions to ensure consistency. 
Req_Preparer The Requisition Preparer is the individual who raised the 
actual requisition. 
The data set covered 1921 individual purchase orders with 4692 line items.  
There were 136 requisitioners, 552 suppliers and 284 distinct purchase 
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categories.  The number of suppliers in each category ranged from 1 to 40 and 
the number of orders placed in each category ranged from 1 to 119.  Categories 
with more than 20 purchases in the month are tabulated in Table 3.1 to assist 
identification of a suitable category. 
 
A single purchase category, F.FX.FXC, coronary stents, was chosen for 
analysis.  This was chosen because it provided a sample frame with a reasonable 
number of requisitioners (14), suppliers (7) and purchase orders (77) in the time 
period.  In addition, the category was well defined, in contrast to other 
categories where the line item descriptions covered a wide range of items with 
some items appearing in more than one category.  The relatively high purchase 
frequency (77 purchase orders in one month) allows the model to be 
parameterised and tested even though the time period of analysis is short.  
During the pilot study, discussions with representatives from NHS PASA, CPHs 
and the trust that provided the pilot data also identified coronary stents as a 
significant expenditure for the NHS and the subject of much purchasing 
attention in recent years. 
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Table 3.1 Purchaser orders by category (single hospital trust) 
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3.4.2 Sample Frame 
The analysis described in the following sections follows the method set out by 
Ehrenberg (1988).  The unit of analysis for the research is the purchase occasion.  
The data required for the research is a continuous longitudinal record of 
purchase occasions for a specific product category, detailing when the purchase 
was made, who made the purchase and what supplier was chosen. 
 
Two considerations are important in determining the sample frame. 
(i) The period of time over which the analysis is made. 
This is determined by the typical length of time between purchases.  
For example if the average inter-purchase time is three months, the 
sample should extend over several three month periods to permit 
analysis of repeat purchase behaviour.  The data should be collected 
over a period of time long enough to use part of the data to fit the 
model and the remainder as a hold out sample for testing the fit of the 
predictions. 
(ii) The number of purchasers in the sample. 
The population being studied is limited to those who purchase the 
specific product category, rather than all potential purchasers in the 
organisation.  Analysis of continuous purchase records allows the 
whole population of category purchasers to be analysed. 
 
The population of purchasers is an important measure that is indirectly used to 
parameterise the Negative Binomial Distribution through the proportion of the 
population that do not purchase from a specific supplier (see Section 3.4.3).  
This is also influenced by the period of time over which the analysis is made.  
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Using purchase order data rather than panel data means that over the entire 
period of the continuous data collection, all of the population will have made at 
least one purchase.  While this means that the sample is actually a census of the 
whole population of buyers, the proportion of non-buyers will be zero.   
 
The entire purchasing population will include a number of “never buyers” or 
“hard core non-buyers” who will never raise a requisition for a coronary stent 
because they do not work in the relevant departments.  To parameterise the 
model and avoid the misleading results that may arise from too high a proportion 
of “never buyers” (Morrison, 1969; Dunn et al, 1983), a relevant purchasing 
population is assumed to be between the entire population of requisitioners and 
those who buy coronary stents during the period of analysis.  
 
Several assumptions underpin the Dirichlet model.  In addition to the formal 
distributional assumptions outlined in Chapter 2, it is assumed that the market is 
stable and non-partitioned.  A check should be made that the Dirichlet 
assumptions hold for the particular sample, for example by comparing the 
stability of supplier market shares and average purchase rate over the period of 
analysis.  Too short a sample time may introduce discrepancies if the period of 
analysis is too close to the average interpurchase time (Ehrenberg, 1988); too 
long a sample time may mask the existence of dynamic situations. 
 
The distributional assumptions can also be tested for the sample although in 
practice the number of successive time periods is usually insufficient to fully 
validate the long run purchase probabilities of individual buyers.  For this 
analysis the assumptions underpinning the NBD part of the NBD-Dirichlet 
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model will be tested by examining the fit between calculated and observed 
distribution of purchases (Ehrenberg, 1988) as shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
Buyer Successive Time Periods  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 … 
Long 
Run 
Average 
Distribution 
A x x x x x x  A Poisson 
B x x x x x x  B Poisson 
C x x x x x x  C Poisson 
D x x x x x x  D Poisson 
…         Poisson 
Distribution NBD NBD NBD NBD NBD NBD  Gamma  
Figure 3.1  Distributional assumptions of the NBD-Dirichlet 
 
Table 3.2 presents the tabulated pilot study data.  It shows the characteristic 
NBD form with most buyers making relatively few (or no) purchases per week 
and a few buyers making a larger number of purchases.   
 
The remaining assumptions underpinning the NBD-Dirichlet model, namely that 
supplier choice probabilities can be described by a multivariate beta distribution 
(the Dirichlet), that buyers have their own, fixed supplier choice probabilities 
and that these supplier choice probabilities are independent of purchase 
frequency, are also difficult to validate in isolation.  The independence of 
supplier choice probabilities and purchase frequency can be tested by examining 
supplier market shares for light, medium and heavy category buyers – if the 
assumption holds, these should be the same irrespective of being a light or heavy 
purchaser.  The other assumptions are tested by examining the fit between 
calculated and observed distribution of purchases. 
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The remainder of this chapter uses the pilot data to demonstrate the mechanics 
of the calculations required to operationalise, test and apply the NBD-Dirichlet 
model.  The complete pilot data analysis is presented in Chapter 5.   
Table 3.2 Weekly purchases by buyer 
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3.4.3 Data Analysis 
The data required to fit the model for a chosen product category in a specific 
time period are as follows: 
(i) The proportion of the population buying the category at all (B) 
(ii) The average number of purchase occasions recorded for those in the 
population who purchase the category at all (W) 
(iii) For each supplier (i), the proportion of the population buying from 
that supplier at all (bi) 
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(iv) For each supplier (i), the average number of purchase occasions 
recorded for those in the population who purchase from that supplier 
at all (wi) 
The minimum purchase record data required for the analysis will include the 
date of each purchase, the product category (if the records cover multiple 
categories), the supplier and the purchaser or requisitioner (may be a department 
although analysis at the individual purchaser level can give additional insights 
into purchasing behaviour).  These data are usually readily available from 
organisational purchasing systems.  The purchase data are for the number of 
purchase occasions, not for volume of product or amount of expenditure. 
 
In practice, raw purchasing data often contains errors and omissions, typically 
unclear or missing category or product descriptions and multiple variations of a 
supplier’s name.  The data must be screened to remove these discrepancies and 
arrive at a common set of category definitions and supplier names.  
 
When the data has been screened the first step in the analysis is to tabulate the 
data to determine the appropriate timescale for analysis.  This will depend on the 
purchase frequency of the product category.  For example, relatively fast moving 
categories may be analysed in periods of 2-4 weeks, durable, infrequently 
purchased capital equipment items may require analysis over several years.  This 
initial tabulation also starts to show up preliminary patterns, for instance light 
and heavy purchasers, duplication of purchase, where a buyer fulfils their 
requirements for the product category with two or more suppliers, and high and 
low market share suppliers. 
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At this stage the Dirichlet assumptions can start to be tested.  By plotting market 
share for each supplier and average purchase frequency in each time period the 
stability assumption can be tested.  If an individual’s purchase patterns (i.e. the 
propensity to purchase and the propensity to choose a particular supplier on that 
purchase occasion) are constant, then the market shares of individual suppliers 
can be assumed to be constant from one period to another. 
 
The other Dirichlet assumption relates to non-partitioning, i.e. there are no 
segments that exhibit a preference for a subset of the suppliers.  Sharp & 
Driesener (2000) have demonstrated that violation of the Dirichlet assumption 
on non-partitioning does lead to deviation between the predicted and observed 
performance measures.  Again, a review of the tabulated data can identify niche 
suppliers (lower than expected penetration, higher than expected purchase 
frequency) that are used relatively heavily by a small proportion of buyers (Kahn 
et al, 1988). 
3.4.4 Fitting the Model 
For a given product category, the model is parameterised using two input 
measures for each supplier in the category and for the category as a whole.  If 
the model was an exact fit, any single supplier could be used to determine the 
parameters.  However, in practice this is rarely the case and each of the leading 
suppliers are used to determine the model parameters in turn.  The parameters 
are then combined as a weighted average, using the supplier market share as the 
basis for weighting. 
 
For the chosen analysis period (week, month, quarter, year …), the following 
measures are determined for each supplier: 
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The Penetration (b) is the proportion of the population that buys from the 
supplier at least once in a given time period. 
( )
buyerspotentialofnumberTotal
onceleastatbuyingNumberbnPenetratio =  
 
The Purchase Frequency (w) is the number of occasions on which the average 
buyer of the particular supplier bought from that supplier during a given time 
period. 
 
Table 3.3 shows summary statistics for an average two-week period.  It can be 
seen that the average requisition frequency is quite similar across all the 
suppliers although the market shares differ.  The exception is the “Others” 
composite supplier where the combination of low market share and low 
purchase frequency is the frequently observed “Double Jeopardy” pattern where 
small suppliers not only have fewer purchasers but these purchasers also 
purchase less frequently.   
Table 3.3 Summary statistics (average two weekly) 
Supplier Number of Requisitions
Number of 
Requisitioners
Requisition 
Frequency Penetration Market Share
MEDTRONIC 12.0 6.5 1.8 16.3% 34.3%
BOSTON 11.5 6.0 1.9 15.0% 32.9%
ABBOTT 8.0 4.5 1.8 11.3% 22.9%
OTHER 3.5 2.5 1.4 6.3% 10.0%
ANY 35.0 10.5 3.3 26.3% 100.0%
 
 
In this case the relevant population is assumed to be 40.  ANY is the combined 
data for the sub-category, regardless of supplier.  The number of requisitioners 
for ANY supplier is 10.5, compared to the simple sum of buyers of all products 
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which is 19.5.  This shows that several requisitioners split their purchases 
between more than one supplier in the time period. 
 
The method of fitting the model follows the procedures in Goodhardt et al. 
(1984) and Ehrenberg (1988). 
 
(i) Fitting the NBD 
The NBD is derived from expanding the binomial expression k
km
m
−
+
− )1(  to 
determine the probability pr of observing r purchases where r is a non-negative 
integer (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, …).  The probability pr is given by the following expression 
r
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where m is the average number of purchases per individual for the whole 
population and k is the exponent of the NBD. 
 
m is readily determined from the sample data, either directly or from the product 
of the penetration and the purchase frequency ( wbm ×= ). 
 
To determine k, Ehrenberg (1988) proposes a method utilising the number of 
non-buyers.  The observed proportion of non-buyers p0 is equated to its expected 
value. 
 
From expression [1] and setting r = 0, the expected value for p0 becomes 
k
k
mp −+= )1(0  
88 
The observed proportion of non-buyers can be determined from the sample, 
equated to the expected value and the resulting equation solved for k.  This 
equation cannot be solved directly and requires an iterative solution. 
 
Table 3.4 presents the parameters for the pilot data set, calculated using the 
method described above and using average two-weekly data. 
Table 3.4 Calculated NBD parameters 
Supplier Average Number of Purchases (w) Penetration (b) p0 = 1-b m = b.w k
MEDTRONIC 1.8 16.3% 83.8% 0.30 0.182
BOSTON 1.9 15.0% 85.0% 0.29 0.155
ABBOTT 1.8 11.3% 88.8% 0.20 0.125
OTHER 1.4 6.3% 93.8% 0.09 0.111
ANY 3.3 26.3% 73.8% 0.88 0.166
 
 
(ii) Fitting the Dirichlet 
The Dirichlet distribution assumed to describe the heterogeneity in supplier 
choice probabilities is a multivariate Beta distribution given by the joint density 
function (Goodhardt et al, 1984). 
11
...
−− gj
gj pCp
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pj is the probability that an individual chooses supplier j from j = 1, … , g 
suppliers and j is the Beta distribution parameter for supplier j. 
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The Dirichlet S parameter is the sum of the alphas over all the individuals and 
suppliers. 
 
Ehrenberg (1988) sets out a procedure to estimate the Dirichlet parameter S.  
Using Equation 1 above, the m and k parameters determined for the ANY 
“supplier” in the previous section are used to generate a theoretical Negative 
Binomial Distribution (NBD) such that the probabilities of an individual making 
0, 1, 2, 3, … purchases of the whole product category in the time period can be 
calculated.   
 
The NBD is an infinite series so the calculation must be truncated and the tail of 
the NBD approximated.  This tail consists of very heavy buyers and is hence 
numerically important.  The truncation procedure detailed in Goodhardt et al 
(1984) approximates the tail by assuming that the sum of the tail probabilities 
can be divided over two values n’ and n’+1.  Purchase proportions (pn’ and pn’+1) 
and number of purchases (n’pn’ and (n’+1)pn’+1) can be calculated.  n’ is 
determined by setting the sum of the number of purchases at n’ and n’+1 equal 
to the residual tail i.e. the total purchases accounted for by those buying more 
times than the number of purchases at which the distribution was truncated. 
 
If the NBD is truncated at n*, then  
R
n
nnn Pppp =−=+ +
*
0
1'' 1    [2] 
R
n
nnn QnpMpnpn =−=++ +
*
1
1'' )1'('  [3] 
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where M is the mean number of category purchases per member of the 
population (i.e. m for the ANY “supplier”).  These equations are used to 
determine n’ and n’+1. 
 
This is demonstrated in the following worked example, using the pilot data.  
First the NBD proportions of the population buying the product category n times 
are calculated using Equation 1.  The calculation must be truncated at some 
point and in the example shown, this is when the residual cumulative probability 
is greater than 0.9975 i.e. when n* is 18. 
 
Using Equation 2, 
R
n
nnn Pppp =−=+ +
*
0
1'' 1  = 1 – 0.9978 = 0.0022 
And Equation 3, 
R
n
nnn QnpMpnpn =−=++ +
*
1
1'' )1'('  = 0.8749 – 0.8233 = 0.0516 
where M is the value for m for the ANY “supplier” (Table 3.4). 
 
PR is multiplied by n’ and subtracted from QR to give 
RRn PnQp '1' −=+ , 
which can be divided by PR to give, 
'
1' n
P
Q
P
p
R
R
R
n
−=
+
 
n’ is the integral part of 
R
R
P
Q
 and thus 
pn’+1 = PR * (non-integral part of 
R
R
P
Q ) 
Using the pilot data, 
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4545.23
0022.0
0516.0
==
R
R
P
Q
, so n’ = 23 
pn’+1 =  p24 = 0.0022 * 0.4545 = 0.0010 
pn’ = p23 = PR – pn’+1 = 0.0022 – 0.0010 = 0.0012 
 
This approximation to the tail is shown in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5 Calculated proportion of population buying the category n times 
Proportion 
Buying
Cumulative 
Proportion Purchases
Cumulative 
Purchases
Pn Pn nPn nPn
0 0.7375 0.7375 0.0000 0.0000
1 0.1028 0.8403 0.1028 0.1028
2 0.0504 0.8906 0.1007 0.2035
3 0.0306 0.9212 0.0917 0.2952
4 0.0203 0.9415 0.0813 0.3765
5 0.0142 0.9558 0.0712 0.4478
6 0.0103 0.9661 0.0619 0.5096
7 0.0076 0.9737 0.0535 0.5631
8 0.0058 0.9795 0.0460 0.6091
9 0.0044 0.9839 0.0395 0.6486
10 0.0034 0.9872 0.0338 0.6824
11 0.0026 0.9899 0.0289 0.7112
12 0.0021 0.9919 0.0247 0.7359
13 0.0016 0.9935 0.0210 0.7569
14 0.0013 0.9948 0.0179 0.7748
15 0.0010 0.9958 0.0152 0.7900
16 0.0008 0.9966 0.0129 0.8030
17 0.0006 0.9973 0.0110 0.8140
18 0.0005 0.9978 0.0093 0.8233
23 0.0012 0.9990 0.0276 0.8509
24 0.001 1.0000 0.024 0.8749
n
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The estimation of the Dirichlet parameter is by an iterative procedure, using 
non-buyers of the supplier to fit the model in the same way as for the NBD.  For 
each frequency of buying the product category, non-buyers of the supplier are 
estimated from the product of the probability of making n category purchases 
(pn) and an estimated probability of not buying supplier j, having made n 
purchases (p’(0|n)).  p’(0|n) is estimated using a trial value of S which is denoted S’. 
Ehrenberg (1988) introduces two dummy variables, c’ and d’ to simplify the 
calculations. 
M
SmSc ''' ×−=  
'
'
'
S
cd =  
The initial estimate of p’0 is estimated from the NBD p0 and p1 
)( '10'0 dppp ×+=  
 
Using the pilot data, data for Abbott (Table 3.4), a starting value for S’ = 2 and 
p0 and p1 from Table 3.5. 
5428.1
8749.0
)22.0(2' =×−=c  
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Next p2 is used to generate a new estimate of p’0.  The value of d’ must be 
revised for each n up to n’ and n’+1, the approximations for the NBD tail. 
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Thus, for n = 2 
6538.0))12(2
)12(5428.1(7714.0' =
−+
−+
×=newd  
8498.0)6538.00504.0(8168.0'0 =×+=p  
and for n = 3 
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×=newd  
8675.0)5791.00306.0(8498.0'0 =×+=p  
The final estimated value for p’0 is compared to the observed value for non-
buyers of the supplier.  A revised S’’ is estimated and the procedure repeated.  If 
p’0 is less than p0, a larger value for S is used, if smaller then a smaller S is used.  
The iterations continue until the difference between the calculated and observed 
values of p0 is within the desired limits. 
 
The iteration is summarised in Table 3.6 below, using p0 = 0.8875 for Abbott 
(from Table 6).  If p’0 becomes greater than p0 before reaching n’ and n’+1 the 
calculation can be stopped and a new value for S’ chosen.  The value of n 
reached in each stage is shown in Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.6 Summary of iterations to determine S for Abbott 
S' p'0 p'0 - p0 n
2.0 0.8897 0.0022 6
4.0 0.8880 0.0005 8
6.0 0.8880 0.0005 13
8.0 0.8863 -0.0012 24
6.9 0.8875 0.0000 24
 
 
94 
This repeated for the other suppliers and the overall Dirichlet parameter 
calculated from a weighted average of the supplier Sj using the market shares of 
each supplier (mj). 


=
M
m
M
mS
S
j
jj
 
If the model fits well, all the individual supplier Sj values should be similar.  If 
this is not the case, one or more of the outlying supplier Dirichlet parameters 
may be excluded from the estimate of the overall parameter. 
 
The parameters calculated from the pilot data are presented in Table 3.7.  The 
iteration for Medtronic did not converge and no value for Sj was calculated.  It 
can be seen from Table 3.7 that there is a wide variation in the individual Sj 
values, suggesting that the model is far from an exact fit. 
 
Table 3.7 Dirichlet parameters for pilot data 
Supplier Sj mj mj/M Sjmj/M
Medtronic 0.30 0.34
Boston 18.2 0.29 0.33 5.98
Abbott 6.9 0.20 0.23 1.58
Others 15.3 0.09 0.10 1.53
 
 
If Medtronic and Abbott are excluded from the calculation for the overall S 
parameter, the value of S is estimated to be 17.5.   
 
Several computer programmes have been developed to calculate the Dirichlet 
parameters.  These include BUYER (Uncles, 1989) and DIRICHLET (Kearns, 
2009).  A systematic comparison of BUYER and DIRICHLET concluded no 
bias in either software solution, allowing confidence in the selection of either 
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(Kearns & Lewis, 2000).  The BUYER programme permits use of tabulated 
purchase data and is used in the current research.  The outputs of the BUYER 
software have been checked against the manual calculation using the 
methodology described above.  The outputs from the manual calculations and 
the BUYER software are compared in Table 3.8.  The BUYER software forces a 
value for the Medtronic S parameter, resulting in a much higher estimate for the 
overall S.  The other calculated parameters are similar and any differences may 
be attributed to differences in the truncation procedures used.  The BUYER 
software allows the overall S to be manually changed in the event that one or 
more of the individual Sj values appears irregular.  
Table 3.8 Comparison of calculated S parameters for pilot data 
Supplier Manual BUYER
Medtronic 50
Boston 18.2 17.13
Abbott 6.91 6.87
Others 15.3 14.9
Overall 17.5 25.82
 
3.4.5 Using the Model 
Having fitted the NBD-Dirichlet model, it is used to predict a range of brand 
performance measures (Ehrenberg et al, 2004) for the time period of analysis 
and for time periods of different length. 
 
Typical measures include: 
(i) Penetration of purchasers, i.e. the proportion of the population 
buying from that supplier 
(ii) Light and heavy purchasers, i.e. percentage of purchasers buying 
from the supplier once and five times (say) in the time period 
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(iii) Average number of purchases from the supplier per buyer (of that 
supplier) 
(iv) Percentage of buyers of a particular supplier who purchase again 
from that supplier in the next period. 
(v) Average number and distribution of the numbers of purchases of the 
category by buyers of a specific supplier 
(vi) Share of category requirements, i.e. the share of requirements that 
buyers of a particular supplier actually meet from that supplier 
(vii) Percentage of sole buyers, i.e. buyers who meet all their category 
requirements with a single supplier 
(viii) Rate of purchase of sole buyers 
(ix) Duplication of Purchase, i.e. what other suppliers are used by buyers 
of a particular supplier.  For example 25% of buyers from Supplier i 
also purchase from supplier j. 
 
Although all of these measures are determined using the BUYER software, the 
calculations for each of the measures are described below.  These are as 
presented in Ehrenberg (1988). 
 
For each supplier, the matrix of Dirichlet proportions is developed.  A typical 
matrix is shown below in Figure 3.2 detailing the proportions of the population 
purchasing the category n = 0, 1, 2, 3 or more times and the proportion of those 
purchases that are made with a particular supplier.  n*, n’, n’+1 are the numbers 
of category purchases used in the truncation procedure as defined in the previous 
section and r = 0,1,2,3…r’-1, r’, r’+1 for the single supplier. 
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The proportions making 0,1,2,3,… purchases for the product category are 
determined from the category NBD as defined in Section 3.4.4 (Equation 1).  
This is the row P0, P1, P2 … in Table 3.2 below.  The main part of the table is 
the matrix of the proportion of the population making r purchases of a particular 
supplier, given n purchases of the product category. 
 
 n = 0, 1, 2, 3, … purchases of the Product Category  
Numbers 0 1 2 3 … n* n’ n’+1 Total 
Proportions P0 P1 P2 P3 … Pn* Pn’ Pn’+1 1.0 
0 p0|0 p0|1 p0|2 p0|3 … p0|n* p0|n’ p0|n’+1 p0 
1  p1|1 p1|2 p1|3 … p1|n* p1|n’ p1|n’+1 p1 
2   p2|2 p2|3 … p2|n* p2|n’ p2|n’+1 p2 
…     …    … 
…     …    … 
r’-1      pr'-1|n* pr’-1|n’ pr’-1|n’+1 pr’-1 
r'       pr’|n’ pr’|n’+1 pr’ 
 
 
Purchases 
of a single 
supplier 
r'+1        pr’+1|n’+1 pr’+1 
Figure 3.2  Table of Dirichlet proportions 
 
The individual cells in the matrix are calculated using the recurrence formula 
presented by Ehrenberg (1988), 
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using the Dirichlet parameter, S, as calculated in the previous section. 
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Putting the initial value of p0|0 equal to P0, the next value p0|1 can be calculated.  
This value can in turn be used to calculate p0|2 and so on. 
 
The remaining entries are calculated using the recurrence formula, 
nrnr p
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α
 
The starting value p0|1 is obtained from the previous row of the matrix and used 
to calculate p1|1.  p0|2 is used to calculate p1|2 and so on. This is repeated for all r 
and n.  The values to the left of the diagonal are equal to zero (i.e. the probability 
of buying twice from a particular supplier when only one category purchase is 
made). 
 
When the table is complete, the following arithmetic checks should be made. 
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A section of the Dirichlet proportion table for Abbott is presented in Table 3.9 
below. 
3.4.5.1 Calculating the Supplier Performance Measures 
Single supplier measures can be calculated from the NBD part of the model 
(using the parameter k as described in the previous section) or from the 
theoretical frequency distribution as shown in the last column of Table 3.9.  The 
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calculation of multi-supplier measures requires use of the full NBD-Dirichlet 
model. 
Table 3.9 Section of Dirichlet proportions matrix (Abbott) 
Numbers n 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Proportions pn 0.73750 0.10277 0.05036 0.03056 0.02034 0.01425 0.01031 1.000
0 0.73750 0.07927 0.03045 0.01469 0.00787 0.00448 0.00267 0.882
1 0.02349 0.01680 0.01137 0.00763 0.00513 0.00346 0.076
2 0.00311 0.00392 0.00369 0.00311 0.00247 0.024
3 0.00058 0.00102 0.00120 0.00120 0.010
4 0.00013 0.00029 0.00041 0.004
5 0.00003 0.00009 0.002
6 0.00001 0.001
7 0.001
8 0.000
9 0.000
… …
Total 0.73750 0.10277 0.05036 0.03056 0.02034 0.01425 0.01031 1.000
Purchases of 
Abbott
 
3.4.5.1.1 Penetration 
The penetration can be derived from the value of p0 in the theoretical frequency 
distribution for the particular supplier. 
01 pb −=  
In the specified time period, p0 is used to fit the model, but the NBD can be used 
to calculate penetrations in time periods of different length. 
k
T k
Tmb
−






+−= 11  
bT is the penetration in the new time period. 
 
T is the new time period based on the observed time period.  For example, if the 
original data was based on a 4 week period and the penetration in 12 weeks was 
required, T = 3. 
 
Using the pilot data (two week base period) the expected theoretical (T) 
penetration in 1 week (T = 0.5) and  4 weeks (T = 4) can be calculated and 
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compared to the observed (O) data as shown in Table 3.10.  The correlation 
coefficient and the Mean Absolute Deviation between the observed and 
theoretical performance are calculated as summary goodness of fit measures.  
These are discussed further in Section 3.4.6. 
Table 3.10 Penetration growth 
Supplier O T O T
MEDTRONIC 9.4% 10.4% 22.5% 23.3%
BOSTON 10.0% 9.7% 25.0% 21.3%
ABBOTT 7.5% 7.1% 15.0% 16.4%
OTHER 3.8% 3.6% 10.0% 10.0%
Average Supplier 7.7% 7.7% 18.1% 17.8%
Correlation, r 0.98 0.95
Mean Absolute Deviation 0.5% 1.5%
1 week 4 week
 
3.4.5.1.2 Average Number of Purchases  
The average number of purchases can be calculated from the market share and 
penetration for that particular supplier. 
b
m
w =  
Table 3.11 Purchase frequency in different time periods 
Supplier O T O T
MEDTRONIC 1.6 1.4 2.7 2.6
BOSTON 1.4 1.5 2.3 2.7
ABBOTT 1.3 1.4 2.7 2.4
OTHER 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.8
Average Supplier 1.4 1.4 2.3 2.4
Correlation, r 0.82 0.80
Mean Absolute Deviation 0.1 0.2
1 week 4 week
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As the market shares are assumed to be stationary, the average frequency of 
buying in different length time periods can be simply determined from the 
calculated penetrations in different time periods.  The observed and theoretical 
purchase frequencies for 1 week and 4 weeks are shown in Table 3.11. 
3.4.5.1.3 Light and heavy purchasers 
The percentage of purchasers buying from the supplier once, twice and five 
times (say) in the time period can be determined from the theoretical frequency 
distribution for the supplier, either from the Dirichlet matrix (Table 3.9) or 
calculated directly from the NBD parameters m and k (Table 3.4) using Equation 
1 in Section 3.4.4.  Table 3.12 presents the distribution for Abbott.  The 
distribution derived from the NBD differs from the Dirichlet because the 
individual supplier NBD parameters are used rather than the weighted average 
Dirichlet parameter. 
Table 3.12 Light and heavy purchasers 
Observed NBD Dirichlet
0 0.8875 0.8875 0.8816
1 0.0375 0.0682 0.07562
2 0.0625 0.0236 0.0239
3 0.0125 0.0103 0.0097
4 0 0.005 0.0044
5+ 0 0.0055 0.0048
Proportion of population making 0, 1, 2, 3 
… purchasesNumber of 
purchases
 
 
Note that the proportion of the population making no purchases is used in fitting 
the NBD.   
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3.4.5.1.4 Repeat purchasing 
The NBD can be used to determine what proportion of buyers of the product in 
one period do so again in the next period and the purchase frequency of these 
repeat buyers.  When the proportion of repeat buyers is known, the proportion of 
lapsed buyers (i.e. those who buy in Period 1 but not in Period 2) and new 
buyers (those who buy in Period 2 but not in Period 1) can be calculated. 
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where bR is the proportion of population who are repeat buyers in two successive 
equal time periods. 
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where wR is the average purchase frequency per repeat buyer. 
 
The proportion of the population who are new buyers (bN) is given by the 
difference between the proportion of buyers and the proportion of repeat buyers. 
RN bbb −=  
Under stationary conditions the proportion of buyers (b) in Period 1 is the same 
in Period 2.  Hence the proportion of the population who are lapsed buyers (bL) 
is also given by the difference between the proportion of buyers and the 
proportion of repeat buyers and is equal to bN. 
 
The average purchase frequency of new or lapsed buyers (wN, wL) is given by 
the formula, 
103 
1
1
−−






+×=
k
N k
m
mm  
N
N
N b
m
w =  
Table 3.13 Repeat purchasing 
Supplier O T O T O T
MEDTRONIC 57.1% 56.5% 1.8 2.2 1.7 1.3
BOSTON 28.6% 57.7% 2.0 2.3 1.6 1.3
ABBOTT 75.0% 54.2% 1.7 2.2 2.0 1.3
OTHER 50.0% 40.4% 2.0 1.6 1.0 1.2
Average Supplier 52.7% 52.2% 1.9 2.1 1.6 1.3
Correlation, r -0.08 -0.43 0.91
Mean Absolute Deviation 15.0% 0.4 0.4
Incidence of repeat 
buyers
Buying frequency per 
repeat buyer
Buying frequency of 
new buyers
 
 
The instance of repeat buying by light and heavy buyers can also be calculated 
from the NBD.  The proportion of buyers who buy at all in the second period, 
conditional on having made r purchases in the preceding period (pi|r) is given by 
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Note that this is not expressed as a proportion of the total population but as a 
proportion of the number of buyers who made r purchases in Period 1. 
 
The average purchase frequency per repeat buyer, conditional on having made r 
purchases in the preceding period (wi|r) is given by 
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These measures can be calculated for r = 0, 1, 2, ….  Of course for r = 0, this is 
the special case of new buyers. It will also be necessary to calculate the repeat 
buying estimates for buyers who purchased more than r times in the preceding 
period.  This is achieved by calculating the required measures up to r and then 
subtracting from the total number of buyers and the total number of purchases 
predicted in the second period. 
 
The repeat buying proportions (pi|r) are expressed on a “per informant” basis to 
avoid explicitly introducing the sample size.  The proportion of informants not 
buying in the first period is p0 or (1 – b). A proportion of these Period 1 non-
buyers (pi|0) purchase in the second period, such that the percentage of the 
population (i.e. all informants) who buy in the second period, having not bought 
in the first, is given by, 
0|00| ii ppb ×=  
The purchase rate of these new buyers is wi|0, such that the total number of 
purchases per informant made by these buyers is 0|0| ii bw × . 
 
In the same way the proportion of informants buying r times in the first period 
(pr) can be determined from the NBD distribution.  Of this proportion, pi|r, 
purchase in the second period such that the percentage of the population (i.e. all 
informants) who buy in the second period, having bought r times in the first, is 
given by, 
rirri ppb || ×=  
The purchase rate of these new buyers is wi|r, such that the total number of 
purchases per informant made by these buyers is riri bw || × . 
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The residual proportion of buyers who purchase in the second period, having 
purchased more than r times in the first period is given by, 

=
> −=
r
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0
||  
and the residual number of purchases made by these buyers is given by, 
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The preceding expressions assume stationarity such that b and w, the total 
number of buyers (on a per informant basis) and the total number of purchases 
that they make, are the same in the first and second period. 
 
The proportion of repeat buyers who also purchased more than r times in the 
first period can then be expressed as a proportion of the buyers who bought 
more than r times, 
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Expressing the purchase frequency on a per buyer (rather than per informant) 
basis gives the Period 2 purchase frequency for buyers who made more than r 
purchases in the first period. 
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3.4.5.1.5 Share of Category Requirements 
The total category usage made by buyers of a particular supplier (wP) can be 
calculated from the Dirichlet model. 
( ) bpPnpPpPw nonP /))(1'(...)(2)(1 1'|1'2|021|01 ++ −+++−+−=  
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The share of category requirements can then be calculated from w/wP, where w 
is the purchase frequency for the particular supplier. 
Table 3.14 Share of category requirements (2 week) 
O T
MEDTRONIC 39.4% 43.6%
BOSTON 41.7% 42.4%
ABBOTT 28.5% 34.2%
OTHER 87.5% 24.1%
Average Supplier 49.3% 36.1%
Correlation, r -0.77
Mean Absolute Deviation 18.5%
 
3.4.5.1.6 Proportion of sole buyers 
The proportion of the population who only buy from a single supplier (bS) in the 
analysis period is given by, 
)1'(|)1'(2|21|1 ... +++++= nrS pppb  
This can be expressed as a proportion of all buyers of the particular supplier by 
dividing bS by the penetration for the supplier, b. 
 
Table 3.15 Proportion of buyers of a particular supplier who only buy from that 
supplier 
O T
MEDTRONIC 22.6% 28.3%
BOSTON 28.6% 27.5%
ABBOTT 0.0% 22.7%
OTHER 75.0% 17.1%
Average Supplier 31.5% 23.9%
Correlation, r -0.63
Mean Absolute Deviation 21.8%
 
 
The average number of purchases made by sole buyers in the period is, 
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( ) SnrS bpnppw /)1'(...2 )1')(1'(2|21|1 ++++++=  
Table 3.16 Average purchase frequency of sole buyers 
O T
MEDTRONIC 1.3 1.3
BOSTON 0.5 1.2
ABBOTT 0.0 1.2
OTHER 1.2 1.1
Average Supplier 0.7 1.2
Correlation, r 0.06
Mean Absolute Deviation 0.5
 
3.4.5.1.7 Duplication of purchase 
The proportion of the population who buy from two suppliers (X and Y) is 
estimated by calculating their separate and combined penetrations.  Buyers of X 
and Y can either buy X only, Y only or X and Y together.  The proportion 
buying X and Y together is given by, 
)( YXYXXY bbbb +−+=  
b(X+Y) is determined by forming a composite supplier (X+Y), and revising the 
matrix of Dirichlet proportions as described above to give the composite 
penetration.  This data can be presented in a duplication table as shown in Figure 
3.3. 
  Suppliers 
  X Y Z 
X  bX|Y bX|Z 
Y bY|X  bY|Z 
 
Suppliers 
Z bZ|X bZ|Y  
Figure 3.3  Matrix of Duplication proportions 
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Using the pilot data, the two week duplication table is as shown in Table 3.17 
where the values represent the proportion of the overall population who buy 
from a pair of suppliers.  The values on the diagonal are simply the two week 
penetrations for the particular supplier (see Table 3.3). 
Table 3.17 Percentage of overall population buying from a pair of suppliers 
Who also purchase from:
First Purchase Second Purchase
Buyers who purchase from: MEDTRONIC BOSTON ABBOTT OTHERS
MEDTRONIC 16.3 8.5 7 4
BOSTON 8.5 15 6.9 4
ABBOTT 7 6.9 11.3 3.3
OTHERS 4 4 3.3 6.3
 
 
Conditional proportions can also be calculated, for example the proportion of 
buyers of supplier Y that also buy X and vice versa. 
Y
XY
YX b
bb =| , 
X
XY
XY b
bb =|  
 
Table 3.18 Percentage of buyers of one supplier who also buy from another 
Who also purchase from:
First Purchase Second Purchase
Buyers who purchase from: MEDTRONIC BOSTON ABBOTT OTHERS
MEDTRONIC 54.8 45.4 26
BOSTON 56.3 45.7 26.2
ABBOTT 58.6 57.4 27.7
OTHERS 62.4 61.3 51.7
Average observed duplication 59.1 59.35 48.7 26.95
 
 
The Duplication Coefficient, DXY can also be calculated. 
YX
XY
XY bb
bD
×
=  
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According to the Duplication of Purchase Law the duplication coefficients are 
expected to be the same for each pair of suppliers in the category. 
Table 3.19 Duplication of Purchase Coefficients 
Who also purchase from:
First Purchase Second Purchase
Buyers who purchase from: MEDTRONIC BOSTON ABBOTT OTHERS
MEDTRONIC 3.48 3.80 3.90
BOSTON 3.48 4.07 4.23
ABBOTT 3.80 4.07 4.64
OTHERS 3.90 4.23 4.64
Average duplication coefficient 3.72 3.93 4.17 4.25
 
 
3.4.5.2 Testing the Model 
Having derived the set of supplier performance measures, it is necessary to test 
whether the model holds i.e. are the predicted values are indeed a good fit to the 
observed values.  
 
The purpose of the goodness of fit test is not just to compare the distribution of 
measures from the data with the distribution predicted by the model to accept or 
reject the hypothesis, i.e. that the observed data can be described by the NBD-
Dirichlet model.  Just because a fit has been obtained at some confidence level 
does not mean that the model is correct (Schunn & Wallach, 2001).  There are 
other models, other data sets that could lead to equally good fits.  However taken 
in the context of the NBD-Dirichlet empirical generalisation, where validation of 
the model is through replication to new situations, a good fit signifies a further 
replication and adds to the heuristic power of the model.   This is the application 
of Sophisticated Methodological Falsification (Leong, 1985) where each 
110 
experiment or test of the model in itself does not lead to the universal acceptance 
or rejection of the model but does add to the body of knowledge that constitutes 
the “positive heuristic” of the model.  As Ehrenberg (1988, p.23) notes, “the 
important point is not so much whether the discrepancies are real (or merely 
sampling errors) but that the same theoretical formula accounts for the greater 
part of the observed variation and that the residual deviations are relatively small 
and more or less unbiased.” 
 
The treatment of goodness of fit in replicated studies has been the subject of 
much comment (Ehrenberg & Bound, 1993; Lindsay & Ehrenberg, 1993; 
Ehrenberg, 1994; Barwise, 1995), in particular the distinction between the best 
fit correlation for a single set of data and what has been called “significant 
sameness” (Barwise, 1995), “stochastic sameness” (Ehrenberg & Bound, 1993) 
or a “generally good fit” (Uncles et al, 1995) across many sets of data. The 
relationship between the expected and observed behaviours “should hold within 
much the same limits of scatter as before” (Ehrenberg & Bound, 1993) and 
without any systematic bias (Ehrenberg, 1994).   
 
Visual displays are useful for a rough estimate of degree of fit and for indicating 
where the fits are problematic, including the identification of any systemic 
biases or market partitioning through what Ehrenberg (1988) has referred to as 
“eyeballing”.  In the current research, tabulation of the data is the first of these 
techniques.  A variety of conventions assist the researcher to estimate degree of 
fit.  These include: 
(a) Tabulate supplier data in descending order of market share.  This 
allows observation of the expected trends (market shares and 
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penetrations decrease across the suppliers while purchase frequencies 
are relatively constant).  The Double Jeopardy observation, i.e. that 
smaller brands suffer from lower purchase frequencies can also be 
easily noticed in this kind of tabulation. 
(b) Tabulated data should be rounded to enable easy visual comparison 
of measures.  It is easier to compare 17.9% and 18.2% than 
17.8765% and 18.2477% 
(c) Tables should present the observed data first with the predicted 
(theoretical) data alongside it.  Observed data should be in bold. 
 
Graphical representations can also be used, for example for the observed and 
theoretical frequency distributions.  These may be line graphs or side by side bar 
charts.  A useful convention is to present observed data with closed icons and 
solid lines; theoretical values are represented by open icons and dotted lines.  
The charts will show any systemic deviations and whether the direction of any 
trends is adequately captured by the model. 
 
A variety of numerical measures to assess goodness of fit have been used in the 
Dirichlet and related literature as shown in Table 3.20.  The most commonly 
used measures are the individual deviations, Mean Absolute Deviation, the 
Mean Absolute Percentage Error and the correlation coefficient.  This research 
uses the same set of measures.  As there is a range of performance measures 
predicted by the Dirichlet model, from frequency distributions to discrete 
supplier performance measures, no single value for the average deviation can be 
used as a benchmark.  An analysis of the studies cited above has shown that the 
Mean Absolute Deviation is typically about 10% of the mean of the particular 
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performance measure.  The range of individual deviations is typically ±50% of 
the expected values, with more than half (>70%) of deviations within ±10% of 
the theoretical predictions.  The correlation coefficient, r gives a measure of the 
strength of the relationship between observed and theoretical data, with a 
benchmark correlation between the expected and actual values of the order of 
0.9 (Ehrenberg, 1994; Uncles et al, 1995). 
Table 3.20 Selection of Goodness of Fit measures used in Dirichlet studies 
Study Goodness of fit measures 
(Ehrenberg, 1988) Mean Absolute Deviation 
(Bowman & Lele-Pingle, 1997) r2, Mean Square Deviation 
(Ehrenberg, 1959) Root Mean Square Deviation 
(Pickford & Goodhardt, 2000) Mean Absolute Deviation 
(Stern & Hammond, 2004) r, Mean Absolute Deviation 
(Uncles et al, 1995) r 
(Li et al, 2009) Deviation 
(Kahn et al, 1988) Deviation 
(Bhattacharya, 1997) r2, Deviation 
(Kearns & Lewis, 2000) Mean Absolute Deviation 
(Leckenby & Kishi, 1984) Percentage Error 
(Schmittlein & Peterson, 1994) Mean Square Deviation 
(Sharp et al, 2002) Deviation 
(Sharp & Driesener, 2000) Mean Absolute Deviation 
(Uncles & Kwok, 2003) Mean Absolute Deviation 
(Uncles & Ehrenberg, 1990) Deviation 
(Wright et al, 2002) r, Mean Absolute Deviation, Mean 
Absolute Percentage Error 
(Lam & Mizerski, 2009) r, r2, Mean Absolute Deviation 
 
Further, an understanding of the discrepancies between the observed and 
predicted measures, and any areas of systematic deviation, highlights 
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suggestions for further research.  These could include more systematic research 
into the deviations themselves (to see whether they can themselves be 
replicated), the validity of the model assumptions, sensitivity to changes in the 
model parameters or specific issues related to the data, for example non-
stationarity or partitioning. 
3.5 Qualitative Analysis 
The coronary stent category has been chosen in part because it has been the 
subject of recent purchasing activity and the longitudinal analysis includes a 
period of non-stationary behaviour.  The NBD-Dirichlet model may predict with 
some accuracy the buying behaviours before and after any purchasing 
interventions but it does not provide any insights into the actual interventions 
taken.  In order to provide background information to aid interpretation of the 
observed behaviours, exploratory interviews are conducted after the analysis of 
the data. 
 
Qualitative data is collected through semi-structured interviews with key 
collaborative procurement hub purchasing personnel involved in the cardiac 
stent category purchasing process in order to provide feedback on the findings of 
the modelling and to explore the context and background of the purchasing 
interventions (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 1997). 
 
Organisational change, both imposed by government and internally driven 
change, means that the individuals involved in the original interventions in 2006 
– 2008 are either no longer in post or not available for interview.  Two senior 
procurement executives are interviewed, including the current Deputy Director 
of Procurement for the Collaborative Purchasing Hub.  Although not involved in 
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the original cardiac stent project, the Deputy Director is now responsible for the 
implementation of the framework agreements negotiated during the project.  The 
second interviewee was formerly a procurement executive in the CPH and was 
directly responsible for the cardiac stent project in 2007 – 2008.  She is currently 
the Procurement Director for a large acute hospital trust that is a member of the 
CPH and a major purchaser of cardiac stents.   
 
The interviews last approximately one hour each and are conducted either face-
to-face or by telephone.  It is recognised that the interviews involve recollections 
of events that happened over three years ago and that interviewees may want to 
construct a story that appears logical and consistent (Myers & Newman, 2007).  
To avoid contributing to this constructed knowledge, the findings of the research 
are not shared with the interviewees before the interviews.  The interviews are 
semi-structured and are taped and transcribed before analysis to explore the 
background, context and implementation of the cardiac stent project.  The 
interview guide and an extract from the transcript are included in Appendix C. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter presents the epistemological assumptions that underpin the 
Empirical then Theoretical (EtT) approach advocated by Ehrenberg (1994) and 
the application of the NBD-Dirichlet in buyer behaviour research.  The EtT 
approach is located within the Lakatosian concept of sophisticated 
methodological falsification within a research programme (Leong, 1985). 
 
The design of the research study is also discussed, emphasising the importance 
of this replication to extend the generalisability of the NBD-Dirichlet model and 
its practical applicability, in this case into a new discipline as well as a new 
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market. The research methodology is presented, including data collection, 
operationalisation of the model and testing of the model.  Worked examples 
using data from a pilot study are used to demonstrate the calculation methods.  
The pilot study is also used to identify a suitable category for analysis and to 
confirm the form and availability of the information required for the longitudinal 
study.  Two stent categories will be analysed as separate cases, one where there 
has been no purchasing management intervention (ureteral stents) and one where 
there has been an intervention (coronary stents). 
 
Data is collected from a single hospital trust and a Collaborative Procurement 
Hub (CPH) within the English National Health Service (NHS).  The 
collaborative public procurement environment in the NHS is a complex context 
that will be discussed briefly in the next chapter. 
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4 Procurement in the National Health Service 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has introduced pilot data from a single NHS hospital trust 
in which coronary stents have been selected as the category for study and the 
data requirements and availability have been confirmed.  The main body of the 
research is a longitudinal study into stent purchases in a collaborative 
procurement hub in the English NHS.   
 
This chapter presents a brief overview of the procurement arrangements within 
the NHS and highlights some of the tensions that exist between the design and 
specification of clinical solutions and their sourcing.  It explains why stent 
purchases within the NHS is a suitable case to analyse in the context of the 
research objectives to investigate the behaviour of purchasers in a collaborative 
procurement environment, in particular to seek to identify whether the 
behaviours followed any regular pattern, if the observed patterns could be 
described and predicted using a robust model of buyer behaviour, the NBD-
Dirichlet, and whether such modelling can be used to inform management 
decision making in a collaborative purchasing context. 
 
In particular, procurement in the NHS is a complex and challenging test for the 
Dirichlet model, and as such represents a differentiated replication (Lindsay & 
Ehrenberg, 1993); an extension into very different market conditions.  As well 
as extending the application of the Dirichlet model from a broadly consumer 
marketing environment to a purchasing and supply chain context, the NHS case 
includes a complex and highly regulated collaborative public procurement 
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structure with decision makers at multiple levels, from clinicians to policy 
makers.  The limitations of the NHS as a research subject are also discussed, 
including the availability and accuracy of data from fragmented computer 
systems and the small samples that result from a limited purchasing population. 
4.2 NHS Structure 
This large and complex organisation, the world’s largest publicly funded health 
service (NHS, 2009) is committed to “bringing the highest levels of human 
knowledge and skill to save lives and improve health” (Department of Health, 
2010b; Department of Health, 2010a) (Department of Health, 2010a; 
Department of Health, 2010b).  Third party expenditure on goods and services 
used in the NHS is some £20 billion per year (Department of Health, 2010a), 
about 20% of the total NHS annual budget of over £100 billion (NHS, 2009). 
 
The structure of the NHS can change rapidly with changes in the political 
environment such as devolution or a change in government.  As a result, any 
description of the NHS or its purchasing organisation may often become out of 
date.  The current (June 2009) structure of the NHS in England is shown in a 
simplified form Figure 4.1 (McCay & Jonas, 2009). 
 
This reflects the most recent significant restructuring in the English NHS.  In 
July 2006 the number of Strategic Health Authorities (SHA) was reduced from 
the twenty eight set up in 2002 to ten.  There are now 152 Primary Care Trusts 
(PCT), compared to the 304 PCTs that replaced the NHS Community Trusts and 
Health Authorities in 2002. The Department of Health controls the ten SHAs 
directly, which themselves supervise all the non-foundation NHS Trusts in their 
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area (Harland et al, 2007; NHS, 2009).  Each SHA covers a population of 
between 2.5 – 7.5 million people (Galloway, 2009). 
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Figure 4.1 Structure of English National Health Service 
4.2.1 Primary Care Trusts 
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) are the main commissioners of healthcare in the 
NHS, controlling 80% of the NHS budget. Funding for hospitals (NHS Trusts, 
Foundation Trusts) and contracts with non - NHS providers now come primarily 
from PCTs. Each PCT serves a population of approximately 150,000 – 300,000 
people (Galloway, 2009). 
 
Primary care is usually the first point of contact to the NHS – the people seen 
when one first has a health problem.  These include GPs, optometrists or NHS 
Direct (Harland et al, 2007).  The PCT is responsible for ensuring that there are 
enough health and social care services for people within their area and that these 
services are accessible. It must also make sure that all other health services are 
provided, including GPs, dentists, opticians, mental health services, NHS walk-
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in centres, the NHS Direct telephone service, patient transport (including 
accident and emergency), screening and pharmacies. They are also responsible 
for getting health and social care systems working together for the benefit of 
patients (NHS, 2009) 
 
Five of the 152 PCTs are currently Care Trusts (NHS, 2009), working in both 
health and social care to deliver both services together.  Care trusts are set up 
when the NHS and local authorities agree to work in tandem, usually when it is 
felt that a closer relationship between health and social care is needed or would 
benefit local care services. In areas where Care Trusts have not been established, 
Primary Care Trusts and Social Services work as independent agencies (NHS, 
2009; Galloway, 2009). 
4.2.2 NHS Trusts 
NHS hospital, mental health and ambulance services are generally provided by 
trusts.  They form part of the secondary care sector and are usually the second 
stage of contact with the NHS, providing healthcare services that have been 
commissioned by PCTs and practice-based commissioners (Galloway, 2009; 
Department of Health, 2009a).   
 
Acute trusts manage hospitals to ensure that they provide high-quality healthcare 
and that they spend their money efficiently.  Some acute trusts are regional or 
national centres for more specialised care while others are attached to 
universities and help to train health professionals. There are 168 acute trusts in 
England (NHS 2009).   
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There are 12 ambulance services in England, providing emergency access to 
healthcare.  The NHS is also responsible for providing transport to get many 
patients to hospital for treatment. In many areas it is the ambulance trust that 
provides this service (NHS, 2009). 
 
Mental health trusts provide health and social care services for people with 
mental health problems.  There are 73 mental health trusts in England.  Mental 
health services may be provided through your GP or other primary care services 
with more specialist care normally provided by mental health trusts or local 
council social services departments (NHS, 2009).  
4.2.3 Foundation Trusts 
Since 2004, trusts have been able to apply to change their status to NHS 
Foundation Trusts. As of 4th December 2009 there were 122 NHS Foundation 
Trusts in England (NHS, 2009). The Department of Health intends for all NHS 
Trusts to become NHS Foundation Trusts over time (Department of Health, 
2009a). 
 
NHS foundation trusts provide the same kind of services as any other hospital, 
mental health or ambulance trust but are accountable in a different way and have 
greater freedoms although they remain within the NHS and its performance 
inspection system.  NHS foundation trusts are not overseen by strategic health 
authorities or the Department of Health but are instead regulated by an 
independent body called Monitor. 
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4.2.4 Regulation 
Since April 2009, the safety and quality regulator for all health services has been 
the Care Quality Commission, replacing the Healthcare Commission, Mental 
Health Act Commission, and the Commission for Social Care Inspection.  The 
Care Quality Commission has the power to inspect all registered healthcare 
providers, to suspend services, impose fines, prosecute or deregister 
organisations if it has evidence that suggests a serious problem that may be 
putting patients at risk. 
 
Unlike NHS trusts, which are overseen by strategic health authorities, NHS 
foundation trusts are regulated by Monitor, an independent regulator. NHS 
foundation trusts are assessed by the Care Quality Commission in the same way 
as other hospitals. 
4.3 Purchasing and Supply in the NHS 
Procurement has long been at the forefront of efficiency drives within the 
National Health Service (NHS).  As the Department of Health observes in their 
paper introducing a new commercial operating model for the NHS and 
Department of Health, “Necessity – not nicety”, 
“Looking at the NHS as a whole, the key benefit will be to put the system in a 
strong position to realise demanding procurement efficiency expectations and to 
maximise the NHS’s spending power for the benefit of patient care”. 
 (Department of Health, 2009b, p12) 
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4.3.1 Structure 
Purchasing and supply in the English NHS has been the subject of a longitudinal 
collaborative action research programme with the Centre for Research in 
Strategic Purchasing and Supply (CRiSPS) since 1995 (Walker et al, 2008).  
Consequently there is a wide range of historical and case study literature 
describing NHS procurement and how it has evolved over the past fifteen years. 
 
Figure 4.2 Structure of NHS Purchasing & Supply 1997-1998 (Harland et al, 2007) 
 
As been noted already, procurement has often been a driver for efficiency 
savings within the NHS.  The NHS Supplies Authority was set up in 1991 to 
address inefficiencies by coordinating spending and improving supply 
management (Figure 4.2).  Initially set up on a regional basis, NHS Supplies 
developed into a national structure in 1995, providing a national logistics 
service, a contracting service to establish national framework agreements and 
provide purchasing expertise to individual trusts and a customer service function 
to manage trust-based purchasing and supply functions (Harland et al, 2007).  
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Trusts were under no obligation to use the services of NHS Supplies which had 
no central funding and covered its costs through consultancy fees, product 
handling fees and annual fees from the trusts.  Several trusts established 
independent purchasing and supply departments creating wide variability in 
supply management effectiveness across the NHS (Harland et al, 2007). 
 
Figure 4.3 Structure of NHS Purchasing & Supply 2002-2003 (Harland et al, 2007) 
 
The NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency (NHS PASA) was established in April 
2000 as part of a restructuring that replaced NHS Supplies with two 
organisations - NHS Logistics (a service since outsourced to DHL) and NHS 
PASA (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). Compared to the operational role of NHS Supplies, 
NHS PASA had a remit to develop policy and strategy on behalf of the health 
service and to ensure that the NHS in England made the most effective use of its 
resources by getting the best possible value for money when purchasing goods 
and services.  Centrally funded, it was a purchasing centre of excellence for the 
NHS as well as continuing to provide a contracting service for national 
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framework agreements.  Its prime target was to release money that could be 
better spent on patient care by achieving purchasing savings and improving 
supply performance across the NHS (Harland et al, 2007; Department of Health, 
2009c). 
 
Figure 4.4 Structure of NHS Purchasing & Supply 2007-2009 
 
In May 2009 the Department of Health launched a new Commercial Operating 
Model.  Procurement of goods and services was perceived to be piecemeal and 
sub-optimal.  Under this new model the NHS PASA function was closed in 
October 2009 with its functions transferring to the Office of Government 
Commerce Buying Solutions (OGCbs) for non-clinical supplies, to the NHS 
Logistics Authority to form NHS Supply Chain and to the NHS Commercial 
Medicines Unit (CMU) within the Department of Health (Department of Health, 
2009b).  The proposed new structure is shown in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5 Structure of NHS Purchasing & Supply 2010- 
 
4.3.2 Collaborative Purchasing in the NHS 
Group or consortia purchasing has been identified as a way to improve 
effectiveness in public sector supply management effectiveness (Cleverley & 
Nutt, 1984; Nollet & Beaulieu, 2003; Phillips et al, 2008; Loader, 2010).  
Purchasing consortia can be formed between national and local decision making, 
often on a regional or cross-government basis (Harland et al, 2005).  While the 
benefits of aggregating volume to increase leverage with suppliers, to deliver 
economies of scale and to reduce transaction costs are well documented (Nollet 
& Beaulieu, 2003), several authors have noted potential negative effects such as 
supplier concentration and a consequent reduction in competition and 
disenfranchisement of smaller suppliers through raised entry barriers (Harland et 
al, 2005; Loader, 2010).  It has been recognised that “good value can only occur 
if there is a sufficient choice of appropriate suppliers available” (Loader, 2010, 
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p.46) and that public procurement may have a role to play in market creation 
(Caldwell et al, 2005; Walker et al, 2006). 
 
Procurement in the NHS has been and continues to be described as fragmented 
and piecemeal (Knight et al, 2003; Department of Health, 2009b).  A number of 
national initiatives have attempted to address the inefficiencies arising from this 
fragmentation, including the establishment of NHS Supplies in 1991, the 
restructuring of NHS Supplies into NHS PASA and NHS Logistics in 2000, the 
establishment of a new Commercial Directorate within the Department of Health 
in 2003 and the most recent changes to NHS PASA and NHS Logistics to 
consolidate procurement functions into OGCbs, NHS Supply Chain and the 
CMU in the Department of Health in 2009 (Harland et al, 2007; Department of 
Health, 2009b).  A simplified view of the evolving structure of purchasing and 
supply in the NHS is shown in Figures 4.2 to 4.5. 
 
Informal arrangements for coordination of purchasing and supply at a level 
between the local and the national have also been a feature of the NHS on 
regional or functional bases (Harland et al, 2007).  NHS PASA also introduced 
more formal arrangements with the establishment of six “Pilot Confederations”, 
purchasing and supply organisations covering all the trusts within a SHA.  By 
2005, 95 per cent of trusts belonged to a confederation (Harland et al, 2007).  
The Commercial Directorate in the Department of Health also introduced a 
Supply Chain Excellence Programme (SCEP) in 2004.  With the aim of 
improving supply efficiency, one of the projects under SCEP was the 
establishment of Collaborative Procurement Hubs (CPH) to deliver consistency 
in regional purchasing.  These CPHs would have a remit to deliver £270 million 
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savings by 2007, to improve support for clinicians involved in purchasing and to 
encourage innovation.  Three pathfinder CPHs were established to test and 
refine the CPH model, starting formal operation in April 2005.  There are now 
ten CPHs covering the majority of trusts (Phillips et al, 2008).  Whereas 
confederations were voluntary and virtual organisations, the CPHs are separate 
organisations, owned by all the member trusts with dedicated resources (Harland 
et al, 2007).   
 
The core activities carried out by the hubs on behalf of their members include 
category procurement to provide a collaborative and integrated approach to 
procurement and delivering price reductions through aggregation.  Key to this is 
a requirement to develop and implement common data collection methodologies 
in order to facilitate aggregation, to monitor savings and to profile purchasing 
behaviours to identify patterns of significant and outlying spend.  These 
activities are complicated by the reluctance of trusts to collect data, seeing this 
as onerous.  As a result, poor quality data continues to be an issue (Anonymous, 
2009a). 
 
The CPHs are now undergoing a further period of change with the establishment 
of regional Commercial Support Units (CSUs) which will replace the CPHs but 
will support commissioners of healthcare (PCTs and practice-based 
commissioners) as well as providers (NHS Trusts) (Department of Health, 
2009b; Department of Health, 2010a). 
4.3.3 Procurement Decision-Making in the NHS 
Sourcing decisions in the NHS are mostly made by budget holders at trust level.  
Decisions may be constrained by framework agreements (national or regional) 
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but clinicians in particular can be influenced directly by suppliers and have 
significant influence in sourcing decisions (Harland et al, 2007; Phillips et al, 
2008).  Decisions concerning products and services ordered centrally within a 
trust (e.g. food) and capital equipment are typically taken by a group 
representing trust stakeholders, facilities managers or in some cases contractors 
to whom services may have been outsourced. 
 
An additional factor impacting sourcing decisions in the NHS is the objective to 
improve clinical outcomes.  The National Institute of Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) and has been established to evaluate health technologies and set policy 
concerning their use across the NHS.  In addition, the Centre for Evidence-based 
Purchasing (CEP) provides objective evidence to support adoption of innovative 
products and procedures in healthcare and to inform procurement decisions 
(Harland et al, 2007; Phillips et al, 2008). 
4.3.4 Constraints Facing NHS Procurement 
There are a range of external and internal factors that add to the complexity of 
NHS procurement.  External factors include changes in the political macro-
environment.  Examples in recent years include the move from compulsory 
competitive tendering (CCT) to voluntary competitive tendering (VCT) 
following the change of government in 1997 and changes in purchasing 
objectives from cost savings to value for money, including issues such as 
sustainability and improved patient outcomes (Harland et al, 2007; Phillips et al, 
2008; Walker et al, 2008).  The Department of Health explicitly sees 
procurement as a means to contribute to the “social, economic and 
environmental aspects of sustainability” (Department of Health, 2010a, p.11).  
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Ministerial responses to adverse media or arising events may also trigger 
changes in supply strategy (Walker et al, 2008).  A further external factor 
concerns technological development and the adoption of new technologies as 
trusts work towards improved clinical outcomes (Harland et al, 2007; Walker et 
al, 2008).  While the trend towards evidence-based medicine provides objective 
support for purchasing decision-making, the localisation of purchasing can 
militate against uptake of innovative technologies. 
 
Individual trusts remain accountable for their budgets and delivering targeted 
procurement savings.  Policies to return power and control over budgets to the 
“front line” create tensions between trusts and the aggregators of demand, 
whether regional or national (Harland et al, 2007).  In addition, clinicians enjoy 
considerable discretion over sourcing decisions for pharmaceuticals, medical 
equipment and consumables, leaving them open to supplier opportunism and 
lock-in to preferred suppliers.  This can make supplier rationalisation difficult to 
achieve (Cox et al, 2005).   
 
Excessive local autonomy can result in “shadow procurement” organisations, 
non-compliance or maverick buying i.e. buying outside the centrally negotiated 
framework agreements (Harland et al, 2007; Phillips et al, 2008).  It has been 
noted that control of off-process procurement is a key element in improving 
purchasing performance (Croom & Brandon-Jones, 2007).   
 
However, fragmented information systems and inconsistencies in supplier or 
product coding mean that there is limited direct visibility of what is bought and 
by whom (Bakker et al, 2006b; Harland et al, 2007).  As well as being unable to 
monitor compliance with framework agreements and establish accurate 
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consumption histories or forecasts, this lack of information means that market 
structures cannot be assessed effectively to ensure competitiveness and balance 
(i.e. neither too many nor too few suppliers) (Caldwell et al, 2005; Walker et al, 
2006). 
4.4 Stent Purchases in the NHS 
Coronary stents are small scaffold-like structures that are inserted into arteries to 
stop them from narrowing and becoming blocked (see Figure 4.6).  In coronary 
angioplasty a catheter is inserted into the patient’s leg or wrist and fed up 
through a main artery until it reaches the blockage.  A small balloon attached to 
the end of the catheter is inflated to clear the blockage and expand the stent.  
Two broad categories of stent are available – the Bare Metal Stent (BMS) and 
the Drug Eluting Stent (DES) which is coated to deliver controlled dose of a 
therapeutic agent to the injured artery over a prolonged period, preventing it 
from becoming blocked again.   
 
Figure 4.6 TAXUS® Express2™  Atom™ Paclitaxel-Eluting Coronary Stent System 
 
The stent market is dominated by four major suppliers, Boston Scientific, 
Medtronic, Abbott and Johnson & Johnson.  A number of other suppliers also 
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serve the market, including B Braun, Biotronik, Cook, Orbus Neich, Pyramed 
and Terumo (London Procurement Programme, 2010). 
 
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) has reviewed the cost-
effectiveness of DES which are more expensive than BMS, recommending their 
use in an appraisal in 2003 before reversing this judgement in their appraisal 
consultation document on the grounds that DES were not cost effective.  In 2007 
NICE opted to ban DES on medical grounds.  This guidance has since been 
updated (July 2008) to allow the use of DES in certain circumstances, including 
specifying a cost differential between DES and BMS of no more than £300 
(NICE, 2008; de Belder, 2008).  In the UK in 2007 DES cost between £650 and 
£480 compared to between £100 and £250 for BMS (London Procurement 
Programme, 2010). 
 
Following the revised NICE guidance, hospital trusts and collaborative 
procurement hubs have sought to put in place framework agreements to mitigate 
the expected impact of increased purchases of the more expensive DES.  The 
total annual coronary stent spend for the single hospital trust that provided the 
pilot data is £1.6 million.  During 2008/09 a range of efficiency measures were 
reported to have delivered savings of £395,455 (Anonymous, 2009b).  In the 
Collaborative Procurement Hub the regional spend on cardiac stents (both bare 
metal stents and drug eluting stents) was £5 million.  Since 2007, the Hub has 
implemented an improvement project that has realised £1.1 million procurement 
savings, led to greater standardisation of stents across the region and enhanced 
existing working relationships in cardiology (Anonymous, 2009a).  This project 
integrated clinician influence and procurement expertise in a consensus 
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assessment process where product selection was based on practical application 
and theoretical evidence in order to gain acceptance for the framework 
agreements and reduce the incidence of off-framework purchasing. 
4.5 Summary 
This overview of purchasing arrangements in the NHS has shown the 
complexity of the organisation with multiple influencers including regulatory 
bodies, national purchasing organisations, regional collaborative hubs, 
procurement professionals in hospital and other trusts and individual clinicians.  
This complexity and the historic autonomy of clinicians and hospitals has often 
resulted in poor compliance to purchasing agreements, so-called “maverick” or 
off-framework purchasing.  With continuing pressure on the procurement 
function in the NHS to deliver efficiency savings, identifying and overcoming 
such maverick purchasing is essential to realise the gains available from 
increased standardisation and vendor rationalisation.  
 
Collaborative purchasing in the NHS is relatively mature and formalised, 
especially in the regional collaborative procurement hubs.  The data used is 
collected by the hub on a regular basis from purchase order systems.  By using 
secondary data that records observable occurrences (raising a purchase order), 
the information gathered for the research is not affected by respondent attitudes 
or expectations.  Although the data used in the analysis is generated from a 
single database (in the collaborative procurement hub), the hub aggregates 
purchasing data from over sixty individual trusts, overcoming some of the 
problems associated with fragmented information systems and inconsistent 
product coding.  This aggregation of data reduces some of the issues related to 
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non-response, common method variance and bias in survey research (Autry & 
Golicic, 2010).   
 
The coronary stent category is a significant expenditure for the organisations 
that participated in the research.  It has been impacted by changes in regulatory 
guidance and has been the subject of supply side interventions (negotiated 
framework agreements) over the period of analysis.   
 
The scope, scale and dynamic nature of this category make it ideal for 
longitudinal analysis using the NBD-Dirichlet model.  The NHS procurement 
environment with its complexity and multiple influencers is a challenging and 
highly differentiated replication for the NBD-Dirichlet and as such is a 
substantial contribution to the literature. 
 
The following chapters present the analysis of patterns of stent purchases in the 
single trust and in the collaborative purchasing hub.  Chapter 5 discusses the 
pilot data already introduced in Chapter 3.  Chapters 6 and 7 consider a 
longitudinal data set that spans the three years from 2006 to 2008, including the 
first six months following the implementation of the coronary stent framework 
agreements.  Chapter 6 is a detailed analysis of ureteral stent purchasing 
patterns, a stent category that has not had any purchasing intervention and is 
included to allow a comparison with the coronary stent data that is presented in 
Chapter 7. 
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5 Pilot Study - Modelling Stent Procurement in a Single 
NHS Trust 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of pilot data covering purchases of coronary 
stents by a single NHS hospital trust over a one month period.  As noted in the 
previous chapter, coronary stents have been chosen for analysis because they 
represent significant expenditure for the trust and are in a procurement category 
that has seen recent activity to rationalise the supply base and standardise 
supply.  The screening and preparation of the pilot data has been described in 
Section 3.3 and this chapter will present a description of the data, the fitting of 
the model and the use of the model to predict purchasing behaviour in 
subsequent periods.   
 
The analysis shows that even with this relatively short analysis period, the NBD-
Dirichlet describes supplier performance measures such as penetration, purchase 
frequency and share of category requirements with good accuracy.  A heavy 
(high frequency) purchasing segment is identified and shown to purchase from a 
restricted set of suppliers. 
 
This pilot study identifies coronary stents as a suitable category for analysis and 
demonstrates that stent purchasing patterns in a single hospital over a limited 
time period can be modelled using the NBD-Dirichlet.  This provides a sound 
basis for extension of the analysis to the more complex longitudinal analysis of 
the purchasing patterns in the collaborative purchasing hub. 
135 
 
5.2 Description of the Data 
5.2.1 Purchases by Requisitioner 
The data covers a 4 week period, stretching from 1 May 2008 to 28 May 2008 
inclusive.  14 requisitioners made purchases of coronary stents in the time 
period, with 6 requisitioners accounting for over 80% of total purchases in the 
period (Figure 5.1).  5 requisitioners fulfilled all their category requirements 
with a single supplier in this period although all 5 only made a single purchase, 
thus having no opportunity to choose another supplier.  Of the purchasers who 
made more than one purchase, in no cases were orders placed predominantly on 
a single supplier although 5 of the 6 heaviest purchasers only purchased from the 
three dominant suppliers.  The usual expectation would be for the heaviest 
purchasers to have the greatest opportunity to use the smaller suppliers and for 
the lightest purchasers to be more likely to use the dominant suppliers, the 
Natural Monopoly Phenomenon (McPhee, 1963).  This is an initial indication of 
deviation from the typical patterns of a Dirichlet market and may point to some 
partitioning of the market and a violation of the Dirichlet assumption of 
independence of supplier choice and purchase incidence.  Excess behavioural 
loyalty for dominant suppliers has been observed previously (Fader & 
Schmittlein, 1993; Singh et al, 2009) and attributed to segmentation on the basis 
of different levels of availability or price.  In the stent case availability may be 
constrained by the existence of framework agreements with the main suppliers 
such that purchases from the smaller suppliers may be off framework purchases. 
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Figure 5.1 Stent purchases by requisitioner 
5.2.1.1 Poisson Assumption 
One of the underlying distributional assumptions of the NBD-Dirichlet is that 
purchases by individual buyers follow a Poisson process, such that their long run 
average purchase frequency is steady.  It is not possible to determine a long run 
average purchase frequency over such a short analysis period but the tabulated 
weekly purchase frequencies for each buyer (Table 5.1) show that these are 
fairly steady.  The distribution of purchases appears to show an increase in 
purchases in the middle two weeks of the period.  Analysis over a longer period 
would show if this was a regular pattern.  For the purposes of this analysis, an 
average two week period will be used as the base period in order to smooth out 
this effect. 
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Table 5.1 Weekly purchases by requisitioner 
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5.2.2 Purchases by Supplier 
3 suppliers (Abbott, Boston and Medtronic) account for 63 of the 70 purchase 
orders, 90% of the total (Table 5.2).  To simplify the subsequent analysis, the 
four suppliers making up the remaining 10% (EV3, J&J, Pyramed, Gore) are 
consolidated into a single “Others” composite supplier.  The table shows that 
purchases of the three main suppliers are fairly constant through the four weeks, 
although there is a drop in purchases of Abbott at the end of the period.  
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Table 5.2 Coronary stent purchases by supplier 
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Figure 5.2 shows the market shares for the different suppliers through the 
period.  These are relatively steady for two suppliers with the highest share 
(Medtronic and Boston).  The market share for Abbott falls from 40% to 12% 
over the four weeks and that for the Others rises from zero to 12%.  Analysis 
over a longer time period would show whether this apparent trend was a 
temporary phenomenon in the particular month, the effect of random variation, a 
pattern in purchases that was repeated in subsequent months (i.e. purchases of 
Abbott loaded towards the early part of a month) or a more sustained shift in 
purchaser preferences.  
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Figure 5.2 Weekly market share by supplier 
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Figure 5.3 shows the average weekly purchase frequency for all suppliers.  The 
average weekly purchase frequency shows some marked week to week variation 
at category level and at an individual supplier level although the trend for 
category purchases through the period is relatively steady around an average of 
2.6 purchases per requisitioner.  It should also be noted that although the number 
of purchases of the category in Week 1 is below average (see Table 5.1), the 
purchase frequency for the category lies close to the average frequency of 2.6. 
This shows that the reduced number of purchases is due to fewer purchasers 
rather than a reduction in the frequency of buying.  In fact, only four 
requisitioners make purchases in Week 1, about half of the average number of 
purchasers per week over the whole period (Table 5.1). 
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Figure 5.3 Average weekly purchase frequency by supplier 
Although there is some week to week variability, particularly in the market 
shares for the various suppliers, a visual comparison of the purchase frequency 
against the four week average (Figure 5.3) shows that the average purchase 
frequency for the category is approximately stationary.  For the subsequent 
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analysis, an average two week period is used as the base period in order to 
smooth out the week to week variations.  
5.2.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 5.3 a-c shows observed summary statistics for an average week, an 
average two week period and the whole four week period.  The market shares 
are constant across all the summary data sets as each table is averaged across the 
entire four weeks.  ANY is the combined data for the category, regardless of 
supplier. 
Table 5.3 Summary statistics 
(a) Average 1 week summary statistics
Supplier Number of Requisitions
Number of 
Requisitioners
Requisition 
Frequency Penetration (%) Market Share
MEDTRONIC 6.0 3.8 1.6 9.4% 34.3%
BOSTON 5.8 4.0 1.4 10.0% 32.9%
ABBOTT 4.0 3.0 1.3 7.5% 22.9%
OTHER 1.8 1.5 1.2 3.8% 10.0%
ANY 17.5 6.8 2.6 16.9%
(b) Average 2 week summary statistics
Supplier Number of Requisitions
Number of 
Requisitioners
Requisition 
Frequency Penetration (%) Market Share
MEDTRONIC 12.0 6.5 1.8 16.3% 34.3%
BOSTON 11.5 6.0 1.9 15.0% 32.9%
ABBOTT 8.0 4.5 1.8 11.3% 22.9%
OTHER 3.5 2.5 1.4 6.3% 10.0%
ANY 35.0 10.5 3.3 26.3%
(c) Average 4 week summary statistics
Supplier Number of Requisitions
Number of 
Requisitioners
Requisition 
Frequency Penetration (%) Market Share
MEDTRONIC 24.0 9.0 2.7 22.5% 34.3%
BOSTON 23.0 10.0 2.3 25.0% 32.9%
ABBOTT 16.0 6.0 2.7 15.0% 22.9%
OTHER 7.0 4.0 1.8 10.0% 10.0%
ANY 70.0 14.0 5.0 35.0%
 
 
The typical patterns of a Dirichlet market can be seen in all time periods but they 
are most clear in the 4 week summary tables.  The average requisition frequency 
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is quite similar across all the suppliers although the market shares and 
penetrations differ markedly.  The exception is the “Others” composite supplier 
where the combination of low market share and low purchase frequency is the 
frequently observed “Double Jeopardy” pattern where small suppliers not only 
have fewer purchasers but these purchasers also purchase less frequently.   
 
Penetration is the proportion of the relevant population that makes a purchase.  
With data taken from purchase order data, only those members of the population 
who make a purchase are included in the data set and hence a suitable relevant 
population must be assumed.  In this case the relevant population of 
requisitioners is assumed to be 40.  Table 5.3 shows how the penetration 
increases as the time period under analysis increases.   
 
The number of requisitioners for ANY supplier is generally lower than the 
simple sum of buyers of all products.  This shows that several requisitioners split 
their purchases between more than one supplier in the time period. 
5.3 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
5.3.1 Sample Frame 
The description of the data above has shown that the purchasing behaviours 
show many of the patterns that would be expected in a Dirichlet market.  The 
model is operationalised using an average two week period to smooth out the 
week to week variation in the observed data.  The base period will be used to 
predict performance measures for periods of 1, 2 and 4 weeks to assess how well 
the NBD-Dirichlet can describe and predict the observed performance. 
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5.3.2 Purchase Distributions 
The proportion of purchasers making 0, 1, 2, 3, … purchases from each supplier, 
and of the category in the two week time period are predicted using the NBD 
model and compared to the observed distributions. A simple correlation test and 
the magnitude of the observed deviations are used to assess the fit.  The number 
of purchasers that make no purchases in the time period is used for fitting the 
model and therefore is not included in the test for goodness of fit. 
Table 5.4 Comparison between observed and predicted distribution of purchases 
Period Supplier Correlation between observed 
and theoretical distributions (r) 
Mean Absolute Deviation 
between observed and 
theoretical distributions
MEDTRONIC 0.98 2.6
BOSTON 0.96 4.6
ABBOTT 0.96 3.6
OTHERS 1.00 1.1
ANY 0.93 4.8
MEDTRONIC 0.96 3.6
BOSTON 0.99 2.1
ABBOTT 0.67 8.5
OTHERS 0.91 5.3
ANY 0.91 4.7
MEDTRONIC 0.92 4.1
BOSTON 0.94 5.7
ABBOTT 0.44 11.7
OTHERS 0.92 5.1
ANY 0.91 4.0
1 week
2 weeks
4 weeks
 
 
Table 5.4 presents the results of the goodness of fit tests.  In 13 of the 15 cases 
the correlation coefficient is greater than 0.9 and the mean absolute deviation is 
small.   
 
Plotting the observed and expected distributions (Figures 5.4 to 5.8) also shows 
the generally good fit between the model predictions and the observed data.  
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From the plotted distributions the relatively poor fit for Abbott at 2 weeks and 4 
weeks can be observed.  The model overestimates the number of once only 
buyers and underestimates the number of heavier buyers.  For the other suppliers 
and for the whole category the fit is good with no evidence of systematic bias.  
In a relatively small buying population a single purchaser can represent a large 
percentage of the population such that the observed distribution is not smooth. 
 
Distribution of Purchases (Medtronic)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9+
Number of Purchases
%
 
Pu
rc
ha
se
rs
 
o
f M
e
dt
ro
n
ic
 
m
a
ki
n
g 
1,
 
2,
 
3.
.
.
 
Pu
rc
ha
s
es
 
in
 
pe
rio
d
1 week expected
1 week observed
2 week expected
2 week observed
4 week expected
4 week observed
 
Figure 5.4 Expected and observed distribution of purchases (Medtronic) 
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Distribution of Purchases (Boston)
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Figure 5.5 Expected and observed distribution of purchases (Boston) 
 
 
Distribution of Purchases (Abbott)
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Figure 5.6 Expected and observed distribution of purchases (Abbott) 
 
145 
Distribution of Purchases (Others)
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Figure 5.7 Expected and observed distribution of purchases (Others) 
 
 
Distribution of Purchases (Any)
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Figure 5.8 Expected and observed distribution of purchases for product category 
(Any) 
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5.3.3 Penetration Growth 
The observed and expected 1 week, 2 week and 4 week penetrations and 
purchase frequencies are presented in Table 5.5.   
 
Table 5.5 Observed and theoretical performance measures 
O T O T
Medtronic 9.4% 10.0% 1.6 1.5
Boston 10.0% 9.7% 1.4 1.5
Abbott 7.5% 7.4% 1.3 1.4
Others 3.8% 3.7% 1.2 1.2
Average Supplier 7.7% 7.7% 1.4 1.4
Correlation, r 0.99 0.91
Mean Absolute Deviation 0.3% 0.1
Medtronic 16.3% 15.5% 1.9 1.9
Boston 15.0% 15.1% 1.9 1.9
Abbott 11.3% 12.0% 1.8 1.7
Others 6.3% 6.5% 1.4 1.4
Average Supplier 12.2% 12.3% 1.8 1.7
Correlation, r 0.99 0.98
Mean Absolute Deviation 0.5% 0.0
Medtronic 22.5% 22.1% 2.7 2.7
Boston 25.0% 21.6% 2.3 2.7
Abbott 15.0% 18.0% 2.7 2.2
Others 10.0% 10.6% 1.8 1.7
Average Supplier 18.1% 18.1% 2.4 2.3
Correlation, r 0.94 0.67
Mean Absolute Deviation 1.9% 0.3
Purchase Frequency
SupplierPeriod
1 week
2 weeks
4 weeks
Penetration
 
 
It can be seen that the fit is generally good with the correlation coefficients 
greater than 0.9 and the mean absolute deviation corresponding to a percentage 
error of less than 10% for the 1 week and 2 week data.  The fit is less good for 
the 4 week data, due to higher than expected penetration and lower than 
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expected purchase frequency for Boston and lower than expected penetration 
and higher than expected purchase frequency for Abbott.  Boston has a larger 
than expected number of once-only buyers (see Figure 5.5) which affects both 
the observed penetration and purchase frequency.  The underestimation of 
Abbott’s heavier buyers has already been noted in the previous section. 
5.3.4 Share of Category Requirements 
The Share of Category Requirements (SCR) measures the extent to which the 
particular supplier fulfils the customer’s purchases of the category.  A SCR of 
100% would mean that all customers of the supplier purchased from the supplier 
all of the time.  A SCR of 50% would mean that customers fulfilled their 
requirements from other suppliers half of the time.  Table 5.6 shows that the 
dominant suppliers have SCRs less than 50%, i.e. buyers of these suppliers tend 
to buy from other suppliers more often than they buy from the particular 
supplier. 
 
The observed data (Table 5.6) shows SCRs generally in line with the model 
predictions except for Others.  The relatively low purchase frequencies for the 
supplier Others means that the buyers of this group of suppliers often make only 
a single purchase, giving no opportunity to split purchases between suppliers.  
Table 5.6 also shows a much improved fit for the SCR for a “heavy” and “light” 
purchasing segment, chosen to be those buyers who purchase more than once 
per week and once per week or less respectively.  The heavy segment does not 
purchase from the Others suppliers at all.  This exclusion of the smaller 
suppliers from the heavy buyers’ repertoires is an unusual pattern.  The Natural 
Monopoly phenomenon (McPhee, 1963) predicts that heavier users of a category 
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are more likely to use smaller suppliers because they have more opportunity and 
tend to be well-informed consumers.  Previous studies (Fader & Schmittlein, 
1993) have identified excess behavioural loyalty associated with high market 
share suppliers – the association of excess loyalty with small suppliers is 
atypical.  They suggested that the excess loyalty could be attributed to 
underlying market segmentation with particular reference to brand availability.  
The observed patterns in this case suggest the existence of purchasing segments 
with distinct behaviours, perhaps a purchase repertoire constrained by a 
restricted set of framework purchasing agreements. 
 
Table 5.6 Share of category requirements 
O T O T O T
Medtronic 45.0% 50.8% 41.7% 44.3% 57.1% 77.9%
Boston 42.6% 49.8% 37.5% 41.7% 71.4% 79.7%
Abbott 34.0% 42.8% 31.9% 36.6% 33.3% 73.1%
Others 66.7% 33.9% 0.0% 0.0% 87.5% 84.3%
Average Supplier 47.1% 44.3% 27.8% 30.7% 62.3% 78.8%
Correlation, r -0.68 1.00 0.99
Mean Absolute Deviation 13.7% 2.94% 16.93%
Medtronic 39.4% 43.6% 37.7% 41.0% 50.0% 65.5%
Boston 41.7% 42.4% 36.7% 38.2% 71.4% 68.2%
Abbott 28.5% 34.2% 29.4% 32.8% 33.3% 58.0%
Others 87.5% 24.1% 0.0% 0.0% 87.5% 75.4%
Average Supplier 49.3% 36.1% 26.0% 28.0% 60.6% 66.8%
Correlation, r -0.77 1.00 0.98
Mean Absolute Deviation 18.5% 1.74% 11.56%
4 weeks Medtronic 36.9% 39.1% 37.7% 39.1% 33.3% 52.5%
Boston 37.7% 37.8% 34.0% 36.3% 62.5% 56.1%
Abbott 28.6% 29.0% 28.3% 30.7% 33.3% 42.5%
Others 77.8% 17.9% 0.0% 0.0% 77.8% 65.9%
Average Supplier 45.3% 31.0% 25.0% 26.5% 51.7% 54.3%
Correlation, r -0.79 1.00 0.89
Mean Absolute Deviation 15.7% 1.56% 7.51%
Light SegmentEntire Population Heavy Segment
1 week
2 weeks
Period Supplier
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5.3.5 Sole Buyers 
The incidence of sole loyalty (the proportion of the purchasers of a supplier who 
buy only from that single supplier) can also be predicted and is tabulated in 
Table 5.7.   
Table 5.7 Sole Buying 
O T O T
Medtronic 22.5% 40.0% 0.6 1.2
Boston 33.3% 39.2% 0.8 1.2
Abbott 6.3% 34.1% 0.3 1.1
Others 62.5% 28.0% 0.8 1.1
Average Supplier 31.2% 35.3% 0.6 1.2
Correlation, r -0.59 0.37
Mean Absolute Deviation 21.4% 0.5
Medtronic 22.6% 28.3% 1.3 1.3
Boston 28.6% 27.5% 0.5 1.2
Abbott 0.0% 22.7% 0.0 1.2
Others 75.0% 17.1% 1.2 1.1
Average Supplier 31.6% 23.9% 0.8 1.2
Correlation, r -0.63 0.07
Mean Absolute Deviation 21.9% 0.5
Medtronic 0.0% 20.0% 0.0 1.3
Boston 30.0% 19.3% 1.0 1.3
Abbott 0.0% 15.1% 0.0 1.2
Others 50.0% 10.3% 1.0 1.1
Average Supplier 20.0% 16.2% 0.5 1.2
Correlation, r -0.61 -0.30
Mean Absolute Deviation 21.4% 0.7
1 week
2 weeks
4 weeks
Period Supplier
Sole Buyers Sole Buyer Purchase Frequency
 
 
The incidence of sole loyalty is rather low and the purchase frequency of those 
buyers that are solely loyal is much lower than the average for the whole 
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population.  There are some marked deviations from the model predictions.  
Abbott shows much lower sole loyalty than the model prediction – as is 
evidenced by the apparent decline in market share though the month.  By 
contrast Others shows a much higher incidence of sole loyalty, again an effect of 
the aggregation of suppliers and low purchase frequency providing less 
opportunity for changing supplier. 
5.3.5.1 Duplication of Purchase 
The analysis of duplication of purchase shows the other suppliers that are also 
used by purchasers of a particular supplier within an average two week period.  
It can be seen that there is considerable duplication of purchase between the 
major suppliers and much less with the Others supplier.  This supports the 
observation that buyers of the dominant suppliers may be constrained in their 
choices by negotiated purchasing agreements. 
 
Table 5.8 Observed duplication of purchase 
Who also purchase from:
First Purchase Second Purchase
Buyers who purchase from: Medtronic Boston Abbott Other
Medtronic 61.5% 69.2% 7.7%
Boston 66.7% 66.7% 0.0%
Abbott 100.0% 88.9% 0.0%
Others 20.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Average observed duplication 62.2% 50.1% 45.3% 2.6%
 
5.4 Discussion 
The analysis of the observed purchasing behaviours in the single trust coronary 
stent case has shown that the reported purchasing behaviours can be 
satisfactorily modelled using the NBD-Dirichlet.  The fit is generally good 
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although the loyalty behaviours, Share of Category Requirements and incidence 
of sole buying, show a consistent over-estimation of loyalty for the smaller 
suppliers.  These deviations are attributed to the distinct purchasing behaviours 
of a heavy purchasing segment and a light purchasing segment.  Such a pattern 
has been observed previously in the analysis of foreign exchange services 
(Bowman & Lele-Pingle, 1997).  In particular the smaller suppliers are 
purchased exclusively by the light purchasing segment which purchases less 
frequently and hence has fewer opportunities to be disloyal than the heavier 
purchasers. 
5.4.1 Dirichlet Assumptions 
The single trust coronary stent data set is approximately stationary over the four 
week analysis period although there is some week to week variability, including 
an apparent decline in market share for Abbott.  An average two week base 
period is used to smooth some of this variability such that the Dirichlet 
assumption of stationary markets is assumed to hold. 
 
The second assumption that underpins the Dirichlet analysis is lack of 
partitioning.  In the analysis of the stent purchasing data, segments based on 
purchase frequency (heavy and light purchasers) have been identified as the 
source of deviations between the model predictions and observed behaviour, in 
particular for the share of category requirement.  The heavy purchasers in 
particular purchase only from the major suppliers.  This violates a further 
Dirichlet assumption, that of the independence of purchase incidence and 
supplier choice.  The heavier buyers appear to be buying from a restricted 
repertoire, constrained by supplier framework agreements. 
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5.4.2 Theoretical Implications 
The analysis of the single trust coronary stent case has shown that the observed 
purchasing behaviour can be satisfactorily explained and predicted using the 
NBD-Dirichlet, representing a replication of the model in a healthcare 
procurement environment.   
5.4.2.1 Extension of the NBD-Dirichlet Empirical Generalisation 
The purchasing behaviours of individual coronary stent requisitioners in the 
single trust exhibit the regular patterns of buyer behaviour that have been 
observed in many different markets (Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  These regular 
patterns include the observations that suppliers in the category typically have 
very different market shares and penetrations but the purchase frequency for 
each supplier is approximately constant.  The Double Jeopardy phenomenon 
where smaller suppliers tend to be purchased less frequently than the larger 
suppliers (McPhee, 1963) is also observed.   
 
The heavier purchasers of the category buy only rarely from the smaller 
suppliers.  This unusual pattern is an initial deviation from the typical Dirichlet 
patterns and is attributed to constrained supplier choice and availability (Fader & 
Schmittlein, 1993).  Such constraints can arise from supplier framework 
agreements that result in restricted repertoires.  
 
The patterns of observed supplier loyalty in the coronary stent category show the 
typical patterns of a Dirichlet repertoire market (Sharp et al, 2002) where the 
buyers of a particular supplier tend to buy from other suppliers quite often.  The 
share of category requirements for the average supplier is less than 50%.  This is 
typical of competitive markets where buyers are highly experienced and have 
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well established supplier choice propensities such that the Dirichlet’s zero-order 
assumption holds (Ehrenberg et al, 2004). 
 
Partitioning of the market with a segment of high frequency buyers dominating 
the observed purchase behaviours is particularly noticeable.  Others has a much 
higher share of category requirements than that predicted by the Dirichlet model.  
This is an effect of the exclusion of Others from the repertoires of the heavy 
suppliers and the number of purchases used to operationalise the model.  Others 
is bought exclusively by the lighter purchasers who have few opportunities to 
use alternative suppliers, leading to high observed loyalty measures.  Such 
segmentation violates the Dirichlet distributional assumptions of lack of 
partitioning and the independence of supplier choices and purchase frequency 
(Sharp & Driesener, 2000).  
 
The analysis shows that the NBD-Dirichlet describes and predicts the observed 
purchasing patterns within much the same limits of scatter as previous Dirichlet 
studies (Ehrenberg, 1994), satisfying the test of “significant sameness” 
(Barwise, 1995).   
5.4.3 Managerial Implications 
The theoretical predictions of the NBD-Dirichlet model provide norms and 
benchmarks against which to assess current behaviours and to monitor the 
impact of managerial interventions (Ehrenberg & Sharp, 2000).  The managerial 
implications of the model are discussed below. 
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5.4.4 Buyer Repertoires 
Buyers in competitive Dirichlet type markets will typically purchase from a 
repertoire of several suppliers with fixed long term purchase frequencies and 
steady supplier choice probabilities (Goodhardt et al, 1984).  The single trust 
coronary stent case demonstrates how preferred supply agreements lead to 
restricted buyer repertoires.  In the single trust case the restricted repertoires 
appear well established and the heavy buying segment splits their purchases 
between the suppliers in this constrained choice set. 
5.4.4.1 Supplier Loyalty 
The loyalty shown to particular suppliers in a competitive Dirichlet market tends 
to be similar across all suppliers.  Buyers appear to welcome variety and choice  
(Ehrenberg et al, 2004), a behavioural pattern that is advantageous to purchasing 
managers seeking to encourage competition and choice in a particular category.   
Experienced buyers, such as those in the single trust cardiac stent case already 
exhibit split loyalty behaviour, albeit within a restricted repertoire. 
5.4.4.2 Dirichlet Predictions 
The Dirichlet model provides theoretical norms and benchmarks that can be 
used to assess patterns of behaviour (Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  The purchasing 
manager can use the model in a category audit to compare the observed 
behaviours with the Dirichlet predictions and identify deviations that may 
indicate non-compliance or maverick purchasing behaviour.  The analysis of the 
single trust coronary stent data appears to show rather well-behaved purchasers 
but possible deviations could include unexpectedly high purchase frequency for 
a particular supplier, perhaps in response to a local promotion or unexpectedly 
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high penetration for one of the smaller suppliers, indicating some maverick 
purchasing.  The analysis of purchase behaviours at an individual requisitioner 
level is a powerful tool for managing compliance with purchasing agreements. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented the analysis of the coronary stent purchasing data set 
from the single NHS trust..  The analysis shows that even with a relatively short 
analysis period, the NBD-Dirichlet describes and predicts the observed 
purchasing patterns with good accuracy.  Segmenting the population into a 
heavy (high frequency) segment that purchases from a restricted repertoire of 
suppliers and a light purchasing segment is shown to improve the accuracy of 
the predictions. 
 
The pilot study confirms the coronary stent category as suitable for analysis and 
demonstrates that stent purchasing patterns in a single hospital over a limited 
time period can be modelled using the NBD-Dirichlet.  The number of suppliers, 
the number of buyers and their experience and the frequency of purchase of the 
coronary stent category make it an interesting category for further analysis.  In 
addition, the ability of the Dirichlet to accurately model stent purchase data has 
been established, providing a sound basis for extension of the research to the 
more complex longitudinal analysis of the purchasing patterns in the 
collaborative purchasing hub. 
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6  Modelling Ureteral Stent Procurement in a 
Collaborative Purchasing Hub 
6.1 Introduction 
Data from three full purchasing years (April 2006 to March 2008) for reporting 
trusts in a Collaborative Purchasing Hub (CPH) have been analysed.  As one of 
the assumptions underpinning the Dirichlet model is that of non-partitioned 
markets, the full data set has been categorised into different categories of stent.  
Two major stent categories, ureteral and coronary, are analysed, allowing a 
comparison between purchasing patterns in the two categories. 
 
This chapter deals with ureteral stents, the largest category by number of 
purchase occasions. The coronary stent case will be presented in Chapter 7. A 
description of the data set is followed by the parameterisation of the model and 
testing for goodness of fit.  It is shown that the NBD-Dirichlet is able to 
satisfactorily describe and predict the observed purchasing behaviours. This is a 
substantial extension of the model into the analysis of dynamic behaviour in a 
collaborative public procurement purchasing environment. 
 
The model provides behaviour benchmarks against which the observed 
behaviours are assessed.  Systematic deviations from the model predictions are 
analysed in the context of the Dirichlet assumptions of stationarity and lack of 
partitioning.  It is shown that over the three year analysis period, there is 
considerable non-stationarity and two distinct segments based on purchase 
frequency are identified.  There is a major change in the relative market 
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positions of the two dominant suppliers during the analysis period.  However by 
choosing shorter time periods for analysis, the stability assumption can be 
approximately met and a comparison between successive time periods can be 
made to track the dynamic development of the market in a series of snapshots.   
 
In the cross-sectional analysis, deviations between the observed behavioural 
patterns and those predicted by the model are explained by the existence of a 
high purchase frequency (heavy purchasers) segment and a low purchase 
frequency segment (light purchasers) with distinctive and different purchasing 
behaviours.  The longitudinal analysis tracks the changes in market position of 
the two dominant suppliers.  There has been no purchasing management 
intervention in this category and the interviews with the procurement executives 
were unable to provide any qualitative data other than to comment that the 
observed changes are attributed to a ramp up in sales effort by one of the 
suppliers.   
 
The analysis shows how deviations from benchmark behaviours can be used to 
identify targets for purchasing management intervention, to suggest strategies 
for intervention and to either track the progress of such interventions or track 
changes in the market dynamics as a result of supplier activity.  As will be seen 
in Chapter 8, this observation has implications for public sector procurement 
departments seeking to rationalise supply relationships while nurturing 
innovation and diversity in the supply base. 
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6.2 Description of the Data 
6.2.1 Purchases by Requisitioner 
During the three year period, 45 purchasers made 591 purchases of the category, 
with two buyers alone accounting for almost half of all purchases (47.4%) as 
shown in Figure 6.1.  There is a long tail of infrequent buyers with 28 buyers 
making 5 or fewer purchases in the three years.   
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Figure 6.1 Ureteral stent purchases by requisitioner 
 
Excluding these infrequent buyers, who have less opportunity to change 
supplier, only 5 buyers fulfilled their requirements from a single supplier.  The 
top five buyers, accounting for 67% of purchase occasions, only purchased from 
the two dominant suppliers in the category.  The purchase choices of the 
remaining 40 buyers are shown in more detail in Figure 6.2 and demonstrate 
more diversity in supplier choice than the heavier purchasers 
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Ureteral stent purchasing by low frequency requisitioner
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Figure 6.2 Ureteral stent purchases by low frequency requisitioner 
 
The observed tendency for the heaviest purchasers to prefer the main suppliers 
in a category has already been noted in the analysis of the pilot data (Chapter 5) 
and is a preliminary indication of deviations from the Dirichlet model where the 
expectation would be for the heaviest buyers to have greatest opportunity to use 
some of the smaller suppliers, consistent with the phenomenon of Natural 
Monopoly (McPhee, 1963) where consumers of smaller suppliers are more 
likely to be heavy consumers of the category (Elberse, 2007).  The near 
exclusion of smaller suppliers from the larger buyers’ repertoires is consistent 
with the restrictive effect of preferred supplier agreements on buyer repertoires 
but violates the Dirichlet assumption of independence of supplier choice and 
purchase incidence. 
6.2.1.1 Poisson Assumption 
The NBD is based on the assumption that successive purchases by individual 
buyers are spread over time with a constant mean purchase frequency.  If this 
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assumption holds, the purchase distribution for an individual purchaser can be 
described by a Poisson process with mean  equal to the stable long run 
purchase frequency (see Section 3.4.2).  Half yearly purchases for each cost 
centre are tabulated in Table 6.1, demonstrating that the heaviest buyers 
(accounting for 60% of purchases) do exhibit a stable purchase frequency 
throughout the three year period.   
Table 6.1 Purchases by requisitioner (2006 – 2008) 
Cost Centre H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 Average
71 25 30 40 30 40 28 32.2
76 11 10 11 11 11 17 11.8
12 4 6 15 19 15 12 11.8
35 7 13 4 4.0
4 11 6 2.8
68 5 5 1 5 2.7
60 4 3 3 3 2.2
55 1 3 5 2 1 1 2.2
44 2 3 3 2 3 2.2
81 2 8 1.7
56 2 2 2 1 2 1.5
42 2 6 1.3
70 2 6 1.3
41 1 1 1 2 3 1.3
72 2 2 2 1.0
69 5 0.8
63 2 3 0.8
36 4 1 0.8
62 2 3 0.8
77 4 0.7
73 3 1 0.7
14 2 2 0.7
66 1 1 1 1 0.7
11 2 1 1 0.7
40 2 2 0.7
37 1 2 0.5
18 1 2 0.5
67 2 0.3
64 1 1 0.3
34 2 0.3
43 1 1 0.3
75 1 1 0.3
51 1 1 0.3
57 1 1 0.3
65 1 0.2
80 1 0.2
38 1 0.2
27 1 0.2
15 1 0.2
13 1 0.2
58 1 0.2
2 1 0.2
49 1 0.2
45 1 0.2
52 1 0.2
Total Purchases 62 78 124 112 85 94 92.5
Total Requisitioners 15 16 21 24 16 17 18.2
2006 2007 2008
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There is more observed variability in those buyers that purchase less frequently, 
with some purchasers active for only a portion of the overall time period but 
exhibiting a relatively constant purchase frequency within that period. 
6.2.2 Purchases by Supplier 
Two suppliers, Boston Scientific and Cook Medical, together account for 562 of 
the 591 purchase orders, 95% of the total (Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2 Ureteral stent purchases by supplier 
BOSTON COOK ROCKET BARD EUROMEDICAL TOTAL
2006 102 40 4 4 0 150
2007 127 105 3 6 6 247
2008 73 115 5 1 0 194
TOTAL 302 260 12 11 6 591
 
 
Table 6.2 also shows a noticeable increase in purchases of Cook over the three 
years such that Cook has displaced Boston as the dominant supplier by 2008.  
This change in Cook’s position can also be seen in Figure 6.3 which plots the 
development in market share for the five suppliers.  It can be seen that a period 
of relative stability when Boston enjoyed a market share of about 70% with 
Cook at about 25% started to change towards the end of 2006 (beginning of 
calendar year 2007).  This was followed by about 9 months of volatility before 
another period of relative stability between Month 18 and Month 27.  The 
remaining months show a sustained but variable market share advantage for 
Cook.  Discussions with purchasing executives in the hub have confirmed that 
there has been no purchasing management intervention in this category and that 
the changes in supplier position are the result of increased promotional activity 
by Cook.  
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Analysis of the monthly purchase frequency over the same period shows that 
this increase in market share for Cook is accompanied by a slight increase in 
purchase frequency over the same period (Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.3 Monthly market share by supplier 
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Figure 6.4 Monthly purchase frequency by supplier 
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Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show that the market is non-stationary with a clear trend 
through the three year period as Cook displaces Boston as the dominant supplier.  
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 compare the predicted purchasing behaviour in six months 
and thirty-six months based on the first six months of the data set and on an 
average six month base period (averaged over the 36 month data set).   
Table 6.3 Dirichlet predictions (average six months, first six months) 
Base Period Supplier O T O T O T
Boston 15.2% 15.6% 4.0 3.8 65.8% 67.6%
Cook 11.3% 13.3% 4.3 3.6 58.6% 61.5%
Others 3.5% 2.0% 1.6 2.9 64.3% 42.2%
Average Supplier 10.0% 10.3% 3.3 3.4 62.9% 57.1%
Correlation, r 0.98 0.95 -0.09
Mean Absolute Deviation 1.3% 0.7 8.9%
Boston 12.5% 14.8% 4.3 3.6 76.8% 80.2%
Cook 7.5% 6.8% 2.7 2.9 80.0% 56.5%
Others 2.5% 1.4% 1.5 2.6 100.0% 47.0%
Average Supplier 7.5% 7.7% 2.8 3.1 85.6% 61.2%
Correlation, r 0.99 0.99 -0.80
Mean Absolute Deviation 1.4% 0.7 26.6%
Average 6 months
First 6 months
SCRPenetration Purchase Frequency
 
 
Table 6.4 Dirichlet predictions (3 year) 
Base Period Supplier O T O T O T
Boston 37.5% 27.2% 9.7 13.3 58.2% 59.5%
Cook 35.0% 24.0% 8.3 12.2 48.9% 51.9%
Others 10.0% 4.2% 3.5 8.3 44.4% 28.8%
Average Supplier 56.2% 18.5% 12.2 11.3 50.5% 46.7%
Correlation, r 1.00 1.00 0.89
Mean Absolute Deviation 9.0% 4.1 6.6%
Boston 37.5% 25.9% 9.7 12.5 58.2% 74.0%
Cook 35.0% 13.5% 8.3 8.9 48.9% 43.6%
Others 10.0% 3.1% 3.5 7.3 44.4% 32.1%
Average Supplier 56.2% 14.2% 12.2 9.5 50.5% 49.9%
Correlation, r 0.88 0.87 1.00
Mean Absolute Deviation 13.3% 2.4 11.1%
First 6 months
SCRPenetration Purchase Frequency
Average 6 months
 
 
Table 6.3 presents the predictions for a six month period and Table 6.4 the 
predicted behaviours for the 36 month period.  It can be seen from the 
164 
correlations and the Mean Absolute Deviation that there is an approximate fit 
between the observed data and the predictions for both base periods for 
penetration and purchase frequency although not for share of category 
requirements.  In both cases the fit deteriorates when the predictions are 
extended to 36 months although the average six months does a better job of 
predicting behaviours over this period as it captures the growth in the 
penetration for Cook.  This analysis confirms the observation from the charts 
that there is a clear trend in Cook’s market position.  The initial conditions (first 
six months) provide less good predictions of three year performance than the 
averaged conditions, demonstrating that there are changes in behaviour over the 
three years.  Cross sectional analysis of shorter time periods within the data set 
will allow analysis of the way in which the market structure has developed. 
6.2.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 6.5 a-c shows the summary statistics for 2006, 2007 and 2008.  The total 
purchases differ slightly from those shown in Table 6.2 because the “year” in 
Table 6.5 (and Table 6.1) is taken to be 48 weeks (12 equal 4 week periods) 
rather than calendar months. 
 
The tables show the progression in Cook market share and purchase frequency 
and the typical Dirichlet patterns of a wide range in market share and penetration 
across the five suppliers but much less variation in purchase frequency.  
However, the patterns of Double Jeopardy are quite marked where the low share 
suppliers (Rocket, Bard and Euromedical) not only have fewer buyers but also a 
much lower frequency of purchase than the two dominant suppliers.   
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Table 6.5 Summary statistics 2006 - 2008 
(a) 48 weeks 2006 Summary Statistics
Supplier
Number of 
Purchases
Number of 
Buyers
Purchase 
Frequency Penetration (%)
Market Share 
(%)
Boston 99 15 6.6 37.5% 70.7%
Cook 34 10 3.4 25.0% 24.3%
Rocket 4 1 4 2.5% 2.9%
Bard 3 1 3 2.5% 2.1%
Euromedical 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0%
Total 140 20 7 50.0%
(b) 48 weeks 2007 Summary Statistics
Supplier
Number of 
Purchases
Number of 
Buyers
Purchase 
Frequency Penetration (%)
Market Share 
(%)
Boston 121 21 5.8 52.5% 51.3%
Cook 100 13 7.7 32.5% 42.4%
Rocket 3 2 1.5 5.0% 1.3%
Bard 6 4 1.5 10.0% 2.5%
Euromedical 6 2 3.0 5.0% 2.5%
Total 236 29 8.1 72.5%
(c) 48 weeks 2008 Summary Statistics
Supplier
Number of 
Purchases
Number of 
Buyers
Purchase 
Frequency Penetration Market Share
Boston 68 11 6.2 27.5% 38.0%
Cook 105 15 7.0 37.5% 58.7%
Rocket 5 2 2.5 5.0% 2.8%
Bard 1 1 1.0 2.5% 0.6%
Euromedical 0 0.0% 0.0%
Total 179 20 9.0 50.0%
Total 12 Months (2006)
Total 12 Months (2007)
Total 12 Months (2008)
 
6.3 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
6.3.1 Sample Frame 
As has been noted in the previous section, there is some year to year variability 
in both market share and purchase frequency for particular brands, and some 
movement in the purchasing population.  To accommodate this variability, the 
model is parameterised using a 12 week period from each year and tested for 
goodness of fit against this period and a contiguous, successive 12 week period.  
The sample and test periods are taken from times when the market shares of the 
main suppliers are relatively stable.  The sample periods and their corresponding 
hold-out samples are 2006, weeks 13 to 24 and weeks 25 to 36, 2007, weeks 25 
166 
to 36 and weeks 37 to 48 (weeks 77 to 88 and 89 to 100 in the full three year 
data set) and 2008, weeks 13 to 24 and weeks 25 to 36 (weeks 117 to 128 and 
129 to 140 in the three year data set). Loyalty performance measures (share of 
category requirements) are also compared across the three year period. 
6.3.2 Purchase Distributions 
The purchase distributions (i.e. proportion of purchasers making 0, 1, 2, 3, … 
purchases in the time period) predicted by the NBD are compared to the 
observed distributions. A simple correlation test is used to assess the fit between 
the predicted distribution and the observed distributions for both the base period 
(i.e. the period used to fit the distribution) and the hold-out period. 
 
Table 6.6 Comparison between observed and predicted distribution of purchases 
Observed distribution
Year Supplier Base Period Hold-out Period Base Period Hold-out Period Standard Deviation
Boston 0.94 0.96 4.2 4.8 18.6
Cook 0.93 0.83 6.2 7.1 26.7
Others 0.98 0.98 4.6 4.6 33.3
Any 0.97 0.96 4.5 3.8 19.6
Boston 0.87 0.94 5.7 4.1 15.6
Cook 0.80 0.81 8.0 7.7 15.9
Others 0.97 0.97 6.3 6.3 33.3
Any 0.96 0.96 3.6 4.7 13.3
Boston 0.40 0.88 13.5 6.4 16.7
Cook 0.86 0.88 10.4 6.1 24.6
Others 0.99 0.99 2.7 2.7 33.3
Any 0.85 0.91 9.7 4.6 22.6
Correlation between observed and 
theoretical distributions (r) 
Mean Absolute Deviation between 
observed and theoretical 
distributions
2006
2007
2008
 
 
The strength of the correlations is high in all cases except Boston in 2008.  In 15 
of the 24 cases (62.5%) the correlation coefficient, r, is higher than the 
benchmark correlation coefficient of 0.9 and in 23 of the 24 cases (96%) r is 
higher than 0.8 (Table 6.6).  The mean absolute deviation (MAD) is also 
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presented in the table and in all cases the MAD is small compared to the 
standard deviation of the observed distribution.  The NBD is able to describe the 
observed data and to predict behaviour in a subsequent period with some 
accuracy although as will be seen below there is a systematic tendency to 
underestimate light buyers and overestimate heavy buyers. 
 
Plotting the observed and expected distributions (Figures 6.5 to 6.8) also shows 
a generally good fit between the model predictions and the observed data.  The 
charts only show the observed distribution from the base period: the observed 
data from the hold out sample is omitted for clarity. 
 
The plotted distribution for the category (Figure 6.8) shows that the model 
underestimates both the proportion of light buyers (especially once only buyers) 
overestimates the proportion of heavier (two purchases or more) buyers.  The 
under-estimation of light buyers has been observed previously in the NBD and 
has been attributed to “never buyers” (Dunn et al, 1983).  In 2007 the proportion 
of light buyers of Cook is overestimated.  The proportion of light buyers of 
Boston is a close fit in 2006 and overestimated in 2008.  For Cook in 2007 and 
Boston in 2008 the over-estimation results from the impact of a relatively small 
number of unusually high frequency buyers (see Table 6.7). 
 
The underestimation of both light and heavy buyers is most marked when the 
purchasing population is most polarised i.e. a small number of buyers accounts 
for a large proportion of purchases.  As can be seen from Table 6.1, the top three 
buyers account for approximately 60% of purchases in 2006, 50% in 2007 and 
70% in 2008.  The relatively small buying population also distorts the picture.  
In the case of Boston in 2008, the contribution of the small purchasing 
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population to the poor fit can be seen clearly.  In this case there are only three 
purchasers and thus each represents 33.3% of the purchasing population.  The 
behaviour of these three relatively high volume purchasers has an extremely 
distorting effect on the observed distribution. 
 
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 also show that between 2006 and 2007 the proportion of 
light buyers decreased for both Boston and Cook.  In 2008 the observed 
proportion of light buyers of Boston fell again while that for Cook returned to 
the 2006 level.  This pattern can also be seen in the data for penetration and 
purchase frequency and will be discussed further in the next section. 
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Figure 6.5 Expected and observed distribution of purchases (Boston) 2006 – 2008 
 
169 
Distribution of Purchases (Cook)
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Figure 6.6 Expected and observed distribution of purchases (Cook) 2006 – 2008 
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Figure 6.7 Expected and observed distribution of purchases (Others) 2006 – 2008 
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Distribution of Purchases (Any)
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Figure 6.8 Expected and observed distribution of purchases for product category 
(Any) 2006 – 2008 
6.3.3 Penetration Growth 
Table 6.7 presents the observed and expected 12 week penetration rates and 
purchase frequencies for each supplier over the three years.  It can be seen that 
the penetrations for both Boston and Cook change markedly across the three 
years as Cook improves its market position to become the market leader.  The 
decline in Boston’s share of the market is clearly linked to a reduction in the 
number of purchasers – fewer buyers are choosing Boston in 2008 compared to 
2007 and 2006.  There is a corresponding increase in the share of the purchasing 
population that choose Cook in 2007 and 2008.  Between 2006 and 2007 the 
number of purchasers (in the base period) increased from 13 to 17, resulting in a 
general increase in penetration for the category that is reflected across all the 
suppliers.  However in the base period in 2008 the number of purchasers 
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dropped back to 10.  Cook kept the purchasers gained in 2007 (12 week 
penetration 20%) while Boston lost purchasers and hence market share. 
Table 6.7 Observed and theoretical performance measures (12 week analysis 
period) 
Year Supplier O T O T
Boston 17.5% 25.6% 2.9 1.9
Cook 12.5% 13.1% 1.6 1.5
Others 5.0% 3.8% 1.0 1.3
Average Supplier 11.7% 14.2% 1.8 1.6
Correlation, r 0.98 1.00
Mean Absolute Deviation 3.3% 0.5
Boston 30.0% 30.5% 2.3 2.3
Cook 15.0% 31.1% 4.8 2.3
Others 7.5% 5.0% 1.0 1.5
Average Supplier 17.5% 22.2% 2.7 2.0
Correlation, r 0.74 0.76
Mean Absolute Deviation 6.4% 1.0
Boston 7.5% 15.4% 4.0 1.9
Cook 20.0% 19.8% 2.4 2.4
Others 2.5% 2.2% 1.0 1.2
Average Supplier 10.0% 12.4% 2.5 1.8
Correlation, r 0.87 0.55
Mean Absolute Deviation 2.8% 0.8
2008
Penetration Purchase Frequency
2006
2007
 
 
Buyers of Boston continue to purchase at roughly the same frequency through 
the three years although there is an increase in 2008 as purchases of Boston are 
consolidated into a smaller number of heavier purchasers. The purchase 
frequency for Cook increases sharply in 2007 before falling back in 2008. 
 
A comparison of the observed (O) and theoretical (T) penetrations and purchase 
frequencies shows that there are some deviations from the NBD-Dirichlet 
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model.  In 2007 and 2008 the correlation coefficients are lower than the 0.9 
benchmark.  In 2007 the Mean Absolute Deviation between observed and 
theoretical penetration rates is also large compared to the performance in 2006 
and 2008.  In all cases where there are deviations these tend to overestimate the 
penetration (i.e. the number of buyers) and underestimate the purchase 
frequency.  These deviations arise because the purchasing population is 
partitioned into a “heavy” segment with a few high frequency buyers and a 
“light” segment with the remainder of buyers.   
 
Table 6.8 Observed and theoretical performance measures, heavy purchasers (12 
week analysis period) 
Year Supplier O T O T
Boston 5.0% 6.0% 6.5 5.4
Cook 2.5% 2.0% 4 4.9
Others 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.0
Average Supplier 3.8% 4.0% 5.3 5.1
Correlation, r 0.98 0.95
Mean Absolute Deviation 0.5% 0.7
Boston 5.0% 5.5% 6.0 5.3
Cook 7.5% 6.7% 7.3 8.1
Others 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.0
Average Supplier 6.3% 6.1% 6.7 6.7
Correlation, r 0.99 0.98
Mean Absolute Deviation 0.4% 0.5
Boston 5.0% 5.8% 5.5 4.7
Cook 7.5% 6.3% 4.7 5.5
Others 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0
Average Supplier 6.3% 6.0% 5.1 5.1
Correlation, r 0.97 0.96
Mean Absolute Deviation 0.7% 0.5
2008
Penetration Purchase Frequency
2006
2007
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Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show the expected 12 week penetration rates for a “heavy” 
segment (containing the three cost centres with the highest number of purchases) 
and a “light” segment containing the remainder of the purchasing cost centres.   
 
Table 6.9 Observed and theoretical performance measures, light purchasers (12 
week analysis period) 
Year Supplier O T O T
Boston 12.5% 15.0% 1.4 1.2
Cook 10.0% 9.1% 1.0 1.1
Others 5.0% 4.8% 1.0 1.0
Average Supplier 9.2% 9.7% 1.1 1.1
Correlation, r 0.96 0.87
Mean Absolute Deviation 1.2% 0.1
Boston 25.0% 27.0% 1.6 1.5
Cook 7.5% 13.8% 2.3 1.3
Others 7.5% 6.4% 1.0 1.2
Average Supplier 13.3% 15.7% 1.6 1.3
Correlation, r 0.94 0.29
Mean Absolute Deviation 3.1% 0.4
Boston 2.0% 1.0
Cook 10.0% 1.0
Others 2.0% 1.0
Average Supplier 4.7% 1.0
Correlation, r
Mean Absolute Deviation
2008
Penetration Purchase Frequency
2006
2007
 
 
The NBD-Dirichlet describes penetration rates and purchase frequency for the 
heavy purchasers with good accuracy as assessed by both the correlation 
coefficient and the Mean Absolute Deviation (Table 6.8).  The fit for the light 
segment is less good (Table 6.9).  It has not been possible to fit the model for the 
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2008 data (seven purchasers, each making a single purchase) but the observed 
measures are presented in Table 6.9. 
 
Table 6.8 shows that in the heavy purchasing segment there is little change in 
Boston’s performance over the three years but that Cook gains buyers (from one 
of the heavy buyers in 2006 to all three in 2007 and 2008).  The largest deviation 
in the light purchasing segment occurs for Cook in 2007 where the penetration is 
overestimated and the purchase frequency underestimated.  There is a general 
reduction in the number of purchasers in the light segment, perhaps as a result of 
some buyer consolidation, and a notable collapse in the number of Boston 
purchasers from a penetration of 25% (10 purchasers) to 2.5% (1 purchaser). 
6.3.4 Share of Category Requirements 
Share of Category Requirements (SCR) is a widely used loyalty measure and is 
one of the outputs of the NBD-Dirichlet model.  As well as providing an 
assessment of the fit of the model, the trends in SCR provide some insights into 
the changes in market position taking place over the three year time period. 
 
Table 6.10 shows the observed and theoretical SCR for Boston, Cook and the 
aggregated Others for the entire purchasing population and the heavy and light 
segments as defined in the previous section.  The SCR for Others is overstated 
because of the effect of aggregating three small suppliers into one and because 
the overall purchase frequencies for buyers of Others tend to be very low, giving 
few opportunities to satisfy requirements from alternative suppliers.  This 
aggregated supplier accounts for less than 10% of overall purchases and will not 
be discussed further. 
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It can be seen that the fit for the entire population is not good with the 
correlation coefficient less than 0.9 in 2006 and 2007 and large deviations in all 
cases, although this is somewhat distorted by the Others data.  All but one of the 
deviations is in the same direction, suggesting a systematic bias towards 
underestimating loyalty.  
 
Such deviations from the Dirichlet benchmarks have been described in the 
literature (Fader & Schmittlein, 1993; Bhattacharya, 1997) as “excess 
behavioural loyalty”.  This excess loyalty has been noted as a systematic 
deviation from the Dirichlet model, in particular for market leading brands and 
as a result has been identified as a market share premium.  In this case however, 
all suppliers (with the exception of Cook in 2008) have the loyalty premium. 
Fader & Schmittlein (1993) attributed such deviations to underlying 
segmentation of the market place with particular reference to brand availability.  
In the current case, such segmentation may be related to purchase frequency 
(heavy and light buyers) or constraints on availability.  These constraints may be 
organisational (cost of evaluating new vendors or perceived absence of choice 
(Jarvis & Wilcox, 1977)), habitual (we’ve always bought from this supplier), 
policy related (a sole supply agreement) or distribution related (the sales rep 
stops calling because he never makes any sales).  Table 6.10 shows a good fit for 
the heavy purchasers and a less good fit for the light purchasers.   
 
Loyalty measures for light purchasers are affected by the opportunity that light 
purchasers have to repurchase (Stern & Hammond, 2004).  In 2006 only one 
purchaser makes more than one purchase, in 2007 five buyers make more than 
one purchase and in 2008 no buyers make more than one purchase.  Stern and 
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Hammond (2004) also note that loyalty measures such as SCR are dependent on 
the number of purchases used to calculate the measures.  They observe that SCR 
declines sharply between 5 and 15 purchases, declines more slowly from 15 to 
60 purchases after which it changes very little.  Even the heaviest purchasers in 
the current sample only occasionally exceed 15 purchases in the analysis period. 
 
Table 6.10 Share of Category Requirements 
Year Supplier O T O T O T
Boston 95.2% 76.4% 100.0% 93.4% 87.5% 82.4%
Cook 88.9% 51.1% 100.0% 79.9% 80.0% 74.1%
Others 100.0% 40.2% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 68.9%
Average Supplier 94.7% 55.9% 100.0% 86.7% 89.2% 75.1%
Correlation, r -0.22 0.99 -0.51
Mean Absolute Deviation 38.8% 8.9% 14.0%
Boston 69.0% 58.2% 42.9% 36.9% 100.0% 77.5%
Cook 69.0% 58.0% 64.7% 65.6% 87.5% 59.5%
Others 42.9% 29.5% 0.0% 0.0% 42.9% 52.3%
Average Supplier 58.5% 48.3% 53.8% 51.2% 76.8% 63.1%
Correlation, r 1.00 0.99 0.85
Mean Absolute Deviation 11.7% 2.3% 20.0%
Boston 60.0% 46.6% 57.9% 46.1% 100.0%
Cook 63.3% 65.0% 56.0% 57.6% 100.0%
Others 100.0% 19.5% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Average Supplier 74.4% 43.7% 56.9% 51.9% 100.0%
Correlation, r -0.88 0.98
Mean Absolute Deviation 31.9% 4.5%
2008
Heavy Segment Light SegmentEntire population
2006
2007
 
 
Several patterns can be identified from the SCR measures.  The heavy 
purchasers generally exhibit lower loyalty levels than light purchasers.  This is 
to be expected as the heavier purchasers have more opportunities to change 
supplier.  Over the three years of the analysis the observed and predicted loyalty 
levels decline as the heavy (and initially extremely loyal) purchasers of Boston 
add Cook to their purchasing repertoire.  In 2007 and 2008 the measures 
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approach the Dirichlet norms.  By 2008 Cook’s excess behavioural loyalty has 
been eliminated although Boston still enjoys a small premium. 
6.3.5 Duplication of Purchases 
Analysis of the other suppliers purchased by buyers of a particular supplier can 
be useful to identify clustering of particular suppliers or to identify potential 
substitute suppliers to facilitate supplier development or supplier rationalisation 
initiatives.  In this case with only two dominant suppliers the analysis is perhaps 
a little artificial in that if purchasers of Boston do buy from another supplier, it is 
quite likely that the other supplier will be Cook.  This expected pattern of 
behaviour is indeed observed as can be seen in Table 6.11.  There is little 
duplication of purchase between Others and either Boston or Cook reflecting the 
low number of purchasers of Others.   
 
The way in which the duplication of purchase develops through the three years 
shows that buyers of Boston become more likely to buy also from Cook.  In 
2006 only 14.3% of Boston buyers buy from Cook.  By 2008 this percentage has 
increased to 66.7%.  Over the same period, the same analysis for Cook shows 
that the percentage of Cook buyers that also buy from Boston remains relatively 
steady. 
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Table 6.11 Observed duplication of purchase (entire buying population) 
First Purchase
Buyers who purchase from: Boston Cook Others
Boston - 14.3% 0.0%
Cook 20.0% - 0.0%
Others 0.0% 0.0% -
Average observed duplication 10.0% 7.1% 0.0%
Boston - 16.7% 0.0%
Cook 33.3% - 16.7%
Others 0.0% 33.3% -
Average observed duplication 16.7% 25.0% 8.3%
Boston - 66.7% 0.0%
Cook 25.0% - 0.0%
Others 0.0% 0.0% -
Average observed duplication 12.5% 33.3% 0.0%
Second Purchase
Who also purchase from:
Year
2006
2007
2008
 
 
The trend for buyers of Boston to increase the extent to which they also 
purchase from Cook can be observed even more clearly when the duplication for 
the heavy purchasers is considered.  It is this segment that has shown the biggest 
change in purchasing behaviour (see Table 6.10 in previous section) and the 
increased tendency towards split loyalty behaviour is also demonstrated in the 
duplication behaviours.  Table 6.12 presents the duplication of purchase for the 
heavy segment.  In 2006 these heavy purchasers are solely loyal – there is no 
duplication of purchase.  However in 2007 and 2008 all buyers of Boston also 
buy from Cook and two thirds of buyers of Cook also buy from Boston. 
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Table 6.12 Observed duplication of purchase (heavy purchasing segment) 
First Purchase
Buyers who purchase from: Boston Cook Others
Boston - 0.0% 0.0%
Cook 0.0% - 0.0%
Others 0.0% 0.0% -
Average observed duplication 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Boston - 100.0% 0.0%
Cook 66.7% - 0.0%
Others 0.0% 0.0% -
Average observed duplication 66.7% 100.0% 0.0%
Boston - 100.0% 0.0%
Cook 66.7% - 0.0%
Others 0.0% 0.0% -
Average observed duplication 66.7% 100.0% 0.0%
2007
2008
Year
Who also purchase from:
Second Purchase
2006
 
6.4 Discussion 
The preceding empirical analysis has shown that the reported purchasing 
behaviour can be satisfactorily modelled using the NBD-Dirichlet.  Although the 
fit is generally good, some systematic deviations from the model behaviour are 
observed.  These deviations may arise from sampling errors introduced by the 
relatively small number of purchasers or errors and omissions in the data set 
(Ehrenberg, 1988).  Deviations will also occur as a result of violation of the 
Dirichlet assumptions of stationarity, lack of partitioning and the independence 
of supplier choice and purchase incidence (Sharp & Driesener, 2000).   
 
No detailed qualitative analysis was conducted as the ureteral stent category had 
not been subject to any procurement intervention.  However, the ureteral stent 
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case was raised during the interviews with purchasing executive at the 
collaborative procurement hub.  The Deputy Director of Procurement confirmed 
that the ureteral stent category had not been the subject of any procurement 
intervention and that the change in market structure appears to have been the 
result of an aggressive and targeted promotional campaign by Cook.  As the 
Deputy Director commented during the interview, “They’ve certainly been busy 
over the last few years.  They’ve invested a hell of a lot in their sales force in the 
region.” 
6.4.1 Dirichlet Assumptions 
Although the largest purchasers of the category have relatively stable purchasing 
rates, their supplier choices change through the three year analysis period.  There 
is also a large amount of churn in the remainder of the buying population with 
buyers becoming inactive or active.  The Dirichlet is a steady state model and is 
based on the assumption of stationary markets. As the behaviour over the three 
year analysis period is non-stationary, the time periods for analysis have been 
chosen to give approximately stable purchasing behaviour for the cross sectional 
analysis.  As can be seen from the comparison between time periods in the 
longitudinal analysis, there are major differences between the behaviours in 
these periods. 
 
The second assumption that underpins the Dirichlet analysis is that the market is 
non-partitioned.  The analysis has shown that segments based on purchase 
frequency (heavy and light purchasers) can be identified and that 
operationalising the model using these segments leads to an improved fit 
between the model predictions and observed behaviour.  This may be a 
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statistical effect related to the number of purchases used to operationalise the 
model (Stern & Hammond, 2004) or the impact of the restricted repertoire 
exhibited by the heavy purchasers.  Heavy buyers may be more likely to 
standardise or to have preferred supply agreements that constrain choice and 
hence availability of particular suppliers.  The distorting impact of a small 
number of high frequency buyers has been noted before (Bowman & Lele-
Pingle, 1997) and may be a feature of organisational markets.  The heavy 
purchasers in this case are all acute hospital trusts with specialist urology 
centres.  In addition, the heaviest buyer, and the trust in which the largest change 
in buying behaviour has been observed (100% loyal to Boston in 2006, 
purchases split equally between Cook and Boston in 2008), is a teaching hospital 
and potentially more open to alternative suppliers. 
 
The ureteral stents case shows a successful intervention to develop a supplier as 
an alternative to a dominant supplier.  Although this results from the actions of a 
supplier the analysis of this case points to several important implications for the 
theory and practice of organisational purchase behaviour. 
6.4.2 Theoretical Implications 
The analysis of the ureteral stent case represents a substantial extension of the 
NBD-Dirichlet model into a complex collaborative public procurement 
environment.  Although the case describes a supplier intervention, the analysis 
shows how the understanding of buyer behaviour provided by the model adds to 
the theory of collaborative purchasing. 
182 
6.4.2.1 Extension and Replication of the NBD-Dirichlet Empirical 
Generalisation 
The ureteral stent case is a differentiated replication of the NBD-Dirichlet model 
carried out to determine to what extent the model is generalisable to a new set of 
conditions (Lindsay & Ehrenberg, 1993), in this case the procurement of 
surgical supplies in a collaborative public procurement organisation.  The fit of 
the expected behaviours predicted by the NBD-Dirichlet model with the 
observed purchasing behaviour patterns have been shown to satisfy the test of 
“stochastic sameness” (Ehrenberg & Bound, 1993).  The specific conditions of 
the case, in particular organisational purchasing, public procurement, 
collaborative purchasing and expert purchasing where the choice is not made by 
the consumer represent a highly differentiated replication of the model. 
 
The patterns of purchasing behaviour are typical of Dirichlet markets, with the 
larger suppliers having much higher market share and penetration than the 
smaller suppliers while the purchase frequencies for each supplier are similar, 
except for the Double Jeopardy effect where the smaller suppliers are purchased 
slightly less frequently (Ehrenberg, 1988).   
 
The initial loyalty behaviours in the ureteral stent case are typical of a Dirichlet 
subscription market (Sharp et al, 2002) where buyers of a particular supplier 
tend to be solely loyal to that supplier.  However by the end of the three year 
analysis period the patterns are much more like a repertoire market (Sharp et al, 
2002).  This is to be expected as buyers become more experienced with the 
alternative supplier to the point where it becomes established in the buyers’ 
purchase portfolios. 
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Systematic deviations from the model predictions are observed, including a 
tendency to overestimate the number of buyers (penetration) and to 
underestimate purchase frequency and share of category requirements.  These 
deviations result from a violation of the Dirichlet assumption of lack of 
partitioning (Sharp & Driesener, 2000) with a segment of high frequency buyers 
dominating the observed purchase behaviours.  This concentration of high 
frequency buyers has also been noted in the analysis of foreign exchange 
services (Bowman & Lele-Pingle, 1997) and may be a repeatable characteristic 
of organisation markets. 
6.4.2.2 Application of the NBD-Dirichlet Model to Collaborative 
Purchasing 
The collaborative purchasing literature focuses on the mechanisms by which 
purchasing consortia arise, the development of purchasing groups and their 
governance (Schotanus & Telgen, 2007).  There has been little research into the 
actual buying behaviours of organisations within purchasing consortia.  The 
application of the Dirichlet in a collaborative purchasing context provides a 
coherent theory of purchasing behaviour to describe, predict and explain buyer 
behaviour in purchasing consortia. 
 
One of the underlying Dirichlet assumptions is that of the repertoire of suppliers 
from which a buyer chooses with a steady and predictable probability each time 
a purchase is made.  The ureteral stent case shows how the concept of the 
purchasing portfolio or repertoire is an important basis for analysing and 
understanding purchasing interventions associated with standardisation or 
rationalisation.  Supplier development can be understood as an extension to the 
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buyer’s repertoire, as evidenced by the performance of Cook over the analysis 
period.  Although a stationary model, the NBD-Dirichlet can be applied over a 
series of time periods to allow analysis of dynamic developments in market 
structure as a result of such purchasing interventions. 
 
The ureteral stent case also demonstrates how the model provides a baseline for 
interpretation of observed loyalty.  Deviations from the Dirichlet norms can be 
used as a point of departure for further investigation such as the identification of 
distinct heavy and light purchasing segments within the buying population.   
The observed behaviours show a marked deviation from the expected patterns, 
in particular the constrained choice sets of the heavy buying segment.  This 
group would be expected to have more opportunity to try alternative suppliers 
and be better informed about the supplier choices available to them than the 
lighter buyers.  Thus the heaviest purchasers would have the greatest 
opportunity to use the smaller suppliers and the lightest purchasers would be 
more likely to use the dominant suppliers, the Natural Monopoly Phenomenon 
(McPhee, 1963).  This deviation appears to be due to preferred supply 
agreements constraining supplier choice and is likely to be replicated in other 
purchasing environments characterised by framework agreements.   
6.4.3 Managerial Implications 
The theoretical predictions of the NBD-Dirichlet model provide norms and 
benchmarks against which to assess current behaviours and to monitor the 
impact of managerial interventions (Ehrenberg & Sharp, 2000).  The 
implications of the model for managers in collaborative procurement 
organisations are discussed below. 
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6.4.3.1 Buyer Repertoires 
Experienced buyers in Dirichlet markets typically purchase from a repertoire of 
several suppliers with steady long term purchase frequencies and fixed supplier 
choice probabilities (Goodhardt et al, 1984).  Purchasing managers who wish to 
introduce a new supplier or develop an existing supplier to improve competition 
and increase leverage over the supply base need the new supplier to become 
established in buyer repertoires so that the supplier attracts more buyers 
(Ehrenberg, 1988) and the buyers develop enough experience with the new 
supplier for the choice to become routinised.  The ureteral stent case provides a 
good illustration of the impact of a sustained supplier development effort, albeit 
an effort initiated by the supplier itself. Between 2006 and 2008 Cook grows its 
market share from 24% to 59% by increasing penetration (the number of buyers) 
from 25% to 37.5%. By 2008 Cook is established in the majority of buyer 
repertoires. 
 
The ureteral stent case also demonstrates that interventions to change the 
distribution of purchases must focus on changing the number of buyers for a 
particular supplier (i.e. the penetration), rather than the frequency of purchase of 
particular suppliers.  Between 2006 and 2007, Cook gained customers and saw 
an increase in purchase frequency, primarily because the customers gained wre 
high frequency purchasers.  From 2007 to 2008, Cook’s purchase frequency 
returned to a level close to the long term average as more new (low purchase 
frequency) customers bought from Cook.  Similar conclusions have been drawn 
from the consumer marketing field where market share and sales increases have 
been shown to come from gaining new buyers, not from increased purchase 
frequency from existing buyers (Goodhardt et al, 1984).  Experience from 
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consumer marketing also suggests that consumer behaviour often returns to long 
run average behaviour after a short term promotion (Ehrenberg, 1994).  The 
change in Cook’s position in the ureteral stent case has been achieved over a 
sustained period and appears to be a permanent adjustment.  Further monitoring 
would indicate whether the new purchasing patterns are sustained. 
 
6.4.3.2 Supplier Loyalty 
The loyalty shown to particular suppliers in a competitive Dirichlet market tends 
to be similar across all suppliers.  Buyers appear to welcome variety and choice  
(Ehrenberg et al, 2004), an observation noted in the collaborative hub coronary 
stent case.  This persistent split-loyalty behaviour typical of Dirichlet markets is 
advantageous to purchasing managers seeking to encourage competition and 
choice in a particular category. The assumption of as-if random purchasing 
behaviours where loyalty is split between suppliers in a purchasing repertoire 
has implications for purchasing managers seeking to make interventions to 
change the purchasing behaviours of members of the purchasing group.   
 
The ureteral stent case demonstrates the development of such split-loyalty 
behaviours.  The conditions in the ureteral stent case show high levels of sole 
loyalty (Table 6.10) at the start of the analysis period such that buyers satisfy 
most of their requirements from a single supplier.  By the end of the analysis 
period the ureteral stent buyers have gained experience of an alternative supplier 
and exhibit the split loyalty behaviours typical of a Dirichlet market.  It is not 
clear from the data whether the initial high levels of sole loyalty result from 
inexperienced buyers who gain experience of Cook during the period of analysis 
or whether the initial position is determined by distribution effects.  The 
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exploratory interviews suggest that the increase in Cook’s market share arises 
from increased sales activity – the equivalent of a sustained promotional effort 
or securing more distribution outlets for a product.  Analysis of subsequent time 
periods would show if Boston responds to Cook’s improved performance such 
that the relative positions stabilise into a kind of stationary competitive 
equilibrium or whether the positions at the end of 2008 persist. 
 
Excess behavioural loyalty (as measured by SCR) can be an indicator of the 
existence of segments where purchasing behaviours are constrained by habit, 
policy or availability of particular suppliers (Fader & Schmittlein, 1993).  Thus 
comparison of observed and predicted SCR identifies such behaviours and 
allows the progress of any supplier development interventions to be tracked.  
Analysis of the purchase duplications can assist purchasing managers to identify 
acceptable substitute products or suppliers and form the basis of a supplier 
development initiative. 
6.4.3.3 Dirichlet Predictions 
The Dirichlet model provides theoretical norms and benchmarks that can be 
used to assess patterns of behaviour.  It can also be used for scenario planning, 
for example to model the introduction of a new supplier, the development of an 
existing supplier or the removal of an existing supplier.  As seen in the analysis 
of the longitudinal ureteral stent data the Dirichlet can also be used to analyse 
dynamic market development over an extended period (Ehrenberg et al, 2004). 
 
In 2006, buyers of Boston and Cook satisfy approximately 90% of their category 
requirements from a single supplier, a purchasing pattern that is more like a 
subscription market than a competitive split loyalty repertoire market (Sharp et 
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al, 2002).  These high observed loyalties suggest an opportunity for intervention 
to expand the buyers’ repertoires beyond their single preferred supplier perhaps 
by building increased awareness of credible alternatives or increased 
transparency in pricing.  By 2008, after a sustained promotional intervention by 
Cook, the share of category requirements was less than 60% for each supplier. 
 
The Dirichlet predictions can also be used by purchasing managers to simulate 
changes in market structure like those observed in the ureteral stent case.  This is 
discussed further in Section 8.3.3.3 where the change in Cook’s market share 
from 24% in 2006 to 59% in 2008 is simulated, demonstrating the effect of this 
change on penetration, purchase frequency and share of category requirements. 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented the analysis of ureteral stent purchasing data from 
three full years (April 2006 to March 2008) for reporting trusts in the 
Collaborative Purchasing Hub (CPH).  Although the period of analysis covers a 
three year period during which sustained supplier activity results in a change to 
the market structure with an initially dominant incumbent supplier losing market 
position, it has been shown that the observed purchasing behaviours and the 
dynamics of these changing behaviours can be described by the NBD-Dirichlet. 
 
The analysis of the ureteral stent case is a substantial replication and extension 
of the NBD-Dirichlet into a collaborative public procurement purchasing 
environment, adding to the Dirichlet literature and a novel contribution to the 
collaborative purchasing literature.  The case also demonstrates how the NBD 
Dirichlet can provide benchmarks against which observed behaviours can be 
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assessed.  The longitudinal analysis shows how such benchmarks can be used to 
identify targets for purchasing management supply side or demand side 
interventions, to suggest strategies for intervention and to track the progress of 
such interventions.   
 
The next chapter develops the contribution of the Dirichlet to describing, 
predicting and explaining buying behaviour in collaborative purchasing 
organisations.  It considers the case of coronary stents in the collaborative 
procurement hub, a category that has been subject to purchasing management 
intervention in the form of a set of supplier framework agreements.  The 
purchase behaviours before and after the implementation of the frameworks are 
analysed to demonstrate the impact of the intervention and the application of the 
Dirichlet in tracking the resulting changes in buying behaviour. 
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7 Modelling Coronary Stent Procurement in a 
Collaborative Purchasing Hub 
7.1 Introduction 
Coronary stents represent the second largest stent category in the collaborative 
procurement hub by number of purchase occasions.  The category has also been 
a target for a major purchasing intervention and the 2006 – 2008 data set covers 
the run up to the implementation of a negotiated set of framework agreements in 
September 2008.  The background to these interventions has been investigated 
through an exploratory interview process with representatives of the 
collaborative procurement hub.  This has provided valuable contextual 
information to aid the interpretation of the observed behaviours. 
 
The chapter proceeds with a description of the data set, followed by the 
operationalisation of the model and testing for goodness of fit.  It is shown that 
the NBD-Dirichlet can provide satisfactory predictions of observed purchasing 
behaviour. The analysis replicates the findings of the ureteral stent case and is a 
further extension of the NBD-Dirichlet model into a new market structure, the 
collaborative public procurement environment, and into a new management 
discipline, purchasing and supply management. 
 
Systematic deviations from the Dirichlet model predictions are observed and 
analysed.  As in the ureteral stent category, the buying population can be 
partitioned into a high purchase frequency and a low purchase frequency 
segment.  Other factors contributing to the observed deviations include the 
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presence of a single, solely loyal, high frequency purchaser whose actions 
dominate the analysis of observed purchasing behaviours, particularly towards 
the end of the analysis period when there is a smaller number of buyers.   
 
Through the analysis period there is a marked reduction in the proportion of the 
buying population that make purchases, although the frequency of purchase 
remains relatively constant.  The reduction happens in the twelve months prior 
to the new framework contracts being finalised and may be evidence of 
inventory reduction before more attractive pricing comes into force or increased 
purchase quantity per purchase occasion as suppliers offer deals to improve their 
position during the framework negotiations.  Following the implementation of 
the framework agreements, changes to the supplier loyalty patterns are observed.  
This may be due to increased awareness of credible alternatives as a result of the 
frameworks. 
 
The model predictions provide a useful benchmark for collaborative purchasing 
organisations to understand the market dynamics for a particular category and to 
identify opportunities for intervention, including the use of observed duplication 
of purchase behaviours to identify potential alternative suppliers.  The very 
different dynamics of this case compared to the ureteral stent category further 
demonstrates the power of the Dirichlet as a theoretical model to understand and 
inform purchasing and supply management decision-making. 
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7.2 Description of the Data 
7.2.1 Purchases by Requisitioner 
During the three year period, 18 purchasers made 402 purchases of this category.  
This is a much smaller purchasing population than that observed for the ureteral 
stents and there is evidence of buyer consolidation during the observation period 
with 10 cost centres making purchases in 2006, 7 in 2007 and 6 in 2008.  Only 
one cost centre is active through the entire purchasing period.  This could be due 
to a policy of buyer consolidation, inventory reduction or deliberate under-
reporting although there has been no central initiative to reduce the number of 
buying centres.  The purchasing population has a higher proportion of heavy 
purchasers with over half of the cost centres (10 out of 18) who make at least 
one purchase during the three years making ten or more purchases.  For the 
ureteral stents, there are also 10 cost centres making 10 or more purchases but 
this represents less than one quarter of the purchasing population.  Consequently 
the tail of infrequent buyers is relatively short with 9 buyers making 5 or fewer 
purchases in the three years (Figure 7.1).  
 
Excluding buyers who made only one purchase in the period and thus have no 
opportunity to change supplier, only a single buyer fulfilled their requirements 
from a single supplier throughout the period of analysis.  There is consolidation 
in the population of buyers through the three years with the top three buyers 
making 66% of purchases in 2006, 74% of purchases in 2007 and 89% in 2008.  
The heaviest buyers show remarkable diversity in their purchasing choice sets as 
seen in Table 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1 Coronary stent purchases by requisitioner 
 
One cost centre places all of its purchases with just a single supplier (the 
dominant supplier in the category) while another, with a similar number of 
purchases, uses six suppliers (Abbott, J&J and four smaller suppliers that are 
aggregated into the Others supplier) over the course of the analysis.  This 
difference does not appear to be due to demography – both trusts are acute trusts 
with specialist cardiology centres.   
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Table 7.1 Cost Centre choice sets (2006 – 2008) 
Cost Centre Number of Purchases Number of Suppliers Used (Choice Set)
6 82 4
30 81 6
50 69 1
9 41 3
3 30 8
48 23 4
7 19 2
13 18 2
74 14 3
5 11 2
81 4 2
10 4 2
1 1 1
16 1 1
56 1 1
57 1 1
8 1 1
78 1 1
 
 
Consistent with the Natural Monopoly Phenomenon (McPhee, 1963) whereby 
the heaviest purchasers have the greatest opportunity to use a wide range of 
suppliers, this diverse purchasing behaviour contrasts with the observations from 
the pilot data and the ureteral stent data analyses where the heaviest purchasers 
show a preference for the main suppliers in the category.  The implication is that 
there are none of the restrictions on choice sets like those seen in the single trust 
coronary stent case or the ureteral stent case. 
7.2.1.1 Poisson Assumption 
A number of observations can be made from the tabulated half year purchase 
frequencies for each cost centre (Table 7.2).  Only one buyer makes purchases in 
each of the three years, and does so with a reasonably stable annual purchase 
frequency although the number of purchases is not evenly distributed between 
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the first and second halves of the year.  The purchase frequency of the other 
buyers is generally stable through the period in which they make purchases.  
Thus the assumption that the purchase distribution for an individual purchaser 
can be described by a Poisson process is assumed to hold within these defined 
periods.  As for the ureteral stent data, cross-sectional analysis can be carried out 
within a defined period or relative stability and the observations from successive 
years compared in the longitudinal analysis. 
 
There is a sharp decline in overall category purchases in 2007 with a slight 
recovery in the second half of 2008.  This decrease is due to a combination of a 
reduction in the number of buyers and a reduction in the number of purchases 
made by buyers.  The new framework agreements were negotiated during 2007 
and implemented in the second half of 2008.  Although no specific purchasing 
interventions took place during 2007, the fact that purchases of the cardiac 
(coronary) stent category were being analysed and discussed in preparation for 
the framework negotiations appears to have influenced purchasing behaviours.  
Inventories may have been run down in anticipation of new and more 
advantageous pricing, purchase quantity per purchase occasion may have 
increased as suppliers offer attractive deals to build position during the 
framework negotiations or buyers may be responding to increased scrutiny of 
purchasing behaviour. 
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Table 7.2 Purchases by requisitioner (2006 – 2008) 
H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2
6 43 24 10 3 13.3
30 19 1 6 15 6 20 11.2
50 19 13 21 13 11.0
9 14 27 6.8
3 12 12 1 1 4.3
48 5 4 8 5 3.7
7 2 17 3.2
13 8 6 2.3
74 2 8 1.7
5 8 1.3
81 1 3 0.7
10 4 0.7
1 1 0.2
16 1 0.2
56 1 0.2
57 1 0.2
8 1 0.2
78 1 0.2
Total Purchases 90 79 49 40 43 70 61.8
Total Requisitioners 7 9 7 6 4 7 6.7
2006 2007 2008
Cost Centre Average
 
7.2.2 Purchases by Supplier 
Three suppliers, Boston Scientific, Medtronic and Abbott, together account for 
316 of the 402 purchase orders, equivalent to 79% of the total.  A further six 
suppliers make up the balance.  The three major suppliers are dominant 
throughout the three year period, although there is a dramatic decline in the 
Medtronic market share in 2007 (Table 7.3). 
 
Table 7.3 shows how the reduction in purchase incidence in 2007 affects all the 
suppliers except Abbott.  In 2008, most suppliers see a slight recovery except 
J&J and Biotronik.  The smaller suppliers (in particular Atrium, B Braun and 
Terumo) increase their purchase incidence in 2008. 
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Table 7.3 Coronary stent purchases by supplier 
2006 2007 2008
BOSTON 89 46 58 193
MEDTRONIC 23 5 29 57
ABBOTT 25 25 16 66
J&J 20 6 5 31
BIOTRONIK 14 1 0 15
ATRIUM 0 2 9 11
ORBUS 1 7 3 11
B BRAUN 2 1 6 9
TERUMOL 1 1 7 9
TOTAL 175 94 133 402
Year
Supplier TOTAL
 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the monthly market share for each supplier plotted through the 
three year period.  The approximate start of the cardiac stent project in August 
2007 and the implementation of the resulting framework agreements in 
September 2008 are shown on the chart. Boston is the market leader through 
most of the period but appears to experience a drop in market share towards the 
end of 2008, perhaps as a result of the introduction of the framework 
agreements.  Another feature of this plot is the period in 2007 (from about 
Month 16 to 22) where the market shares of suppliers other than Boston or 
Abbott fall to close to zero.  After the implementation of the framework 
agreements in September 2008 the other suppliers appear to return to the market. 
 
Analysis of the monthly purchase frequency over the same period shows a 
reduction in purchase frequency in 2007, followed by an increase in the second 
half of 2008 (Figure 7.3).  The frequency of purchase of Medtronic is 
noteworthy, with high purchase frequency in the first few months of the 
analysis, very little activity through all of 2007 and a marked increase in 
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purchase frequency in 2008, in particular following the implementation of the 
framework agreement. 
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0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Month
M
a
rk
e
t S
ha
re
 
(%
) Boston
Medtronic
Abbott
J&J
Others
Start of 
discussions for 
framework 
agreement
Implement 
framework 
agreement
 
Figure 7.2 Monthly market share by supplier 
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Figure 7.3 Monthly purchase frequency by supplier 
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Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show that there are few periods where the purchasing 
behaviour captured in this particular data set can be considered as stationary.  
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 compare the predicted purchasing behaviour based on the 
first six months of the data set and on an average six month period (averaged 
over the first 36 months).  Table 7.4 presents the predictions for a six month 
period and Table 7.5 the predicted behaviours for the 36 month period.  It can be 
seen from the correlations and the Mean Absolute Deviation that there is an 
approximate fit between the observed data and the predictions for both base 
periods.  In both cases the fit deteriorates when the predictions are extended to 
36 months although the average six months does a better job of predicting 
behaviours over this period.  This analysis shows that the long term behavioural 
patterns are relatively stable and can be accommodated by averaging over the 
period of analysis.  The initial conditions (first six months) provide less good 
predictions of three year performance than the averaged conditions, 
demonstrating that there are some changes in behaviour over the three years. 
 
The purchasing intervention is made in the last six months of 2008 and to isolate 
the effect of this intervention and any other dynamic market developments over 
the three years, it is necessary to carry out the longitudinal analysis using time 
periods shorter than the full three years.  The charts of market share and 
purchase frequency show that there is considerable month to month non-
stationarity and to average out some of the month to month variations for the 
NBD analysis, the model will be parameterised and evaluated over a six month 
time period in each analysis year.   
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Table 7.4 Dirichlet predictions (average 6 months, first six months) 
Base Period Supplier O T O T O T
Boston 18.3% 26.2% 8.4 5.9 75.5% 56.8%
Medtronic 7.5% 9.8% 5.2 4 35.1% 31.1%
Abbott 15.0% 11.6% 3.2 4.1 43.9% 32.8%
J&J 8.3% 6.6% 3.0 3.8 24.6% 28.5%
Others 12.5% 10.0% 3.2 4.0 32.7% 31.3%
Average Supplier 12.3% 12.8% 4.6 4.3 42.4% 36.1%
Correlation, r 0.83 0.92 0.97
Mean Absolute Deviation 3.6% 1.2 7.8%
Boston 25.0% 32.0% 8.0 6.2 78.4% 46.0%
Medtronic 15.0% 21.1% 5.0 3.5 26.3% 20.3%
Abbott 15.0% 18.7% 4.0 3.2 33.3% 17.5%
J&J 25.0% 21.1% 3.0 3.5 18.8% 20.3%
Others 10.0% 14.4% 4.0 2.8 24.2% 13.9%
Average Supplier 18.0% 21.5% 4.8 3.8 36.2% 23.6%
Correlation, r 0.79 0.91 0.95
Mean Absolute Deviation 5.0% 1.2 13.2%
First 6 months
Penetration Purchase Frequency SCR
Average 6 months
 
 
Table 7.5 Dirichlet predictions (3 year) 
Base Period Supplier O T O T O T
Boston 50.0% 40.8% 18.5 22.6 67.3% 52.1%
Medtronic 20.0% 18.4% 11.8 12.7 31.1% 22.8%
Abbott 35.0% 21.4% 8.3 13.5 27.1% 24.7%
J&J 30.0% 12.8% 5.0 11.7 12.4% 20.0%
Others 30.0% 18.7% 8.0 12.8 32.9% 23.0%
Average Supplier 33.0% 22.4% 10.3 14.7 34.2% 28.5%
Correlation, r 0.86 0.91 0.95
Mean Absolute Deviation 10.6% 4.3 8.7%
Boston 50.0% 47.4% 18.5 25.3 67.3% 44.7%
Medtronic 20.0% 37.2% 11.8 12.1 31.1% 17.4%
Abbott 35.0% 34.4% 8.3 10.5 27.1% 14.2%
J&J 30.0% 37.2% 5.0 12.1 12.4% 17.4%
Others 30.0% 28.9% 8.0 8.3 32.9% 10.3%
Average Supplier 33.0% 37.0% 10.3 13.7 34.2% 20.8%
Correlation, r 0.65 0.87 0.85
Mean Absolute Deviation 5.7% 3.3 15.4%
First 6 months
Penetration Purchase Frequency SCR
Average 6 months
 
7.2.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 7.6 (a) – (c) shows the product category summary statistics for 2006, 2007 
and 2008.  The total purchases differ slightly from those shown in Table 7.3 
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because the “year” in Table 7.3 is taken to be 48 weeks (12 equal 4 week 
periods) rather than calendar months.  The tables show the typical Dirichlet 
patterns of market share and penetration with a wide range between the market 
leader and the smallest suppliers.   
 
The typical Dirichlet patterns are maintained in the market shares through 2006 
to 2008 but become less marked for the penetration measure.  In 2008, the 
combined penetration of the smaller suppliers “Others” (including Biotronik, 
Atrium, Orbis Neich, B Braun and Terumo) is 20%, compared to the penetration 
of 15% for Boston.  The corresponding market shares are respectively 20.4% 
and 46.9%.  Typically the highest market share supplier will have the largest 
number of buyers (i.e. the highest penetration).  The unusual behaviour in 2008 
results from a relatively small population of buyers, a high frequency purchaser 
who is solely loyal to Boston and the effect of aggregating five separate 
suppliers into a single combined supplier. 
 
Purchase frequencies are expected to be roughly similar across all suppliers in a 
typical Dirichlet market, with a tendency for lower share suppliers to have a 
lower purchase frequency, the Double Jeopardy effect.  However Table 7.6 
shows that in the case of the coronary stent category there is a wide range of 
purchase frequencies.  In particular Boston has a consistently high purchase 
frequency, a pattern that becomes more marked through the three years.  As will 
be seen in Section 7.3.3, this is the result of a heavy purchasing segment that 
favours Boston over the smaller suppliers.  The effect is more marked in 2007 
and 2008 due to a single high frequency buyer that is solely loyal to Boston and 
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the dominant effect of a few very frequent purchasers when the overall number 
of purchasers of the product category declines. 
 
Table 7.6 Summary statistics 2006 - 2008 
(a) 48 weeks 2006 Summary Statistics
Supplier
Number of 
Purchases
Number of 
Buyers
Purchase 
Frequency Penetration Market Share
Boston 84 7 12.0 35.0% 53.5%
Medtronic 22 4 5.5 20.0% 14.0%
Abbott 20 4 5.0 20.0% 12.7%
J&J 16 5 3.2 25.0% 10.2%
Biotronik 12 2 6.0 10.0% 7.6%
Atrium 0 0 0.0 0.0% 0.0%
Orbus Neich 1 1 1.0 5.0% 0.6%
B Braun 2 1 2.0 5.0% 1.3%
Terumol 0 0 0.0 0.0% 0.0%
Total 157 10 15.7 50.0%
(b) 48 weeks 2007 Summary Statistics
Supplier
Number of 
Purchases
Number of 
Buyers
Purchase 
Frequency Penetration Market Share
Boston 43 3 14.3 15.0% 48.3%
Medtronic 4 3 1.3 15.0% 4.5%
Abbott 24 6 4.0 30.0% 27.0%
J&J 6 3 2.0 15.0% 6.7%
Biotronik 1 1 1.0 5.0% 1.1%
Atrium 2 1 2.0 5.0% 2.2%
Orbus Neich 7 1 7.0 5.0% 7.9%
B Braun 1 1 1.0 5.0% 1.1%
Terumol 1 1 1.0 5.0% 1.1%
Total 89 7 12.7 35.0%
(c) 48 weeks 2008 Summary Statistics
Supplier
Number of 
Purchases
Number of 
Buyers
Purchase 
Frequency Penetration Market Share
Boston 53 3 17.7 15.0% 46.9%
Medtronic 23 2 11.5 10.0% 20.4%
Abbott 10 2 5.0 10.0% 8.8%
J&J 4 1 4.0 5.0% 3.5%
Biotronik 0 0 0.0 0.0% 0.0%
Atrium 7 2 3.5 10.0% 6.2%
Orbus Neich 3 1 3.0 5.0% 2.7%
B Braun 6 2 3.0 10.0% 5.3%
Terumol 7 1 7.0 5.0% 6.2%
Total 113 6 18.8 30.0%
Total 12 Months (2006)
Total 12 Months (2007)
Total 12 Months (2008)
 
 
The changes between 2006 and 2008 can also be observed using the data in 
Table 7.6.  The drop in the number of purchases in 2007 is due to both fewer 
purchasers and those purchasers purchasing less often.  When the number of 
purchases increases again in 2008, this is due to a recovery in purchasing 
frequency (the number of purchasers actually falls).  Just as the lessons of the 
Dirichlet teach marketers that the way to sustainable sales volume increases is to 
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acquire more customers rather than getting existing customers to buy more, so 
the lesson for purchasing management would appear to be that reductions in 
purchase frequency may reduce purchased volumes for a short period, but such 
interventions are unlikely to be sustainable, particularly when demand is derived 
as in this case where the requirement for stents is governed by the number of 
cardiac operations carried out.   
 
The observed reduction in the number of purchases is likely to be due to short 
term inventory reductions, either as a response to increased scrutiny of cardiac 
stent purchases or in anticipation of cheaper stents after the framework 
agreements are put in place.  The Dirichlet analysis does not consider purchase 
quantity and it is possible that the buyers are placing fewer, larger orders.  
However, limited order quantity data is available and analysis of this shows no 
major changes in order quantity (see Section 7.3.3.1). 
  
There are no dramatic changes in the distribution of purchases between 2006 and 
2008.  Boston stays at around 50% share, although this is slowly reducing.  
There is more year to year movement between the other suppliers although the 
only sustained changes in supplier position appear to be J&J’s decline in market 
share and the increased share taken by the smaller suppliers.  The combined 
share of the five smallest suppliers (Biotronik, Atrium, Orbus, B Braun and 
Terumo) grows from 9.5% in 2006 to 13.4% in 2007 and 20.4% in 2008. 
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7.3 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
7.3.1 Sample Frame 
It has already been seen that the month to month market share and purchase 
frequency for particular suppliers is highly variable, violating the NBD-Dirichlet 
assumption of stationarity.  To accommodate this variability by averaging over a 
relatively long time period, the model is parameterised using a 6 month period 
from each year and tested for goodness of fit against this period and a 
contiguous, successive 6 month period.  The sample and test periods are taken to 
be the first 6 months and the last 6 months of each year.  The sample periods and 
their corresponding hold-out samples are 2006, weeks 1 to 24 and weeks 25 to 
48, 2007, weeks 1 to 24 and weeks 25 to 48 (weeks 53 to 76 and 77 to 100 in the 
full three year data set) and 2008, weeks 1 to 24 and weeks 25 to 48 (weeks 105 
to 128 and 129 to 152 in the three year data set). Loyalty performance measures 
(proportion of sole buyers and share of category requirements) are also 
compared across the three year period, including analysis of performance in the 
last six months of the analysis period following the implementation of the 
framework agreements. 
7.3.2 Purchase Distributions 
The purchase distributions (i.e. proportion of purchasers making 0, 1, 2, 3, … 
purchases in the time period) predicted by the NBD are compared to the 
observed distributions (Table 7.7). A simple correlation test is used to assess the 
fit between the predicted and observed distributions for both the base period (i.e. 
the period used to fit the distribution) and the hold-out period.  The Mean 
Absolute Deviation is also calculated.   
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Table 7.7 Comparison between observed and predicted distribution of purchases 
Observed distribution
Base Period Hold-out Period Base Period Hold-out Period Standard Deviation
Boston 0.76 0.69 10.7 8.6 20.3
Medtronic -0.22 -0.25 19.0 21.6 23.6
Abbott -0.02 0.06 15.1 14.1 16.7
J&J 0.67 0.91 12.2 13.0 22.6
Others -0.15 0.57 19.1 10.4 22.1
Any 0.91 0.91 6.0 4.5 15.9
Boston 0.53 0.38 10.4 14.5 16.7
Medtronic -0.04 0.95 20.2 10.2 33.3
Abbott 0.63 0.31 9.7 13.0 16.7
J&J -0.13 0.17 21.0 18.1 33.3
Others -0.16 -0.21 19.2 21.6 22.1
Any 0.55 0.40 9.1 11.2 11.8
Boston 0.12 0.73 16.4 10.8 22.1
Medtronic -0.11 -0.12 18.5 20.8 22.1
Abbott -0.04 0.00 20.2 17.3 33.3
J&J 0.15 0.15 18.1 18.1 33.3
Others 0.62 0.45 10.6 12.4 23.6
Any 0.51 0.92 9.8 6.1 14.5
Supplier
Correlation between observed and 
theoretical distributions (r) 
Mean Absolute Deviation between 
observed and theoretical 
distributions
2008
2007
2006
Year
 
 
The observed and expected distributions are plotted to determine the fit and to 
identify any systematic biases (Figure 7.4 to Figure 7.9).  The small number of 
purchasers means that the observed distributions are not smooth but have a 
sawtooth pattern.  When the overall number of buyers of a particular supplier is 
small (for example 2 or 3 buyers) an individual buyer can represent 50% or 33% 
of the population.   
 
206 
Distribution of Purchases (Boston)
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9+
Number of Purchases
%
 
Pu
rc
ha
s
e
rs
 
o
f B
o
s
to
n
 
m
a
ki
n
g 
1,
 
2,
 
3.
.
.
 
Pu
rc
ha
s
e
s
 
in
 
12
 
w
e
e
k 
pe
rio
d 2006 Expected
2006 Observed
2007 Expected
2007 Observed
2008 Expected
2008 Observed
 
Figure 7.4 Expected and observed distribution of purchases (Boston) 2006 – 2008 
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Figure 7.5 Expected and observed distribution of purchases (Medtronic) 2006 – 2008 
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Distribution of Purchases (Abbott)
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Figure 7.6 Expected and observed distribution of purchases (Abbott) 2006 – 2008 
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Figure 7.7 Expected and observed distribution of purchases (J&J) 2006 – 2008 
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Figure 7.8 Expected and observed distribution of purchases (Others) 2006 – 2008 
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Figure 7.9 Expected and observed distribution of purchases for product category 
(ANY) 2006 – 2008 
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The fit is not good with only four of the 36 cases having a strong correlation (r > 
0.9).  The charts, particularly those for Medtronic (Figure 7.5), Abbott (Figure 
7.6) and the category (Figure 7.9) show a systematic tendency to overestimate 
the proportion of light buyers and to underestimate the heavy buyers.   
 
As noted in the ureteral stents case, the tendency to overestimate light buyers is 
most marked when the purchasing population is dominated by a small number of 
purchasers who account for a large number of purchases.  In a relatively small 
buying population the distorting effect of this heavy purchasing segment is 
amplified, resulting in the poor fit for the overall population. For example, 
Figure 7.6 shows how a single buyer, making three purchases in the 2008 data 
series, distorts the overall comparison.  The consolidation in the buying 
population can also be seen in the reduction in the proportion of light buyers of 
Boston and for the category between 2006 and 2008 (Figure 7.4). 
7.3.3 Penetration Growth 
The observed and expected 6 month penetration rates and purchase frequencies 
for each supplier are presented in Table 7.8.  This shows the performance 
measures for each year and for the six months immediately after the 
implementation of the framework agreements (2008, months 7 – 12). 
 
It can be seen from the table that the number of purchasers of each supplier 
(measured by the penetration) declines sharply across the three years.  The 
category penetration (i.e. the number of buyers who purchase on at least one 
occasion, from any supplier) decreases from 40% in 2006 to 25% in the first six 
months of 2008 although it does pick up to 35% in the last six months of 2008, 
after the agreements are implemented.  The average observed purchase 
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frequency is fairly constant through 2006 to 2008 although it does increase in 
the last six months.  This decline and subsequent rebound has been noted before.  
The reduction in activity is likely to be due to inventory reduction in anticipation 
of the negotiation of attractive prices in the framework agreements.  Once the 
agreements are implemented, purchasing activity resumes and inventories start 
to be rebuilt.   
 
The performance of the individual suppliers can also be tracked to identify shifts 
in market position over the three years.  In most cases, a reduction in market 
share is the result of a reduction in penetration (i.e. fewer purchasers).  This is 
the case for Medtronic in 2007 and Abbott in 2008 but the most dramatic decline 
is for J&J, which goes from being purchased by 25% of the buying population in 
2006 to a 5% penetration in 2008.  J&J’s market share reduction over the same 
period is from 10.2% to 3.5% (see Table 7.6).  This decline predates any 
purchasing interventions and appears to be due to J&J losing buyers through 
poor service and marketing (see Section 7.4.1).   
 
Boston also loses customers over the three years; its penetration falls from 25% 
in 2006 to 10% in 2008, although recovers to 15% by the end of 2008.  
However, over this period Boston maintains a dominant market share with a 
slight decline from 53.5% to 46.9% and a further decline to 44% in the last six 
months of 2008.  The market position is maintained despite having fewer buyers 
because those buyers that stay with Boston tend to be heavy purchasers.  Thus 
the purchase frequency of buyers of Boston increases through the analysis 
period.   
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Table 7.8 Observed and expected performance measures (6 month) 
Supplier O T O T
Boston 25.0% 32.0% 8.0 6.2
Medtronic 15.0% 21.1% 5.0 3.5
Abbott 15.0% 18.7% 4.0 3.2
J&J 25.0% 21.1% 3.0 3.5
Others 10.0% 14.4% 4.0 2.8
Average Supplier 18.0% 21.5% 4.8 3.8
Correlation, r 0.79 0.91
Mean Absolute Deviation 5.0% 1.2
Boston 15.0% 24.8% 9.3 5.6
Medtronic 5.0% 5.8% 3.0 2.6
Abbott 15.0% 12.5% 2.7 3.2
J&J 5.0% 7.4% 4.0 2.7
Others 10.0% 10.2% 3.0 4.5
Average Supplier 10.0% 12.1% 4.4 3.4
Correlation, r 0.80 0.76
Mean Absolute Deviation 3.1% 1.5
Boston 10.0% 21.4% 13.0 6.0
Medtronic 10.0% 11.5% 3.5 3.0
Abbott 5.0% 6.3% 3.0 2.4
J&J 5.0% 4.5% 2.0 2.2
Others 15.0% 9.2% 1.7 2.7
Average Supplier 9.0% 10.6% 4.6 3.3
Correlation, r 0.41 0.98
Mean Absolute Deviation 4.1% 1.9
Boston 15.0% 23.1% 11.7 7.5
Medtronic 5.0% 14.4% 18.0 6.2
Abbott 10.0% 6.4% 3.5 5.4
J&J 5.0% 2.0% 2.0 5.0
Others 15.0% 13.8% 5.7 6.1
Average Supplier 10.0% 11.9% 8.2 6.1
Correlation, r 0.63 0.63
Mean Absolute Deviation 5.1% 4.3
2008
month 7 - 12
2008
month 1 - 6
Penetration Purchase Frequency
2006
2007
Year
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The fit between the observed (O) and theoretical (T) performance measures 
presented in Table 7.8 is not good, with the correlation coefficients lower than 
the 0.9 benchmark and relatively large deviations in most cases.  The poor fit 
between observed and expected performance measures is unsurprising give the 
poor fit of the underlying NBD distribution as discussed in the previous section.   
 
There appears to be a systematic overestimation of the Boston penetration (the 
number of buyers) and a corresponding underestimation of the Boston purchase 
frequency.  A similar deviation can be observed for Medtronic in the analysis of 
the second half of 2008.  This deviation is similar to the pattern observed in the 
ureteral stent case and arises because of the effect of a relatively small number 
of high frequency purchasers and in the case of Boston, one high frequency 
purchaser who purchases only from Boston.  To accommodate the effect of the 
heavy purchasers, the purchasing population can be partitioned into two distinct 
segments – a segment of high frequency purchasers (the top three purchasers by 
volume in each year) and one of lower frequency purchasers (Table 7.9). 
 
Table 7.9 compares the goodness of fit achieved when the model is used to 
predict performance measures for the buying population with the predictions for 
the heavy and light segments.  The observed and expected performance 
measures themselves are presented in Tables 7.10 and 7.11 for the heavy and 
light segments respectively. It has not been possible to fit the model for heavy 
purchasers in 2006 or for the last six months of 2008 using a six month base 
period.  These three purchasers average more than one purchase per week and a 
shorter base period (3 months) is used to converge on a solution for the NBD 
which is then used to predict the six month performance measures. 
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Table 7.9 Comparison of goodness of fit between full buying population, heavy 
segment and light segment 
(a) Penetration
Unsegmented Heavy Light Unsegmented Heavy Light
2006 0.79 -0.61 0.8 5.0% 3.1% 3.0%
2007 0.80 0.94 0.99 3.1% 1.5% 0.9%
2008
months 1 to 6 0.41 0.60 0.97 4.1% 2.3% 0.4%
2008
months 7 to 12 0.63 0.93 0.95 5.1% 2.1% 1.4%
(b) Purchase Frequency
Unsegmented Heavy Light Unsegmented Heavy Light
2006 0.91 0.94 0.67 1.2 5.0 1.0
2007 0.76 0.94 0.97 1.5 1.5 0.2
2008
months 1 to 6 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.9 1.8 0.2
2008
months 7 to 12 0.63 0.91 0.89 4.3 3.5 0.3
Year
Year
Correlation between observed and theoretical 
distributions (r) 
Mean Absolute Deviation between observed and 
theoretical distributions (%)
Correlation between observed and theoretical 
distributions (r) 
Mean Absolute Deviation between observed and 
theoretical distributions (%)
 
 
It can be seen that the fit for the heavy and light segments is generally better 
than that for the full buying population on both measures of correlation 
coefficient and Mean Absolute Deviation.  The NBD-Dirichlet describes 
penetration rates and purchase frequency with good accuracy although some 
deviations remain, notably for the heavy segment in 2006 where a single 
purchaser accounts for all the purchases of Boston in the period.   Separating out 
the light and heavy segments also allows the dynamics of market development 
in each segment to be analysed.  Comparing Tables 7.10 and 7.11, it can be seen 
that Boston improves its position in the heavy segment, increasing penetration at 
a time when all other suppliers are experiencing reductions in penetration in this 
segment.  Conversely by 2008, Boston’s penetration in the light purchasing 
segment has fallen to zero. 
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Table 7.10 Observed and theoretical performance measures, heavy purchasers 
Supplier O T O T
Boston 5.0% 14.2% 29.0 10.2
Medtronic 10.0% 9.6% 4.5 5.1
Abbott 10.0% 10.5% 5.0 5.7
J&J 15.0% 11.2% 4.3 6.3
Others 10.0% 11.7% 4.0 6.8
Average Supplier 10.0% 11.5% 9.4 6.8
Correlation, r -0.61 0.94
Mean Absolute Deviation 3.1% 5.0
Boston 10.0% 13.2% 13.5 10.2
Medtronic 5.0% 3.0% 3.0 5.0
Abbott 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.0
J&J 5.0% 3.8% 4.0 5.2
Others 5.0% 3.8% 4.0 5.2
Average Supplier 6.3% 6.0% 6.1 6.4
Correlation, r 0.94 0.94
Mean Absolute Deviation 1.5% 1.5
Boston 10.0% 13.5% 13.0 9.6
Medtronic 5.0% 5.9% 4.0 3.4
Abbott 5.0% 4.8% 3.0 3.1
J&J 5.0% 3.5% 2.0 2.8
Others 10.0% 4.8% 1.7 3.1
Average Supplier 7.0% 6.5% 4.7 4.4
Correlation, r 0.60 0.99
Mean Absolute Deviation 2.3% 1.3
Boston 10.0% 13.1% 17.0 13.0
Medtronic 5.0% 9.0% 18.0 10.0
Abbott 5.0% 3.8% 6.0 7.8
J&J 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.0
Others 5.0% 7.2% 13.0 9.1
Average Supplier 6.3% 8.3% 13.5 10.0
Correlation, r 0.93 0.91
Mean Absolute Deviation 2.1% 3.5
* Fitted using 3 month base period rather than 6 months
Purchase Frequency
2006*
2007
2008*
month 7 - 12
Year
2008
month 1 - 6
Penetration
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Table 7.11 Observed and theoretical performance measures, light purchasers 
Supplier O T O T
Boston 20.0% 19.3% 2.8 2.8
Medtronic 5.0% 14.2% 6.0 2.1
Abbott 5.0% 6.8% 2.0 1.5
J&J 10.0% 6.8% 1.0 1.5
Others 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.0
Average Supplier 10.0% 11.8% 2.9 2.0
Correlation, r 0.80 0.67
Mean Absolute Deviation 3.0% 1.0
Boston 5.0% 3.6% 1.0 1.4
Medtronic 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0
Abbott 15.0% 13.2% 2.7 3.0
J&J 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.0
Others 5.0% 6.1% 2.0 1.6
Average Supplier 8.3% 7.6% 1.9 2.0
Correlation, r 0.99 0.97
Mean Absolute Deviation 0.9% 0.2
Boston 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.0
Medtronic 5.0% 6.6% 3.0 2.3
Abbott 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0
J&J 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0
Others 5.0% 4.6% 2.0 2.2
Average Supplier 5.0% 5.6% 2.5 2.2
Correlation, r 0.97 0.98
Mean Absolute Deviation 0.4% 0.2
Boston 5.0% 4.2% 1.0 1.2
Medtronic 0.0% 0.0% 0.0 0.0
Abbott 5.0% 4.2% 1.0 1.2
J&J 5.0% 7.6% 2.0 1.3
Others 10.0% 12.9% 2.0 1.5
Average Supplier 6.3% 7.2% 1.5 1.3
Correlation, r 0.95 0.89
Mean Absolute Deviation 1.4% 0.3
Purchase Frequency
2006
2007
2008
month 7 - 12
Year
2008
month 1 - 6
Penetration
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Table 7.10 also shows how it is the heavy segment that holds back purchases 
during 2007 and 2008 and leads the increase in purchase frequency in the last 
six months of 2008, after the implementation of the framework agreements.  As 
the heaviest purchasers it is these cost centres that stand to gain the most from 
the lower unit costs that have been negotiated in the agreements. 
7.3.3.1 Order Quantity 
The reduction in the number of purchases between 2006 and 2008 has been 
noted previously and attributed to a reduction in inventories in response to 
increased scrutiny or in anticipation of better prices following the 
implementation of the negotiated framework agreements.  The reduction in the 
number of purchase occasions had not been observed directly by the hub but the 
Deputy Director acknowledged that the launch of the negotiation process one 
year ahead of the implementation of the framework agreements being 
implemented had resulted in “some movement”, particularly around price levels.  
The Deputy Director in the hub and the trust Procurement Director both 
proposed an increase in the number of bulk purchases, perhaps prompted by 
supplier deals as an alternative explanation for the reduction in purchasing 
activity in 2007. 
 
The reduction in purchases is also accompanied by a reduction in the number of 
buyers.  This may be an attempt by individual trusts to rationalise cost centres in 
order to consolidate purchases and so reduce transaction costs while gaining 
better control over purchasing behaviours.  As the Deputy Director of 
Procurement in the hub commented, “I think when we start to open these sorts of 
projects and start to analyse the spend and talk to trusts about what they’re 
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buying, I think it does generate further discussion internally about how can we 
manage this spend better and more efficiently”.  
 
If buyers were consolidating purchases, the purchase order value and the 
purchase order quantity would be expected to increase as the number of 
purchasers and purchase occasions reduced.  Purchase quantity is not a 
parameter used in the Dirichlet analysis – the unit of analysis is the purchase 
occasion – but the data set provided does include some quantity and cost 
information.  Analysis of this data shows that both the quantity and the cost 
associated with each purchase occasion decrease over the analysis period and 
there is an increase in the average quantity per purchase occasion in 2007 (Table 
7.12).  This increase appears to support the premise that the reduction in 
purchase occasions in 2007 is due to an increase in bulk buying, perhaps as 
suppliers try to improve their positions ahead of the framework negotiations.  
The average order quantity in 2006 is almost the same as that in the first half of 
2008, even though the number of purchasers and the number of purchase 
occasions in H1 2008 is approximately half that in the same period in 2006.  The 
costs have been disguised to protect commercially sensitive information. 
 
Table 7.12 Average order quantity per purchase occasion 
Year Average Quantity per purchase occasion
Average cost per 
purchase occasion 
(currency units)
Average cost per 
stent (currency units)
2006 6.1 9216 1521
2007 9.9 10567 1067
2008
month 1 - 6 5.9 5552 941
2008
month 7 - 12 4.3 4188 974
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The analysis shows a reduction in average cost per stent which may be a result 
of the negotiated price reductions or a change in the product mix to include 
fewer of the expensive drug-eluting stents.  The level of detail in the supplied 
product descriptions is insufficient to analyse this further.  However, the overall 
pattern of reduced pricing confirms the success of a project designed to deliver 
“cash releasing savings”. 
7.3.4 Share of Category Requirements 
Table 7.13 shows the observed and theoretical SCR for all suppliers for the 
entire population and for the heavy and light segments as previously defined.  
The fit between the model predictions and the observed behaviours is not good 
for the entire population.  In only one case does the correlation coefficient 
exceed 0.9 and the absolute deviations are large for most suppliers.  Segmenting 
the population into the heavy and light segments improves the fit in most cases 
although some large deviations remain.  As before, the small number of buyers 
and the relatively low purchase frequency distort the analysis because a small 
number of purchases means that there are few opportunities to purchase from 
other suppliers.  This is particularly true for the light segment in 2008, leading to 
high observed SCRs, in particular for J&J where one buyer made one purchase, 
leading to an SCR of 100% and a large deviation from the theoretical 
predictions. 
 
There is a systematic bias towards underestimating loyalty for all suppliers.  The 
only exceptions are J&J in 2006 and Abbott in 2007 (light segment) and 2008 
(light segment).  As discussed in Section 6.3.4, the dependency of SCR on the 
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number of purchases used to operationalise the model will affect the comparison 
between observed and expected SCR (Stern & Hammond, 2004).   
 
Table 7.13 Share of Category Requirements 
O T O T O T
Boston 78.4% 46.0% 80.6% 42.8% 73.3% 56.8%
Medtronic 26.3% 20.3% 17.6% 15.8% 100.0% 35.7%
Abbott 33.3% 17.5% 30.3% 18.8% 66.7% 19.6%
J&J 18.8% 20.3% 18.8% 21.9% 18.2% 19.6%
Others 24.2% 13.9% 24.2% 24.4% 0.0% 0.0%
Average Supplier 36.2% 23.6% 34.3% 24.7% 64.6% 32.9%
Correlation,
 r 0.95 0.95 0.74
Mean Absolute Deviation 13.2% 10.9% 25.9%
Boston 77.8% 59.6% 90.0% 72.9% 16.7% 20.8%
Medtronic 27.3% 18.0% 27.3% 23.9% 0.0% 0.0%
Abbott 72.7% 24.9% 0.0% 0.0% 72.7% 75.8%
J&J 50.0% 19.3% 50.0% 25.4% 0.0% 0.0%
Others 50.0% 22.0% 50.0% 25.4% 50.0% 28.3%
Average Supplier 55.6% 28.8% 54.3% 36.9% 46.5% 41.6%
Correlation,
 r 0.72 0.95 0.94
Mean Absolute Deviation 26.8% 13.9% 5.8%
Boston 81.3% 62.1% 81.3% 69.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Medtronic 50.0% 22.0% 36.4% 15.0% 100.0% 85.2%
Abbott 50.0% 14.8% 50.0% 12.9% 0.0% 0.0%
J&J 33.3% 13.2% 33.3% 11.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Others 26.3% 18.3% 17.6% 12.9% 100.0% 78.5%
Average Supplier 48.2% 26.1% 43.7% 24.2% 100.0% 81.8%
Correlation,
 r 0.88 0.88 1.00
Mean Absolute Deviation 22.1% 19.5% 7.3%
Boston 66.0% 54.6% 65.4% 52.1% 100.0% 42.2%
Medtronic 56.3% 40.4% 56.3% 34.5% 0.0% 0.0%
Abbott 30.4% 32.6% 31.6% 23.6% 25.0% 42.2%
J&J 100.0% 29.4% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 49.7%
Others 70.8% 39.7% 68.4% 29.7% 80.0% 65.7%
Average Supplier 64.7% 39.3% 55.4% 35.0% 76.3% 50.0%
Correlation,
 r -0.11 0.89 0.74
Mean Absolute Deviation 26.2% 16.4% 27.9%
2006
2007
2008
months 7 - 12
2008
months 1 - 6
Year Supplier
Entire population Heavy Segment Light Segment
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Deviations from the Dirichlet predictions of SCR have been noted previously, 
usually as “excess behavioural loyalty” or a “market share premium” for leading 
brands (Fader & Schmittlein, 1993).  Such deviations have been attributed to the 
existence of market segments, with particular emphasis on availability.  An 
analysis of the UK bottled water market has identified similar patterns of excess 
observed loyalty (Singh et al, 2009).  In the bottled water case the analysis was 
carried out on sales data from a single supermarket and the excess observed 
loyalty was for the supermarket’s own brand, an effect attributed to the 
collection of reward points.  Constraints that can restrict real or apparent 
availability in the organisational purchasing context can include policy 
(negotiated purchasing agreements), habit or distribution.  In the current 
coronary stent case, as for the ureteral stents, segments based on purchase 
frequency have already been identified and shown to explain some of the 
deviations from the Dirichlet benchmarks.  In the case of Boston in 2008, one 
buyer accounts for approximately 80% of Boston purchases, fulfilling all their 
requirements from Boston.  The behaviour of this high frequency, solely loyal 
buyer dominates the loyalty performance measure for Boston. 
 
The market dynamics can also be investigated by examining the development of 
the observed loyalty levels.  Two major transitions can be identified.  The first 
happens between 2006 and 2007 when the number of purchases and the number 
of buyers reduces.  The second occurs after the implementation of the 
purchasing agreements halfway through 2008.  Each transition will be 
considered in turn. 
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In 2006 loyalty to Boston is very high compared to the other suppliers in the 
category.  Purchasers satisfy approximately 80% of their category requirements 
with Boston, whereas the comparable figure for the supplier with the lowest 
observed loyalty, J&J, is less than 20%.  Buyers of J&J choose another supplier 
about four times more often than they choose J&J.  These patterns are broadly 
predicted by the model with the major deviation being the excess behavioural 
loyalty to the market leader, Boston. 
 
Through 2007 and early 2008, as the number of purchases falls, Boston 
maintains loyalty levels close to 80%.  This behaviour is driven by high loyalty 
(SCR in excess of 90%) in the heavy purchasing segment, with a single buyer 
remaining solely loyal to Boston.  It appears that Boston is becoming entrenched 
as a dominant supplier (high loyalty by a few heavy purchasers) while the other 
suppliers are bought by a few heavy purchasers who share their purchases 
between members of a large extended choice set.  Abbott also experiences an 
increase in observed loyalty, much higher than the expected loyalty.  As can be 
seen by the analysis for the light segment, this deviation can be explained by 
different buying behaviours in the heavy and light purchasing segments. 
 
Purchasing patterns in the second half of 2008 are quite different to those that 
have gone before.  In particular, the reduction in loyalty to Boston, relatively 
constant at about 80% over the previous 30 months before falling to 66% in the 
last six months of 2008, is noteworthy.  This decrease in loyalty could indicate a 
longer-term shift in buying behaviour as a result of the implementation of 
negotiated purchasing agreements.  The awareness generated by the 
implementation and the associated increased transparency of pricing will have 
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the effect of promoting alternative suppliers.  Whether this is a long term shift or 
a transient will require analysis over a longer period after implementation of the 
agreements. 
7.3.5 Proportion of Sole Buyers 
The proportion of buyers of a particular supplier who only buy from that 
supplier, the so-called sole buyers, is a widely used loyalty measure.  It is 
typically expected in Dirichlet markets that a supplier has relatively few sole 
buyers and that the sole buyers have a lower purchase frequency than the general 
population of buyers.  The distorting effect of a single high-frequency sole 
purchaser on the performance measures for Boston (notably penetration, 
purchase frequency and SCR) has already been noted.  It is instructive to review 
the sole buying patterns to see this effect in more detail (Table 7.14). 
 
The observed behaviours in 2006 follow the expected pattern, with a low 
proportion of sole buyers although the observed proportions are distorted 
somewhat by the relatively small number of purchasers.  The purchase 
frequencies are also low with sole buyers averaging 3.5 purchases compared to 
4.8 for the whole population in the same period.  By 2007 and early 2008, 
although the proportions of sole buyers appear to be increasing, this is largely a 
statistical artefact resulting from the reduction in the number of buyers, such that 
a single sole buyer represents a larger proportion of the buying population.  
However, the sole buyer purchase frequency is extremely high compared to both 
the predicted purchase frequency and the observed frequency for the overall 
population.  This is the result of a single high frequency purchaser entering the 
market in 2007 and only buying from Boston.   
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Table 7.14 Proportion of sole buyers 
O T O T
Boston 20.0% 17.7% 1.0 1.6
Medtronic 33.3% 8.0% 6.0 1.2
Abbott 0.0% 7.1% 0.0 1.2
J&J 0.0% 8.0% 0.0 1.2
Others 0.0% 5.9% 0.0 1.1
Average Supplier 10.7% 9.3% 1.4 1.3
Correlation, r 0.42 -0.01
Mean Absolute Deviation 9.7% 1.8
Boston 33.3% 32.6% 19.0 2.5
Medtronic 0.0% 9.7% 0.0 1.3
Abbott 33.3% 12.8% 1.0 1.4
J&J 0.0% 10.3% 0.0 1.3
Others 0.0% 11.5% 0.0 1.3
Average Supplier 13.3% 15.4% 4.0 1.5
Correlation, r 0.69 1.00
Mean Absolute Deviation 10.5% 4.2
Boston 50.0% 31.6% 21.0 2.1
Medtronic 50.0% 10.8% 3.0 1.2
Abbott 0.0% 8.0% 0.0 1.1
J&J 0.0% 7.3% 0.0 1.2
Others 33.3% 9.3% 2.0 1.2
Average Supplier 26.7% 13.4% 5.2 1.4
Correlation, r 0.62 0.99
Mean Absolute Deviation 19.4% 4.8
Boston 66.7% 36.7% 10.5 5.3
Medtronic 0.0% 25.3% 0.0 4.0
Abbott 0.0% 19.8% 0.0 3.3
J&J 100.0% 17.7% 2.0 3.0
Others 33.3% 24.7% 1.0 3.9
Average Supplier 40.0% 24.8% 2.7 3.9
Correlation, r 0.06 0.82
Mean Absolute Deviation 33.2% 3.3
2008
months 1 - 6
2006
2007
2008
months 7 - 
12
Sole Buyers Sole Buyer Purchase FrequencyYear Supplier
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After the implementation of the framework agreements the proportion of sole 
buyers increases as a number of lower frequency purchasers re-enters the 
market, making only single purchases and thus having no opportunity to be 
anything other than sole buyers.  This is the case for J&J, with one buyer making 
a single purchase.  The high frequency sole buyer continues to only buy Boston 
but the observed sole buyer purchase frequency is reduced because a second 
(low frequency) buyer makes a purchase from Boston. 
7.3.6 Duplication of Purchase 
An analysis of the duplication of purchase behaviour (Table 7.15) shows how 
the patterns of behaviour have changed from 2006 to 2008 although caution 
should be exercised due to the low numbers of purchasers.  In 2006, most buyers 
had a relatively wide repertoire (choice set), with buyers of almost all suppliers 
also purchasing from all four other suppliers.  The exception is Boston whose 
buyers only used the three major suppliers.  In 2007 these repertoires shrink 
such that the maximum number of alternative suppliers used is two.  This pattern 
persists into 2008 for most suppliers although Others is present in the repertoires 
of the buyers of all the suppliers. 
 
This pattern is rather different to that observed for the ureteral stents and the 
single trust coronary stent case.  In these cases the buyers of the dominant 
suppliers (particularly the heavy buyers) tended to buy mainly from the 
dominant suppliers.  In the collaborative hub coronary stent case the smaller 
suppliers are used by the buyers of most other suppliers such that the duplication 
of purchase observed for Others is higher than would be suggested by its 
penetration and the Duplication of Purchase Law (Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  This 
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level of duplication is reduced after the implementation of the framework 
agreement, resulting in patterns more similar to those seen in the previous cases. 
 
In 2006 J&J is the most duplicated supplier.  It has already been noted that 
buyers of J&J are likely to choose an alternative supplier four times more often 
than they choose J&J.  Thus they are familiar with the alternative suppliers and 
their ability to offer credible substitutes.  By 2008 J&J has been eliminated from 
the repertoires of most buyers. 
Table 7.15 Observed duplication of purchase (entire buying population) 
First Purchase
Buyers who purchase from: Boston Medtronic Abbott J&J Others
Boston - 20.0% 20.0% 60.0% 0.0%
Medtronic 33.3% - 33.3% 66.7% 33.3%
Abbott 33.3% 33.3% - 66.7% 66.7%
J&J 60.0% 40.0% 40.0% - 40.0%
Others 0.0% 50.0% 100.0% 100.0% -
Average observed duplication 31.7% 35.8% 48.3% 73.3% 35.0%
Boston - 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0%
Medtronic 100.0% - 0.0% 0.0% 16.7%
Abbott 33.3% 0.0% - 0.0% 33.3%
J&J 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% - 100.0%
Others 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% -
Average observed duplication 33.3% 8.3% 20.8% 12.5% 33.3%
Boston - 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0%
Medtronic 50.0% - 0.0% 0.0% 50.0%
Abbott 0.0% 0.0% - 100.0% 100.0%
J&J 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% - 100.0%
Others 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% -
Average observed duplication 20.8% 20.8% 33.3% 33.3% 75.0%
Boston - 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Medtronic 100.0% - 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Abbott 0.0% 0.0% - 0.0% 100.0%
J&J 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% - 0.0%
Others 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% -
Average observed duplication 25.0% 8.3% 16.7% 0.0% 25.0%
Who also purchase from:
Second Purchase
2008
month 7 - 12
2008
month 1 - 6
2006
2007
Year
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7.4 Qualitative Analysis 
Interviews with two procurement executives in the CPH have provided 
background and context to aid the interpretation of the Dirichlet analysis.  The 
scope of these interviews is discussed in Section 3.5.  A number of broad themes 
emerge from these discussions, concerning the level of buyer experience and 
openness to use alternative suppliers, the relationship between suppliers and 
buyers and the nature of the purchasing intervention. 
7.4.1 Buyer Experience and Commitment 
Three regional clinical networks of cardiac consultants (the cardiac networks) 
operate within the CPH.  The Cardiology Stakeholder Group, comprising 
decision makers and influencers for cardiac stent purchases and chaired by a 
recognised cardiac expert, was formed in July 2007 to develop the stent 
procurement project.  Expert buyer engagement is a key element of purchasing 
interventions in the hub and the procurement executives look to the clinicians 
and experts to help drive the projects in terms of what the requirements are and 
also to help manage the market.  The importance of the commitment of these 
experts is highlighted by the Deputy Director of the hub: “… so if the 
consultants are telling the suppliers “Don’t worry about the hub. You know 
we’ll just pay lip service to it.  We’re going to carry on doing what we’re doing 
now.  You know there’s nothing to worry about.” Then the suppliers won’t 
submit competitive prices and won’t take the process seriously because they 
won’t see that there is an opportunity for them or even a threat of them losing 
business.” 
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The cardiac network have always been proactive in looking at new products 
coming onto the market and are experienced buyers, generally very aware of 
what is available to them, familiar with the products and not afraid to look at 
alternatives.  They are further ahead of most other purchasing groups in 
removing “a lot of the fog around what suppliers provide”.  As an example of 
this, the CPH Deputy Director of Procurement in the hub observed “J&J are 
threatening to put the prices up and trusts are immediately trialling 
alternatives”.  The decline in share for J&J between 2006 and 2008 was also 
attributed to poor service and marketing.  The Deputy Director commented that 
“J&J haven’t spent much time in the trusts and some of the feedback the network 
gave us was that we hardly ever see them, you know the reps hardly ever come 
in, we don’t know what they’re doing and that’s reflected in the spend with 
them”. 
 
The trust Procurement Director commented that the clinicians were concerned 
that they might lose influence over their spend on cardiac stents.  This “huge 
sticking point” was linked to a fear that they would be forced to buy solely on 
the basis of price.  She reported that a common initial reaction to the project was 
“I’m not buying the cheapest”.  The long engagement period helped to overcome 
these fears and to establish the requirements for the project such that clinical 
choice could be maintained while highlighting opportunities to save money.  In 
addition, the aim was to implement the frameworks “in the most painless way 
possible” which in practice meant no significant supplier rationalisation or 
changes in practice.  
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The role of the hub procurement specialists is to provide evidence that 
alternatives are clinically acceptable, usually by showing that products are being 
used elsewhere.  In this respect the framework agreements have opened up 
options and encouraged clinicians to consider alternatives.  This is welcomed by 
both hub and clinicians because it introduces more competition, allows more 
control to be exercised over suppliers and allows more choice for individual 
treatments.   
7.4.2 Relationship between Buyers and Suppliers 
The suppliers recognise the consultants as their end customers, not the 
procurement hub.  Before the implementation of the framework agreements, the 
trust Procurement Director noted that individual trusts will have had their own 
contracts in place with “a lot of disparity in prices across the trusts”.  It is this 
disparity that the frameworks seek to eliminate.  The difference in prices was not 
always volume related, with the larger centres not always getting the best prices.  
During the negotiation period the Deputy Director commented on increased 
supplier activity as “the suppliers try to get commitment from the trusts and 
undermine the [procurement] process”. 
 
The Procurement Director recalled that at the time of the project the 
procurement hub regarded the cardiac stent category as a “fairly stagnant” 
market with comfortable relationships between clinicians and suppliers.  The 
large purchasers tended to be specialist clinical centres without a commercial 
focus and were “flooded with supplier reps”.  Although there was room to 
change, in practice this opportunity was rarely taken. 
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Under the framework agreements, trusts have committed to place a percentage 
of volume with certain suppliers in order to get better prices.  90% of annual 
coronary stent volumes are committed with 10% of volume retained for 
flexibility to trial new products.  The committed volumes are based on historical 
purchase volumes to avoid the tendency of hubs to overestimate their 
requirements.  A process of negotiation between the trusts ensured that the 
volume requirements across the hub were maximised while meeting the 
requirements of each trust to exercise choice over their purchases.  The 
commitment to agreed purchase volumes has generally been good but the 
Deputy Director in the hub is realistic about the depth of this commitment: “If 
there is a supplier offering a product at a lesser price their commitment would 
be irrelevant and they would make that change and then we would have to deal 
with that.” 
7.4.3 Nature of the Purchasing Intervention 
The aim of the purchasing intervention is to deliver cash releasing savings.  
Since the launch of the framework agreements in September 2008, the 
accumulated cash savings are estimated to be £3 million.  This has been 
achieved by agreeing price reductions with suppliers against firm volume 
commitments.  The early years of the intervention did not involve any supplier 
rationalisation but more recently there has been some activity towards 
standardisation and supplier rationalisation with one of the major trusts 
voluntarily reducing their choice set of drug eluting stents down to two.  The 
data analysed do not include any periods of supplier rationalisation.     
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The coronary stent category was one of the first projects identified by the hub 
and was chosen for intervention because it was a significant area of spend, it was 
a new area for the hub procurement team and the cardiac network were 
supportive.  Regulatory changes concerning the price differential between drug 
eluting stents and bare metal stents were expected to bring the prices of drug 
eluting stents down and raise the prices of bare metal stents in order to meet the 
maximum £300 price difference.  Both of these actions would increase hub 
expenditure on stents: as the more expensive drug eluting stents became more 
affordable, volume usage was expected to increase while the prices paid for the 
current purchased stents would increase.  The Procurement Director identified 
these factors as crucial in convincing the hub that the time was right to “start to 
influence and talk to suppliers about changing practice and rationalising across 
the network”.  The project started in August 2007 with an extended period of 
engagement with customers and suppliers before formally going to tender.  The 
negotiated framework agreements were launched in September 2008.  The 
expected price increases in bare metal stents did not occur and while usage of 
drug eluting stents did rise initially, this soon reduced again. 
 
Increases in activity in both buyers and supplier organisations have been 
observed during the evaluation and negotiation phase.  The activities of 
suppliers in trying to undermine the process have been discussed above.  In the 
buying organisation, increased scrutiny over spend in the category “does 
generate further discussion internally about how we can manage this spend 
better and more efficiently” (Deputy Director, Collaborative Procurement Hub).  
By bringing more spend into the purchase order system, procurement managers 
gain better visibility and control over the process compared to a situation 
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described by the trust Procurement Director where “they probably had really 
archaic order numbers that departments had been using for years”.  These 
activities may have resulted in some consolidation of buying centres although 
this was not an objective of the purchasing intervention.  The trust Procurement 
Director also suggested that data collection improved after implementation of 
the frameworks and may be an explanation for the increased number of 
purchasers and increased purchase frequency in the second half of 2008. 
7.5 Discussion 
The analysis of the coronary stent purchasing data demonstrates that the NBD-
Dirichlet model satisfactorily describes the observed purchasing behaviour for 
the coronary stent category in the collaborative purchasing hub over an extended 
period during which there are major changes to the market structure.   
 
Deviations from the model behaviour are observed.  In some cases these are the 
result of a relatively small purchasing population.  Systematic deviations also 
arise when the assumptions that underpin the Dirichlet model are violated.  
These are discussed further below. 
7.5.1 Dirichlet Assumptions 
Over the full analysis period, average purchasing behaviours remain fairly stable 
until the implementation of the negotiated framework agreements.  The fit of the 
model is good when the base period is an average six months (averaged over the 
three year data set).  Comparison of each of the three annual periods shows little 
change in any of the performance measures of market share, penetration, 
purchase frequency or SCR, in particular for the dominant supplier, Boston. 
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Although the average long term behaviour is stable, there is considerable short 
and medium term variability that violates the Dirichlet assumption of 
stationarity.  Month to month variations in market share and purchase frequency 
are marked, particularly for the smaller suppliers; there is considerable change in 
the buying population with new buyers, lapsed buyers and an overall reduction 
in the number of buyers and the number of purchase occasions.  There is also a 
noticeable change in behaviour following the introduction of the framework 
agreement, with the share of category requirements for Boston falling from 
approximately 80% to 66%.  The framework agreements are implemented over 
the last six months of the three year analysis period.  When the average 
performance over the full three years is considered, the performance during the 
first 30 months dominates the analysis and the impact of the framework 
agreements cannot be distinguished. 
 
The second assumption that underpins the Dirichlet analysis is that the market is 
non-partitioned.  The analysis has shown that identifying segments based on 
purchase frequency (heavy and light purchasers) leads to an improved fit 
between the model predictions and the observed behaviour.  This effect is more 
marked when the buying population is smaller and the heavy purchasers 
dominate the overall purchasing patterns, as observed in 2007 and 2008.  These 
findings replicate the observations in the ureteral stent case.   
7.5.2 Theoretical Implications 
The analysis of the coronary stent case represents a further differentiated 
replication of the NBD-Dirichlet model into a complex public procurement 
environment.  The case demonstrates how the model describes, predicts and 
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explains the changes in market structure following a supplier intervention, 
showing how the understanding of buyer behaviour provided by the model adds 
to the theory of collaborative purchasing. 
7.5.2.1 Extension and Replication of the NBD-Dirichlet Empirical 
Generalisation 
Replication studies set out to judge a theory by how generalisable it is over a 
wide range of conditions (Lindsay & Ehrenberg, 1993; Ehrenberg & Bound, 
1993).  The objective is not to achieve the best fit between the observed data and 
the model predictions for a single instance; rather the aim is to find “significant 
sameness” (Barwise, 1995) over a range of different circumstances.  As in the 
ureteral stent case, the analysis of coronary stents in the collaborative 
procurement hub is a highly differentiated replication of the NBD-Dirichlet 
model.  Purchasing decisions are influenced by regulatory decisions affecting 
the use of drug-eluting stents, by collaborative purchasing decisions made within 
the purchasing hub, by individual trust procurement departments and by the 
clinicians themselves.  The fit of the expected behaviours predicted by the NBD-
Dirichlet model with the observed purchasing behaviour patterns have been 
shown to satisfy the test of “stochastic sameness” (Ehrenberg & Bound, 1993).   
 
The purchasing behaviours in the coronary stent category generally exhibit the 
regular patterns of buyer behaviour that have been observed in many different 
markets (Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  These regular patterns include the observation 
that suppliers in the category typically have very different market shares and 
penetrations but that the purchase frequency for each supplier is approximately 
constant.  The performance of Boston is somewhat anomalous, with a purchase 
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frequency of 6.2, almost twice the average of the other suppliers of 3.3.  
Boston’s penetration is also lower than would be suggested by its market share.  
These deviations are attributed to the impact of a single, solely loyal, high 
frequency purchaser. 
 
The patterns of observed supplier loyalty in the coronary stent case show the 
typical patterns of a Dirichlet repertoire market (Sharp et al, 2002) where the 
buyers of a particular supplier tend to buy from other suppliers quite often.  This 
is typical of competitive markets where buyers are highly experienced and have 
well established supplier choice propensities such that the Dirichlet’s zero-order 
assumption holds (Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  Again the single solely loyal 
purchaser affects the behaviour of Boston such that observed loyalty towards 
Boston is much higher than loyalty to the other suppliers and higher than the 
Dirichlet predicted loyalty. 
 
In addition to the specific case of Boston, there is a systematic tendency to 
underestimate loyalty for all suppliers.  These deviations result in part from a 
violation of the Dirichlet assumption of lack of partitioning (Sharp & Driesener, 
2000) with a segment of high frequency buyers dominating the observed 
purchase behaviours and in part from the relatively small number of buyers and 
purchases used to operationalise the model (Stern & Hammond, 2004). 
7.5.2.2 Application of the NBD-Dirichlet Model to Collaborative 
Purchasing 
The collaborative purchasing literature focuses on the mechanisms by which 
purchasing consortia arise, their development and their governance (Schotanus 
& Telgen, 2007).  There has been little research into the actual buying 
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behaviours of organisations within purchasing consortia.  The application of the 
Dirichlet in a collaborative purchasing context provides a coherent theory of 
purchasing behaviour to describe, predict and explain buyer behaviour in 
purchasing consortia. 
 
As in the ureteral stent case, the Dirichlet has been used to establish a base case 
against which deviations in behaviour can be identified and investigated.  The 
coronary stent data covers a period during which a major purchasing 
intervention is discussed, negotiated and implemented and the Dirichlet 
benchmarks provide a valuable theoretical tool to analyse the behaviours in the 
periods before and after implementation.  Deviations from the Dirichlet norms 
can be used as a point of departure for further investigation such as the impact of 
the solely loyal high frequency purchaser.  The collaborative hub coronary stent 
case also shows how the NBD-Dirichlet can be applied over a series of time 
periods to analyse the dynamic response to the implementation of a framework 
agreement.  The implementation of the framework agreements leads to a 
reduction in share of category requirements for the dominant supplier, Boston, 
reducing the observed excess loyalty.  Excess loyalty is attributed to availability 
constraints (Fader & Schmittlein, 1993), through distribution, policy, habit or 
perceived lack of credible alternatives.  Implementation of the framework 
agreements affects loyalty by increasing the awareness of credible alternative 
suppliers and loosening the organisational constraints that hold back adoption of 
such alternative suppliers (Jarvis & Wilcox, 1977). 
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7.5.2.3 Anticipatory Purchasing Behaviours 
The analysis of the coronary stent data has shown some preliminary evidence for 
purchase deceleration in the period before the implementation of the framework 
agreements as buyers defer purchases in anticipation of better pricing after the 
negotiations are concluded.  The evidence is not conclusive and the effect could 
be the result of increased order quantity per purchase occasion as suppliers offer 
bulk purchase deals to improve their market position during the negotiation 
period. 
 
If deferred purchasing does occur, it is likely to lead to the opposite effect to that 
intended, as following the implementation of the negotiated contracts, buyers 
increase purchase rates to rebuild inventories.  This could push the measured 
spend after implementation of a framework agreement above the measured 
spend before the contracts were in place.  This effect has some similarities to the 
acceleration or deceleration and stockpiling of purchases associated with 
promotions in consumer markets, in particular the deferment (deceleration) of 
purchases and the stronger effect observed in the heavy buying segment (Neslin 
et al, 1985; Mela et al, 1998; Macé & Neslin, 2004).  There does not appear to 
be any literature describing this effect in organisational markets. 
7.5.3 Managerial Implications 
The theoretical predictions of the NBD-Dirichlet model provide norms and 
benchmarks against which to assess current behaviours and to monitor the 
impact of managerial interventions (Ehrenberg & Sharp, 2000).  The 
implications of the model for managers in collaborative procurement 
organisations are discussed below. 
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7.5.3.1 Buyer Repertoires 
Buyers in competitive Dirichlet type markets will typically purchase from a 
repertoire of several suppliers with fixed long term purchase frequencies and 
steady supplier choice probabilities (Goodhardt et al, 1984).  Purchasing 
managers who are planning supplier rationalisation interventions should be 
aware of the buyer repertoire as supplier rationalisation interventions that do not 
pay heed to highly dependent relationships typically do not deliver the promised 
benefits (Cousins, 1999).  The intervention in the collaborative hub coronary 
stent case shows a cautious approach to implementation of framework 
agreements in such a way that clinician choice is not reduced.  The increased 
awareness of alternative supply options that follows the implementation of the 
framework agreements increases choice for clinicians and leads to more split 
loyalty purchasing behaviour. 
7.5.3.2 Supplier Loyalty 
The assumption of as-if random purchasing behaviours where loyalty is split 
between suppliers in a purchasing repertoire has implications for purchasing 
managers seeking to make interventions to change the purchasing behaviours of 
members of the purchasing group (Goodhardt et al, 1984).  Buyers appear to 
welcome variety and choice  (Ehrenberg et al, 2004), an observation noted in the 
collaborative hub coronary stent case.  Cardiac stent purchasing in the 
collaborative hub shows high observed loyalty behaviour towards a single 
supplier (Boston) until the implementation of the framework agreements.  After 
the agreements are put in place and credible alternatives are available to be 
added to the buyers’ repertoires, the more typical split loyalty behaviours start to 
emerge.  This development is consistent with the argument put forward by Jarvis 
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and Wilcox (1977) that most repeat purchase behaviour is determined by 
organisational constraints.  When new vendors are evaluated by a collaborative 
procurement hub and presented as credible alternatives in an approved 
purchasing list and prices are negotiated centrally these constraints on repeat 
purchasing behaviour are loosened and split loyalty behaviour emerges. 
7.5.3.3 Implementing and Monitoring Interventions 
Using the NBD-Dirichlet as a benchmark for purchasing behaviours allows the 
procurement manager to track the impact of interventions by assessing 
behaviours before and after implementation.  In the coronary stent case, the 
comparison between behaviours in 2006 – 2008 and the behaviours in late 2008 
(after implementation of the agreements) is striking, particularly when the 
loyalty measures are considered.  Post-implementation, the Dirichlet norms can 
be used as a baseline to check compliance and monitor unexpected behaviours 
(Ehrenberg et al, 2004), for example the behaviour of the high frequency sole 
buyer. 
 
An important feature of the collaborative procurement hub coronary stent case 
framework agreements is the requirement for member organisations to commit 
to particular purchase volumes from specific suppliers such that the aggregated 
volume commitments for the hub are met.  Expected purchase volumes for each 
supplier may not be straightforward historical projections if the purchasing 
patterns are expected to change after implementation of the framework 
agreements.   
 
The NBD-Dirichlet can be used to predict purchasing behaviours over time 
periods of different lengths (Ehrenberg, 1988).  This feature of the model can be 
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used by purchasing managers to make volume predictions under different 
simulated purchasing patterns.  This is discussed further in Section 8.3.3.3 where 
annual (48 week) predictions for coronary stent purchases in 2006 and the first 
twelve months of the framework agreement are estimated.   
7.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented the analysis of coronary stent purchasing data for 
three full years (April 2006 to March 2009) for reporting trusts in a 
Collaborative Purchasing Hub in the English NHS.  The coronary stent category 
has been a target for a major purchasing intervention and the 2006 – 2008 data 
set covers the years immediately preceding the formalisation of these 
interventions in a negotiated set of framework agreements in September 2008.  
The background to these interventions has been investigated through an 
exploratory interview process with representatives of the collaborative 
procurement hub.   
 
There is considerable month to month variation in coronary stent purchasing 
behaviours and an observable change in purchasing patterns following the 
implementation of the supplier framework agreements.  The share of category 
requirements for the dominant supplier, relatively constant at approximately 
80% through the previous thirty months, falls to 66% in the six months after the 
implementation of the frameworks.  This may be due to increased awareness of 
credible alternatives as a result of the framework agreements. 
 
Systematic deviations from the Dirichlet model predictions are observed and 
analysed.  A factor contributing to the observed deviations is a single, solely 
loyal, high frequency purchaser whose actions dominate the analysis of observed 
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purchasing behaviours, particularly towards the end of the analysis period when 
there is a smaller number of buyers.   
 
The analysis of the coronary stent case is a further replication and extension of 
the NBD-Dirichlet into a collaborative public procurement purchasing 
environment, adding to the Dirichlet literature and a novel contribution to the 
collaborative purchasing literature.  The case also demonstrates how the NBD 
Dirichlet can provide benchmarks against which the progress of purchasing 
interventions can be tracked.   
 
The next chapter summarises the research findings and discusses the theoretical 
contribution of the research.  The implications of the findings for purchasing 
managers in collaborative procurement organisations are discussed, together 
with practical applications of the NBD-Dirichlet model. 
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8 Research Implications and Suggestions for Further 
Research 
8.1 Introduction 
The preceding empirical analyses have shown that the purchasing of stents in 
collaborative purchasing organisations follows regular patterns of buyer 
behaviour similar to those seen in Dirichlet markets (Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  
Suppliers of both coronary and ureteral stents typically have very different 
market shares and penetrations but the purchase frequency for each supplier is 
approximately constant.  In addition, the buyers of a particular supplier tend to 
buy from other suppliers quite often.   
 
Although such patterns are typical of Dirichlet-type markets, the conditions of 
stationary and non-partitioned markets necessary for the Dirichlet distributional 
assumptions to be valid do not hold (Goodhardt et al, 1984).  Systematic 
deviations between the observed patterns and those predicted by the NBD-
Dirichlet model (Sharp & Driesener, 2000) are observed, including 
overestimation of the number of buyers (penetration) and underestimation of the 
purchase frequency.  The observed deviations are attributed to partitioning of the 
market, in particular the existence of a small number of high frequency 
purchasers who purchase so frequently that they dominate the observed purchase 
behaviours.  Isolating this heavy purchasing segment improves the fit of the 
model such that the NBD-Dirichlet describes and predicts the observed 
purchasing patterns with a level of accuracy similar to that seen in previous 
Dirichlet studies (Ehrenberg, 1994).  
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The empirical analysis shows that the theoretical predictions of the NBD-
Dirichlet model can provide norms and benchmarks against which to assess 
current behaviours and to monitor the impact of interventions (Ehrenberg & 
Sharp, 2000).  Systematic deviations from the model benchmarks identify 
aspects of market structure (for example the high frequency “heavy” purchasing 
segment) or buyer behaviour that aid understanding of the market and assist the 
identification of opportunities for intervention. 
 
The contributions of the research are considered in more detail below, together 
with a discussion of the limitations of the research and suggestions for further 
research. 
8.2 Theoretical Implications 
The research represents a substantial extension of the NBD-Dirichlet model into 
a complex public procurement environment and demonstrates how this model, 
traditionally associated with business-to-consumer marketing, can be applied in 
business-to-business purchase and supply chain management.  In addition to 
these contributions to the Dirichlet literature and to the purchasing and supply 
chain management literature, the review of the extant literature reveals an 
unexpected complementarity between the stochastic modelling research 
approach and that of the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) group.  The 
research shows how analysis of the observed purchasing behaviours and 
comparison between these and the benchmark behaviours predicted by the 
Dirichlet model can guide and inform case study research into the network 
within which such behaviours are embedded. 
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8.2.1 Extension of the NBD-Dirichlet Empirical Generalisation 
As noted in Section 3.2.1 the essence of replication is to judge a theory by how 
generalisable it is over a wide range of conditions (Lindsay & Ehrenberg, 1993; 
Ehrenberg & Bound, 1993).  The objective is not to achieve the best fit between 
the observed data and the model predictions for a single instance; rather the aim 
is to find “significant sameness” (Barwise, 1995) over a range of different 
circumstances (Ehrenberg, 1994).   
 
The NBD-Dirichlet empirical generalisation has been applied in over fifty 
product or service categories (Uncles et al, 1995).  However, only three of these 
studies have addressed organisational purchasing behaviours (Uncles & 
Ehrenberg, 1990; Bowman & Lele-Pingle, 1997; Pickford & Goodhardt, 2000) 
and none of the studies has considered buyer behaviour in a collaborative 
purchasing organisation.  A study of physicians’ prescribing behaviours (Stern, 
1994) has demonstrated that the Dirichlet holds in the situation where the 
product purchased (prescribed) is not consumed by the specifier.  However the 
physicians were not acting as members of a collaborative purchasing 
organisation and were not subject to the constraints to product choice imposed 
by membership of a collaborative procurement programme. 
 
The current research is set in the context of a collaborative public procurement 
organisation, with complex influences and constraints on supplier choice, 
including regulatory guidance; purchasing policies at both individual trust level 
and at the level of the purchasing group; and the choices made by individual 
clinicians (Cox et al, 2005).  These specific conditions represent a highly 
differentiated replication of the NBD-Dirichlet empirical generalisation.   
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The collaborative hub purchase data covers a three year period during which 
supplier intervention in the ureteral stent case and purchasing intervention in the 
coronary stent case result in major changes to market structure.  The purchasing 
behaviours of individual stent requisitioners in the single trust and of cost 
centres in the collaborative procurement hub exhibit the regular patterns of 
buyer behaviour that have been observed in many different markets (Ehrenberg 
et al, 2004).  These regular patterns include the observations that suppliers in the 
category typically have very different market shares and penetrations but the 
purchase frequency for each supplier is approximately constant.  The Double 
Jeopardy phenomenon where smaller suppliers tend to be purchased less 
frequently than the larger suppliers (McPhee, 1963) is also observed.   
 
Linked to Double Jeopardy is the Natural Monopoly Phenomenon (McPhee, 
1963) where the smaller suppliers tend to be purchased more frequently by 
heavier purchasers who have more opportunity to experiment and are typically 
more experienced purchasers than the lighter buyers.  In the single trust coronary 
stent case and the ureteral stent case the observed behaviours do not follow this 
pattern and the heavier purchasers buy only rarely from the smaller suppliers.  
This is an initial deviation from the typical Dirichlet patterns and is attributed to 
constrained supplier choice and availability (Fader & Schmittlein, 1993).  Such 
constraints can arise from supplier framework agreements that result in restricted 
repertoires.  A similar effect has been observed with own (private) label 
consumer goods which are only available for purchase in their respective stores.  
This restricted availability means that own label brands typically have fewer 
buyers who purchase more frequently than expected (Pare & Dawes, 2008).  
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Purchasing behaviours in the longitudinal coronary stent case are consistent with 
the natural monopoly phenomenon because the framework agreements are 
agreed towards the end of the analysis period and in any case the frameworks are 
designed to maintain the status quo rather than restrict clinician choice. 
 
The patterns of observed supplier loyalty are quite different between the three 
cases analysed.  The two coronary stent cases show the typical patterns of a 
Dirichlet repertoire market (Sharp et al, 2002) where the buyers of a particular 
supplier tend to buy from other suppliers quite often.  This is typical of 
competitive markets where buyers are highly experienced and have well 
established supplier choice propensities such that the Dirichlet’s zero-order 
assumption holds (Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  For the ureteral stents the initial 
loyalty behaviours are typical of a Dirichlet subscription market (Sharp et al, 
2002) where buyers of a particular supplier tend to be solely loyal to that 
supplier.  However by the end of the three year analysis period the patterns are 
much more like a repertoire market.  This is to be expected as buyers become 
more experienced with the alternative supplier and the supplier becomes 
established in the buyers’ purchase portfolios. 
 
Such patterns are typical of Dirichlet-type markets but the operationalisation of 
the model in all three cases demonstrates some systematic deviations between 
the observed performance and theoretical predictions.  These deviations include 
a tendency to overestimate the number of buyers (penetration), to underestimate 
the purchase frequency and to underestimate supplier loyalty.  The dynamic 
development of both stent categories in the collaborative hub over the three year 
analysis period means that the conditions of stationary and non-partitioned 
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markets necessary for the Dirichlet distributional assumptions to be valid do not 
hold (Goodhardt et al, 1984; Sharp & Driesener, 2000).  Selection of a shorter 
time period during which the purchasing behaviour is approximately stationary 
improves the fit and allows analysis of the dynamic development of the purchase 
behaviours in a series of snapshots of behaviour at specific points during the 
analysis period.   
 
Partitioning of the market with a segment of high frequency buyers dominating 
the observed purchase behaviours is particularly marked in the single trust 
coronary stent case and the ureteral stent case where the purchasing repertoire of 
the heavy purchasers is restricted to the major suppliers.  Such segmentation 
violates the Dirichlet distributional assumptions of lack of partitioning and the 
independence of supplier choices and purchase frequency (Sharp & Driesener, 
2000).  Such segmentation by purchase frequency has been observed in earlier 
B2B applications of the Dirichlet, in particular the analysis of foreign exchange 
services (Bowman & Lele-Pingle, 1997).  This may be a repeatable 
characteristic of organisational markets. 
 
Purchasing interventions to establish framework agreements and to put in place 
volume commitments act to restrict the availability of alternative suppliers and 
lead to these observed deviations from the Dirichlet norms (Fader & 
Schmittlein, 1993).  As has already been noted, the framework agreements 
implemented in the collaborative hub coronary stent case do not attempt to 
restrict clinician choice and hence the impact of the heavy purchasing segment is 
less marked.  When the NBD-Dirichlet model is operationalised using the heavy 
purchasing segment it describes and predicts the observed purchasing patterns 
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with a level of accuracy similar to that seen in previous Dirichlet studies 
(Ehrenberg, 1994; Uncles et al, 1995).   
8.2.2 Application of the NBD-Dirichlet Model to Collaborative 
Purchasing 
The collaborative purchasing literature is focused on describing, defining and 
theoretically modelling cooperative purchasing – “to explain, predict and 
understand behaviour concerning the intent, purpose and actual use of 
cooperatives in procurement” (McCue & Prier, 2006 p. 46).  Most of this 
literature addresses the motivation for the use of collaborative purchasing 
arrangements (Tella & Virolainen, 2005), the structure and form of purchasing 
consortia (Bakker et al, 2006a), the evolution of purchasing consortia (Laing & 
Cotton, 1997) and the critical success factors that influence the successful 
implementation of collaborative procurement (Schotanus et al, 2010). 
 
The delivery of long term savings in a purchasing consortium requires product 
standardisation and vendor rationalisation (Chapman et al, 1998) and hence for 
purchasers to change their behaviours concerning supplier choice (Cohen, 2002).  
Commitment and compliance to the purchasing group and acceptance of the 
constraints that membership of the group places on a buyer’s freedom of 
supplier choice are identified in the collaborative purchasing literature as critical 
success factors (Doucette, 1997; Harland et al, 2007) along with effective 
monitoring of local procurement behaviour (Rokkan & Buvik, 2003).  However, 
there has been little research into how the members of purchasing groups 
actually buy and how their purchasing behaviours change as a result of group 
membership, particularly with respect to supplier loyalty.   
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The NBD-Dirichlet model has been used to describe and predict buyer 
behaviour many different product and service categories (Uncles et al, 1995) but 
it has been a tool used exclusively by sellers rather than purchasers.  The 
Dirichlet models buyer behaviours for a purchasing population and is likely to 
be of little practical interest for an individual purchaser or purchasing 
organisation.  However, in a cooperative or collaborative purchasing 
organisation, there is a heterogeneous population of purchasers, good data 
availability through the purchase order record, and the desire to understand 
purchaser behaviour, particularly when favourable contract pricing is contingent 
on the members of the purchasing group making a minimum number of 
purchases.   
 
As a coherent theory of purchasing behaviour, the Dirichlet is an important 
addition to the existing theoretical framework of collaborative purchasing which 
is based on transaction cost economics, the resource based view of the firm, 
agency theory, network theory and game theory (Schotanus & Telgen, 2007).  
The assumptions on which the Dirichlet is based are: (i) each buyer has a steady 
long term average rate of purchasing the product category and these purchases 
can be described by a Poisson process; (ii) the distribution of light, medium and 
heavy buyers is distributed according to a gamma distribution; (iii) each buyer 
chooses a repertoire of suppliers with fixed propensities to choose any particular 
supplier represented by a multinomial distribution; (iv) these distributions are 
distributed across the buying population according to a multivariate Beta 
distribution; and (v) supplier choice is independent of average purchase 
frequency (Goodhardt et al, 1984).  The current research shows how this 
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characterisation of buyer behaviour provided by the Dirichlet enables analysis 
and prediction of purchasing behaviours in collaborative purchasing 
organisations.  In the coronary stent cases in particular, the buyers are highly 
experienced and exhibit the expected patterns of steady split-loyalty purchase 
propensities that are unaffected by previous purchases (the “zero-order” 
assumption) (Ehrenberg & Sharp, 2000). 
 
The concept of the purchasing portfolio or repertoire is an important basis for 
analysing and understanding purchasing interventions associated with 
standardisation or rationalisation.  Supplier development can be understood as 
an extension to the buyer’s repertoire, as evidenced by the performance of Cook 
in the ureteral stent case.  Supplier rationalisation is conceptualised as a 
restriction to the buyer’s repertoire, as seen in the single trust coronary stent 
case.  Although a stationary model, the NBD-Dirichlet can be applied over a 
series of time periods to allow analysis of dynamic developments in market 
structure as a result of such purchasing interventions. 
 
The NBD-Dirichlet model also characterises the loyalty behaviours of buyers in 
collaborative purchasing organisations.  All three cases in the current research 
demonstrate how the model provides a baseline for interpretation of observed 
loyalty.  Deviations from the Dirichlet norms can be used as a point of departure 
for further investigation such as the identification of distinct purchasing 
segments within the buying population as seen in the ureteral stent case and the 
single trust coronary stent case.  The collaborative hub coronary stent case 
shows how the purchasing intervention affects loyalty by increasing the 
awareness of credible alternative suppliers.  
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8.2.3 Stochastic Modelling and Industrial Networks – 
Complementary Views of Organisational Behaviour 
As noted in Chapter 2, stochastic modelling and the “markets as networks” 
research traditions share an approach to knowledge creation that combines 
empirical observation and theory development in a generative process 
(Ehrenberg, 1994; Dubois & Gadde, 2002).  Although the theoretical 
foundations of both traditions are very different, they share assumptions about 
the nature of buyers and sellers and the constraints which govern their 
interactions.  Stochastic modelling and the IMP or “markets as networks” 
approach both assume heterogeneity with respect to purchasing behaviours 
across the population of buyers (Ehrenberg, 1959; Hakansson, 1982).   
 
In addition, both traditions also explicitly recognise that buyers and sellers are 
interdependent and interact between themselves and with others in the network, 
often in individually unpredictable ways that constrain both managerial 
autonomy and the ability to act independently (Ford & Hakansson, 2006).  In the 
interaction approach the constraints imposed on managerial intervention have 
been described as  “the myth of independence” and “the myth of action” (Ford et 
al, 2003).    The concept of “as if random” buying behaviour also constrains 
managerial ability to influence behaviours in steady markets.  Short term 
interventions, for example promotional activity, can have a temporary effect on 
behaviours but the observed patterns typically revert back to the long term 
steady probabilities once the promotion ends (Ehrenberg et al, 1994). Many 
factors influence an individual purchase decision; certainly too many factors to 
model rigorously and in most cases, outside the marketing manager’s control.  
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Stochastic theories of behaviour accommodate this uncertainty by modelling 
purchase behaviour probabilistically (Goodhardt et al, 1984).   
 
The use of stochastic models to analyse and interpret buyer behaviour and 
market structure can add context to network analysis.  Just as deviations from 
the expected behaviour baseline can prompt econometric analyses of the 
unexpected behaviours (Morrison & Schmittlein, 1988), they can also be a basis 
for “purposeful sampling” to identify the rich cases most likely to deliver deep 
understanding of the observed phenomenon (Dubois & Araujo, 2007).  However 
the combination of stochastic modelling and the “markets as networks” 
approach is relatively rare, perhaps due to the tendency to identify each as a 
distinct and separate paradigm.  The current research develops a theoretical 
framework to investigate the common ground between these approaches and 
demonstrates that the complementary insights derived from them can be 
exploited to improve the understanding of organisational purchasing behaviour 
(McCabe & Stern, 2009).   
 
Stochastic modelling and IMP both aim to describe, interpret and explain 
observed regularities in buyer behaviour.  Descriptive and explanatory theory 
develops from observation in a creative process described as abductive (Dubois 
& Gadde, 2002) or Empirical then Theoretical (EtT) (Ehrenberg, 1994).  The 
research methodology adopted by both research traditions considers behaviour 
over an extended series of episodes; interactions in the case of IMP (Ford, 
2004), purchase occasions in stochastic modelling (Ehrenberg, 1988).  While the 
predominant mode of analysis in IMP research is interpretive, through the 
medium of the case study (Easton, 1998), the route to generalisability is 
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empirical, as in the stochastic modelling approach.  Multiple sources of evidence 
in the case study (Easton, 1995b) are analogous to Multiple Sets of Data 
(Ehrenberg, 1995). 
 
Although the IMP research is based on the observation of long-lasting inter-firm 
relationships (Hakansson, 1982) it is recognised that such relationships can 
change as new suppliers take a greater share of a buyer’s purchases (Gadde & 
Mattsson, 1987; Dubois et al, 2003; Kamp, 2005).  The current research 
demonstrates that, in the case of stent purchases in this particular collaborative 
purchasing hub, buyers tend to purchase within a repertoire of supplier 
relationships.  Single sourcing or sole loyalty behaviour is unusual and observed 
behavioural loyalties (measured as Share of Category Requirements) is typically 
around 50%, similar to loyalty levels seen in many consumer markets. 
 
There have been calls to use stochastic techniques “to study the proportion of 
newly established, continuing and disrupted relationships” (Gadde & Mattsson, 
1987).  In his comparison of evolutionary economics with the markets-as-
networks tradition, Brennan (2006) suggests the use of dynamic simulation 
modelling and historical studies to extend the understanding of industrial 
networks.  The current research presents such an example of how stochastic 
modelling can be used to describe and simulate the changing pattern of 
relationships and interactions between buyers and suppliers over an extended 
period. 
8.3 Managerial Implications 
The NBD-Dirichlet is relatively straightforward to operationalise, robust enough 
to be used across a range of purchasing situations and requires minimal inputs 
253 
(Dacko, 2008), yet it provides a comprehensive characterisation of buying 
patterns.  The theoretical predictions of the NBD-Dirichlet model provide norms 
and benchmarks against which to assess current behaviours and to monitor the 
impact of managerial interventions (Ehrenberg & Sharp, 2000).  The 
implications of the model and some practical applications for managers in 
collaborative procurement organisations are discussed below. 
8.3.1 Buyer Repertoires 
Buyers in competitive Dirichlet type markets will typically purchase from a 
repertoire of several suppliers with fixed long term purchase frequencies and 
steady supplier choice probabilities (Goodhardt et al, 1984).  The underlying 
assumption is that buyers are highly experienced such that the steady supplier 
choice probabilities are unaffected by additional purchases (the zero-order 
assumption) and that behaviour is largely routinised within the constraints of the 
purchasing repertoire (Popkowski Leszczyc & Bass, 1998; Ehrenberg et al, 
2004).   
 
Purchasing managers may wish to introduce a new supplier or develop an 
existing supplier to improve competition and increase leverage over the supply 
base.  Such so-called “reverse marketing” (Biemans & Brand, 1995) requires the 
new supplier to become established in buyer repertoires so that the supplier 
attracts more buyers (Ehrenberg, 1988). A sustained effort over an extended 
period is needed to introduce the alternative supplier to an individual buyer’s 
repertoire and for the buyer to develop enough experience for the choice of the 
new supplier to become routinised.  The experience from consumer markets is 
that short term promotions can temporarily change purchase behaviours but that 
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purchasing patterns return to the long term averages once the promotional 
stimulus is removed (Ehrenberg et al, 1994).  The ureteral stent case provides a 
good illustration of the impact of a sustained supplier development effort, albeit 
an effort initiated by the supplier itself. Between 2006 and 2008 Cook grows its 
market share from 24% to 59% by increasing penetration (the number of buyers) 
from 25% to 37.5%. By 2008 Cook is established in the majority of buyer’s 
repertoires. 
 
Purchasing managers planning supplier rationalisation interventions should also 
be concerned with the buyer repertoire.  Supplier rationalisation interventions 
that do not pay heed to highly dependent relationships typically do not deliver 
the promised benefits (Cousins, 1999).  Managers should ensure that supplier 
reduction initiatives recognise that buyers have established purchasing 
repertoires and try to work within the constraints of those repertoires to restrict 
the size of the portfolio.  The intervention in the collaborative hub coronary stent 
case shows such a cautious approach to implementation of framework 
agreements in such a way that clinician choice would not be reduced.  In the 
single trust coronary stent case the supplier rationalisation is more advanced and 
for the heaviest purchasers the repertoire is restricted to the three major 
suppliers.  Duplication of purchase tables can also be analysed to identify 
credible alternative suppliers that could be substituted for existing suppliers in 
the repertoire. 
8.3.2 Supplier Loyalty 
The loyalty shown to particular suppliers in a competitive Dirichlet market tends 
to be similar across all suppliers.  Buyers appear to welcome variety and choice  
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(Ehrenberg et al, 2004), an observation noted in the collaborative hub coronary 
stent case.  This persistent split-loyalty behaviour typical of Dirichlet markets is 
advantageous to purchasing managers seeking to encourage competition and 
choice in a particular category. The assumption of as-if random purchasing 
behaviours where loyalty is split between suppliers in a purchasing repertoire 
has implications for purchasing managers seeking to make interventions to 
change the purchasing behaviours of members of the purchasing group.   
 
The ureteral stent case demonstrates the development of such split-loyalty 
behaviours.  The initial conditions in the ureteral stent case show high levels of 
sole loyalty such that buyers satisfy most of their requirements from a single 
supplier.  By the end of the analysis period the ureteral stent buyers have gained 
experience of an alternative supplier and exhibit the split loyalty behaviours 
typical of a Dirichlet market.  Experienced buyers, such as those in the cardiac 
stent cases already exhibit split loyalty behaviour as is seen in the single trust 
case.  Cardiac stent purchasing in the collaborative hub shows high observed 
loyalty behaviour towards a single supplier (Boston) until the implementation of 
the framework agreements.  After the agreements are put in place and credible 
alternatives are available to be added to the buyers’ repertoires, the more typical 
split loyalty behaviours start to emerge. 
 
8.3.3 Practical Applications of the NBD-Dirichlet Model in 
Purchasing and Supply Management 
The NBD-Dirichlet provides theoretical benchmarks that can be used to audit 
supply categories in order to assess the opportunity for intervention or to 
monitor the progress of an intervention.  It can also be used for scenario 
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planning, for example to model the introduction of a new supplier, the 
development of an existing supplier or the removal of an existing supplier.  As 
seen in the current research the Dirichlet can also be used to analyse dynamic 
market development over an extended period (Ehrenberg et al, 2004). 
 
8.3.3.1 Category Audits 
Brand Performance Measures such as market share, penetration, purchase 
frequency, percentage of heavy buyers, share of category requirements and 
percentage of solely loyal buyers are commonly benchmarked against Dirichlet 
norms (Ehrenberg et al, 2004) to assess whether the observed performance 
matches the performance that would be expected given the brand’s market share.  
The same techniques can be applied to purchase categories in a collaborative 
hub, to assess whether the observed behaviours are in line with those that would 
be expected in a competitive Dirichlet market.  Deviations from the norms can 
indicate opportunities for intervention and the magnitude and direction of 
deviations can be monitored to assess the progress of purchasing management 
interventions.  By way of example, deviations from the Dirichlet norms 
identified in the current research are discussed below. 
 
In the ureteral stent case the observed penetrations are generally lower than the 
Dirichlet norms and the observed purchase frequencies generally higher than the 
benchmarks.  These deviations from the Dirichlet predictions are explained by a 
partitioned market with distinct heavy and light purchasing segments.  There are 
also deviations from the Dirichlet norms in the share of category requirements 
for the ureteral stents.  The observed loyalties are generally higher than the 
predicted loyalties, a deviation that is also attributed to the existence of the 
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heavy purchasing segment.  In addition, in 2006, buyers of Boston and Cook 
satisfy approximately 90% of their category requirements from a single supplier, 
a purchasing pattern that is more like a subscription market than a competitive 
split loyalty repertoire market (Sharp et al, 2002).  These high observed loyalties 
suggest an opportunity for intervention to expand the buyers’ repertoires beyond 
their single preferred supplier perhaps by building increased awareness of 
credible alternatives or increased transparency in pricing.  By 2008, after a 
sustained promotional intervention by Cook, the share of category requirements 
was less than 60% for each supplier. 
 
Similar deviations from the Dirichlet norms are observed in the collaborative 
hub coronary stent case.  In this case the impact of a heavy purchasing segment 
can also be observed in the number of buyers (penetration) and their purchase 
frequency.  When the share of category requirements for the coronary stents is 
considered, it can be seen that Boston has a particularly high observed SCR 
compared to the Dirichlet prediction.  This excess loyalty persists until the 
introduction of the framework agreements in the second half of 2008.  Excess 
loyalty for a market leading supplier has been observed previously (Fader & 
Schmittlein, 1993).  This market share premium is attributed to distributional 
effects which in the coronary stent case can be interpreted as a perceived lack of 
credible alternatives.  The framework agreements raise awareness of possible 
alternatives and the market share premium falls. 
 
Deviations from the Dirichlet norms can also be used to track the progress of 
purchasing interventions and to monitor compliance with framework 
agreements.  The single trust coronary stent case shows that purchasing patterns 
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can be analysed at the level of the individual requisitioner, rather than the cost 
centre.  Observed excess loyalty for one or more suppliers or higher than 
expected purchase frequency or penetration for off-framework suppliers would 
indicate non-compliant or maverick purchasing behaviours.  For example, the 
heaviest purchaser in the collaborative hub coronary stent case buys only from 
the dominant supplier, even after implementation of the framework agreements.  
Although the buyer is using a framework supplier, the apparent lack of 
competition at the particular cost centre could be investigated further by the 
purchasing group. 
8.3.3.2 Identification of Credible Alternative Suppliers 
An underlying assumption of the Dirichlet is that markets are non-partitioned, 
that is, the suppliers within a category supply directly substitutable products.  A 
purchasing intervention to develop a supplier or to introduce a new supplier to a 
particular group of buyers may require that credible alternative suppliers can be 
identified.  The purchase duplications between suppliers can be used to identify 
potential alternative suppliers with directly substitutable product.  For example, 
in the collaborative hub coronary stent case J&J is the most duplicated supplier 
in 2006, with buyers of J&J four times more likely to use an alternative supplier.  
Buyers may have been seeking alternatives because of the reported poor service 
from J&J and by 2008 J&J had been eliminated from the repertoires of most 
buyers. 
8.3.3.3 Supply Base Changes 
The Dirichlet can also be used to simulate the market response to introduction of 
a new supplier or a change in market share of a supplier (Ehrenberg, 1991; 
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Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  For example, Table 8.1 shows the predicted purchasing 
behaviours for the ureteral stent category using the 2006 conditions as the base 
period and simulating the effect of an increase in Cook’s market share to 59% 
(the level in 2008). 
Table 8.1 Simulated 12 week performance measures (ureteral stents) with 2008 
market shares 
Simulation Supplier O T O T O T
Boston 7.5% 17.1% 4.0 1.6 60.0% 57.7%
Cook 20.0% 23.8% 2.4 1.9 63.3% 71.6%
Others 2.5% 1.8% 1.0 1.3 100.0% 38.6%
Average Supplier 10.0% 14.2% 2.5 1.6 74.4% 55.9%
Correlation, r 0.89 0.47 -0.87
Mean Absolute Deviation 4.7% 1.1 24.0%
Base period 2006 (12 
week)
Simulate 2008 (12 week) 
market shares
Penetration Purchase Frequency SCR
 
The accuracy of these predictions is as good as the performance measures 
predicted using the 2008 base period itself (Tables 6.7 and 6.10). 
 
In a similar way, the effect of a new supplier can be simulated as shown in Table 
8.2.  Using 2006 as the base period, the new supplier (NewCo) is assumed to 
secure a 10% market share with Boston on 60%, Cook on 25% and Others on 
5%.  In this case there is no observed data against which to test the predictions. 
Table 8.2 Simulated 12 week performance measures (ureteral stents) with new 
supplier 
Simulation Supplier
Boston
Cook
NewCo
Others
Average Supplier
1.3
1.3
1.5
72.0%
50.0%
42.1%
39.5%
61.2%
Purchase Frequency SCR
1.9
1.5Base period 2006 (12 
week)
Simulate new market 
entrant with 10% share of 
market
23.9%
12.4%
5.5%
2.9%
11.2%
Penetration
 
Simulations like those presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 can be used by purchasing 
managers to plan supplier development interventions. 
 
An important feature of the collaborative procurement hub coronary stent case 
was the implementation of a set of framework agreements to establish 
consistent, target volume based pricing across the hub.  Member organisations 
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must commit to particular purchase volumes from specific suppliers such that 
the aggregated volume commitments for the hub are met.  Agreeing volume 
targets requires that the expected purchased volumes for each supplier can be 
predicted.  These predictions may not be straightforward historical projections if 
the purchasing patterns are expected to change after implementation of the 
framework agreements.   
Table 8.3 Predicted annual performance measures (coronary stents) 
Simulation Supplier O T O T O T
Boston 35.0% 33.6% 12.0 11.9 63.2% 44.9%
Medtronic 20.0% 24.4% 5.5 6.2 22.8% 18.2%
Abbott 20.0% 22.1% 5.0 5.4 38.5% 15.2%
J&J 25.0% 24.4% 3.2 6.2 11.5% 18.2%
Others 10.0% 17.9% 7.5 4.5 34.1% 11.3%
Average Supplier 22.0% 24.4% 6.6 6.8 34.0% 21.5%
Correlation, r 0.97 0.78 0.74
Mean Absolute Deviation 3.3% 1.4 15.1%
Boston 28.0% 12.5 51.9%
Medtronic 18.0% 10.0 36.9%
Abbott 8.2% 8.5 28.7%
J&J 2.5% 7.9 25.4%
Others 17.3% 9.9 36.2%
Average Supplier 14.8% 9.8 35.8%
Base period 2008 (month 
7 - 12)
Predict 2008/9 (First 12 
months of agreement)
Penetration Purchase Frequency SCR
Base period 2006 (6 
month)
Predict 2006 (12 month)
 
The NBD-Dirichlet can be used to predict purchasing behaviours over time 
periods of different lengths (Ehrenberg, 1988).  This feature of the model can be 
used by purchasing managers to make volume predictions under different 
simulated purchasing patterns.  Table 8.3 shows annual (48 week) predictions 
and actual performance for coronary stent purchases in 2006 and predictions for 
the first twelve months of the framework agreement.  In this latter case there is 
no observed data against which to test the predictions.  While these predictions 
refer to purchase occasions rather than actual purchase quantities, the analysis 
presented in Chapter 7 suggests that average purchase quantity is relatively 
constant.  Knowing the average purchase quantity and the purchase frequency 
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per buyer of a particular supplier, the expected volume requirements for that 
supplier can be predicted. 
8.3.3.4 Dynamic Market Development 
As has been seen in the current research, the steady state Dirichlet norms can be 
used to analyse market dynamics through a series of snapshots.  In both the 
ureteral stent and the collaborative purchasing hub coronary stent cases, the 
Dirichlet model is shown to hold at the beginning and the end of the three year 
analysis period despite major changes to the market structure in both cases.  By 
comparing the changes in performance measures over the period of analysis the 
nature of the intervention can be identified (Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  For 
example, in the ureteral stent case, the accumulation of high frequency buyers by 
Cook is identified as the source of Cook’s improving market share. 
 
In the case of coronary stent purchasing in the collaborative hub there is a 
reduction in purchasing volume from 2006 to 2007.  This reduction in 
purchasing activity may be due to buyers deferring purchases in anticipation of 
better prices after negotiation of the framework agreements.  After 
implementation of the agreements in the second half of 2008 most, but not all of 
these buyers return to the market and there is a substantial increase in purchase 
frequency. 
8.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
The analysis has been constrained by a rather limited data set.  Although the 
dataset covered an extended period, allowing a longitudinal analysis to be 
carried out, the population of buyers is relatively small, compared to typical 
consumer panel analyses.   The small population leads to increased predictive 
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uncertainty, particularly over longer time scales.  The cost centre data set drawn 
from the collaborative purchasing hub does not provide the same detail as the 
individual requisitioner purchasing data from the single trust.  Purchasing 
information is not collected at requisitioner level in the hub.  While the data set 
did cover a period of intervention in both the ureteral and coronary stent cases, it 
included only a six month period immediately after the implementation of the 
coronary stent framework agreements.  These framework agreements were 
explicitly intended to maintain the status quo and therefore it was not possible to 
observe the impact of a purchasing intervention designed to restrict supplier 
choice or indeed the longer term impact of the implemented agreements. 
 
By using secondary data that records observable occurrences (raising a purchase 
order), the information gathered for the research is not affected by respondent 
attitudes or expectations.  The aggregation of data from many separate 
purchasing organisations reduces some of the issues related to non-response, 
common method variance and bias in survey research (Autry & Golicic, 2010).  
However, these records are not always complete, particularly for product 
descriptions.  In these cases, errors may be introduced by inaccurate 
categorisation of the products, either by misallocating products to categories or 
by excluding products where the description is unclear.  In addition there may be 
systematic under-reporting when purchases are made outside the purchase order 
system or through incompatible computer systems.   
 
While the research has addressed the “what”, demonstrating that the observed 
purchasing behaviours exhibit typical patterns that can be described by the 
NBD-Dirichlet; and the “how”, that buyers buy with a steady long term purchase 
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frequency and have a stable probability of choosing a particular supplier from a 
repertoire of suppliers; the “why” is not fully answered.  In the ureteral stent 
case, why does Cook successfully displace Boston as the dominant incumbent 
supplier?  What actions do the purchasing team take to cause such a dramatic 
change in purchasing patterns following introduction of the framework 
agreement?  The components of these interventions can be elucidated by a deep 
qualitative case study methodology to “look for the roots of things, to 
disentangle complexities and to conceptualise and reconceptualise, test and 
retest, to be both rigorous and creative and above all to seek for the underlying 
reality through the thick veil which hides it” (Easton, 1998 p.81). 
 
The qualitative element of this research has been limited by access to decision 
makers in the organisations under study.  Organisational change, both imposed 
by government and internally driven change, means that the individuals involved 
in the original interventions in 2006 – 2008 are either no longer in post or not 
available for interview.  Two interviews were conducted to develop an 
understanding of the nature and context of the cardiac stent intervention and to 
aid the interpretation of the observed purchasing patterns.   
 
With these principal limitations in mind, it is suggested that further research may 
focus on extending the range of the sample and on more extensive analysis using 
quantitative and qualitative methods. 
8.4.1 Differentiated Replication  
This research has been an exploratory study using three distinct data sets in 
order to apply the Dirichlet model to a collaborative purchasing and supply 
context.  The initial results have been encouraging but further replication studies 
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will be required to validate the generalisability of the model into the 
collaborative purchasing environment and the impact of demand side 
interventions under different market conditions.  The observed phenomena of 
market partitioning (heavy and light buyers), restricted repertoires due to 
negotiated framework agreements and the associated deviations from the 
Dirichlet norms such as low penetration, high purchase frequency and excess 
observed loyalty should be tested to see if they generalise to other collaborative 
purchasing situations.   
 
Such a replication study should aim to work with a larger buying population, 
perhaps by extending the overall scope of the analysis.  Considering stent 
purchases, a differentiated replication could encompass the entire NHS rather 
than just a single collaborative purchasing hub or consider purchase behaviours 
in other healthcare systems where collaborative purchasing is used.  The 
consolidation of much public procurement under the OGC (Office of 
Government Commerce) and the intention to make much public sector 
procurement activity publicly available could improve availability of 
information for such analysis.  The growth of e-procurement provides a means 
of controlling purchasing behaviours and monitoring those behaviours (Croom 
& Brandon-Jones, 2007) as well as being a source of good quality purchasing 
data.  Future research should address the impact of e-procurement on purchase 
behaviours in collaborative purchasing organisations. 
 
An alternative to extending the scope of the sample would be to deepen it.  The 
East of England CPH cases were analysed at the level of the cost centre.  
Compare this to the pilot data analysis carried out on data from a single trust 
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where the level of resolution of the data was to the individual requisitioner.  
Working at this resolution increases the effective buying population under 
analysis and would also allow purchasing managers to identify individual cases 
of so-called “maverick” purchasing in a way that is not possible with data 
consolidated to a departmental level. 
 
A further extension to the current research would be to distinguish between the 
two coronary stent variants, the drug eluting stents and bare metal stents, in 
order to investigate the effect of the regulatory price controls on purchasing 
patterns.  The lack of detail in the purchase order product descriptions and the 
aggregation of both stent types into a single purchase order mean that it has not 
been possible to differentiate between the variants in the current research. 
 
In addition the observed phenomenon of deferred purchasing in anticipation of 
better pricing and the subsequent rebound of purchase levels should be 
investigated further.  Additional research is required to establish whether the 
observations can be replicated in other organisational purchasing situations 
where an extended evaluation and negotiation period is expected to lead to lower 
prices. 
8.4.2 Extended Case Research 
The analysis has shown how the organisational purchasing patterns develop 
following interventions by suppliers (ureteral stents) and supply managers 
(coronary stents).  These developments have included increases in the number of 
buyers for particular suppliers, increased duplication of purchases where buyers 
purchase from an enlarged repertoire of suppliers and changes in the observed 
loyalty measures.  However, the nature of the interventions has not been fully 
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investigated and further research is required to identify the actions taken and the 
relative effectiveness of particular actions. 
 
The evolving nature of the network of relationships between the collaborative 
purchasing hub and its member trusts, suppliers and government would make an 
interesting and informative case study.  Established relationships between trusts 
and suppliers will have been disrupted by the emergence of the collaborative 
hub and by the subsequent interventions in the purchasing process.   
 
Such an in-depth longitudinal case study could examine the contingent factors 
affecting the network and the behaviours of the actors within it to understand the 
changing behaviours and to develop theoretical explanations of the observed 
behaviours.  The extent to which purchasing behaviour is constrained by supply 
agreements, by habitual purchasing or by distribution could be investigated, as 
could the roles and relationships of the various actors in the purchasing process 
and how these change during the evaluation, negotiation and implementation of 
the framework agreements.   
 
These case studies would be enhanced and informed by the quantitative analysis 
presented in this research.  Stochastic modelling describes the changing pattern 
of relationships and interactions between buyers and their repertoire of suppliers 
and provides context for the selection and interpretation of in-depth case studies 
(Gadde & Mattsson, 1987).  Deviations from the Dirichlet norms can be a basis 
for “purposeful sampling” (Dubois & Araujo, 2007) to identify the cases most 
likely to deliver deep understanding of observed phenomena including the 
impact and sustainability of purchasing and supply management interventions.  
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8.5  Summary 
The research is a highly differentiated replication of the NBD-Dirichlet model in 
a collaborative public procurement situation.  This is a substantial addition to the 
NBD-Dirichlet literature, extending the generalisability of the NBD-Dirichlet 
model to new conditions and establishing boundary conditions where the model 
does not accurately describe or predict the observed behaviours.  The observed 
deviations result from violations of the Dirichlet assumptions, in particular the 
assumptions of stationary behaviour and non-partitioning.  The behaviour of 
buyers through the analysis period is dynamic with observed changes in supplier 
choice.  In addition a small number of high frequency purchasers purchase so 
frequently that they dominate the observed purchase behaviours.  Isolating 
relatively short time periods and the heavy purchasing segment improves the fit 
of the model such that the NBD-Dirichlet describes and predicts the observed 
purchasing patterns with an acceptable level of accuracy. 
 
Extending the application of the NBD-Dirichlet model into a purchasing and 
supply context also contributes to the collaborative purchasing literature.  By 
addressing the actual purchase behaviours of member organisations in a 
purchasing consortium the research adds a new dimension to a literature that has 
mainly dealt with the establishment, development and operation of the 
collaborative organisation. 
 
The analysis also shows how the Dirichlet can inform purchasing managers as 
they analyse purchasing patterns in order to design and implement interventions 
to change purchasing behaviours.  Although a steady state model, the theoretical 
norms provided by the Dirichlet can be used as benchmarks to assess current 
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behaviours and to monitor the progress of purchasing management 
interventions, for example the implementation of purchasing framework 
agreements. 
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9 Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
Effective collaborative purchasing arrangements are an important element of 
purchasing efficiency programmes, particularly in the public sector (Essig, 
2000).  While transaction costs can be reduced by pooling resources and lower 
prices achieved through aggregating volumes to increase leverage with 
suppliers, the long term effectiveness of these arrangements requires product 
standardisation and vendor rationalisation (Chapman et al, 1998).  Standardising 
on a smaller set of suppliers inevitably requires member organisations to change 
their supplier choice behaviours such that new suppliers may be introduced or 
existing suppliers dropped (Cohen, 2002).  Despite the importance of purchasing 
behaviours in determining the success of collaborative procurement 
arrangements, there has been little research into how the members of purchasing 
groups actually buy and how their purchasing behaviours change as a result of 
group membership, particularly with respect to supplier loyalty. 
9.2 Research Objectives 
Taking this lack of research into actual purchasing behaviour as its point of 
departure, this study investigates the behaviour of purchasers in a collaborative 
procurement environment.  The specific objectives of the research were (i) to 
determine if organisational buyers in a collaborative purchasing organisation 
exhibit regular patterns of purchase behaviour in terms of purchase incidence 
and supplier choice; (ii) to model the observed behaviours using an established 
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model of buyer behaviour, the NBD-Dirichlet; and (iii) to provide purchasing 
managers with metrics and benchmarks to assess and monitor buyer behaviour.  
9.3 Research Findings 
Using stent purchase data provided by a collaborative procurement hub in the 
English NHS, the research meets the first research objective by showing that 
members of this purchasing consortium do exhibit the same regular patterns of 
buyer behaviour that have been observed in many different markets (Ehrenberg 
et al, 2004).  These regular patterns include the observations that suppliers in the 
category typically have very different market shares and penetrations but the 
purchase frequency for each supplier is approximately constant.  In addition, the 
buyers of a particular supplier tend to buy from other suppliers quite often.   
 
Such patterns are typical of Dirichlet-type markets.  However, when the second 
research objective is considered, namely the extent to which the observed 
behaviours can be modelled using the NBD-Dirichlet model, the fit of the model 
is not good.  The collaborative hub purchase data covers a three year period 
during which supplier intervention in the ureteral stent case and purchasing 
intervention in the coronary stent case result in major changes to market 
structure.  The resulting dynamic development of both stent categories over the 
three year analysis period means that the conditions of stationary and non-
partitioned markets necessary for the Dirichlet distributional assumptions to be 
valid do not hold (Goodhardt et al, 1984).  This violation of the Dirichlet 
assumptions results in systematic deviations between the observed patterns and 
those predicted by the NBD-Dirichlet model (Sharp & Driesener, 2000).   
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Selection of a shorter time period during which the purchasing behaviour is 
approximately stationary allows analysis of the dynamic development of the 
purchase behaviours in a series of snapshots.  Even with the shorter periods of 
analysis, the fit of the model is not as good as that reported in previous Dirichlet 
studies (Ehrenberg, 1994).  The observed deviations from the model predictions 
include a tendency to overestimate the number of buyers (penetration) and to 
underestimate the purchase frequency and a consistent tendency to 
underestimate supplier loyalty.  Partitioning of the market is evident in the 
ureteral and coronary stent cases with a segment of high frequency buyers 
dominating the observed purchase behaviours and resulting in the observed 
deviations.  Such purchase frequency based segmentation has been noted 
previously (Bowman & Lele-Pingle, 1997) and may be regularity typical of 
industrial markets.  When the NBD-Dirichlet model is operationalised using the 
heavy purchasing segment it accurately describes and predicts the observed 
purchasing patterns. 
 
The research has also met the third objective to provide purchasing managers 
with metrics and benchmarks to assess and monitor buyer behaviour.  The 
theoretical predictions of the NBD-Dirichlet model provide norms and 
benchmarks against which to assess current behaviours and to monitor the 
impact of interventions (Ehrenberg & Sharp, 2000).  For example, in the ureteral 
stent case, buyers are more loyal to the two major suppliers than the model 
predicts.  Such a deviation from the model benchmark suggests an opportunity 
for intervention and in the ureteral stent case a sustained promotional 
intervention results in loyalty performance much closer to the benchmark by the 
end of the three year analysis period.  Similarly in the coronary stent case, 
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loyalty towards the dominant supplier is relatively constant and much higher 
than the Dirichlet benchmark until the implementation of the framework 
agreements after which it drops to levels much closer to the predicted norm.  
9.4 Contribution 
The research makes three main contributions to the literature.  As a highly 
differentiated replication of the NBD-Dirichlet model, it extends the validity of 
this empirical generalisation.  The research adds to the collaborative purchasing 
literature by demonstrating how the model can be applied in a collaborative 
purchasing context.  In addition, the review of the literature also identifies 
unexpected common ground between the stochastic modelling and the Industrial 
Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) research traditions. 
 
By extending the NBD-Dirichlet model into a complex collaborative public 
procurement context, the research represents a highly differentiated replication 
of the Dirichlet.  Replication is an essential element in the development and 
testing of empirical generalisations, adding to the literature by extending 
generalisability to new conditions or by establishing boundary conditions where 
the model does not hold (Lindsay & Ehrenberg, 1993).  This research 
demonstrates how violation of the Dirichlet assumptions of stationary behaviour 
and non-partitioned markets leads to deviations between the observed 
behaviours and the predicted Dirichlet norms.   
 
The impact of purchasing framework agreements on buyer repertoires and 
observed loyalty behaviour is also discussed.  Unrestrictive (i.e. many suppliers) 
agreements tend to increase use of smaller suppliers by establishing these 
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suppliers as credible alternatives.  By contrast, restrictive agreements lead to 
restricted repertoires and an observed deviation of the Natural Monopoly 
Phenomenon (McPhee, 1963).  The smallest suppliers would normally be 
expected to be purchased more frequently by the heaviest purchasers who have 
more opportunity to purchase and tend to be more experience purchasers.  The 
observed patterns where restrictive frameworks are in place shows that the 
heaviest purchasers purchase almost exclusively from the market leading 
suppliers. 
 
The collaborative purchasing literature deals mainly with the development and 
operation of purchasing consortia, rather than the buying behaviour of 
purchasers in such consortia (McCue & Prier, 2006).  Extending the NBD-
Dirichlet model into a collaborative purchasing context adds to the collaborative 
purchasing literature by providing new insights into buyer behaviour and a new 
way of describing and predicting buyer behaviour.  The Dirichlet norms can be 
used as benchmarks to identify deviations from expected behaviours in order to 
identify opportunities for further research and to design and target purchasing 
interventions to change purchasing behaviours.  
 
Using stochastic modelling to add context to network studies and to guide 
“purposeful sampling” (Dubois & Araujo, 2007) is one connection between 
stochastic modelling and the IMP or markets as networks research approach.  
Further common ground between these two traditions is explored in a paper 
published during the research and included in Appendix A (McCabe & Stern, 
2009).  This paper discusses shared assumptions about the nature of buyers, and 
the research objectives and methodologies employed.  The current research is an 
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example of stochastic modelling techniques can be used “to study the proportion 
of newly established, continuing and disrupted relationships” (Gadde & 
Mattsson, 1987). 
9.5 Summary 
Growth in collaborative purchasing looks set to continue as organisations seek to 
pool their purchase requirements to deliver economies of scale, improve 
standardisation and increase leverage over suppliers.  This is particularly so in 
public procurement where pooling large but typically fragmented purchase 
volumes is seen as a mechanism for delivering value for money under public 
expenditure constraints.  However, for collaborative purchasing organisations to 
be effective, the behaviours of the member organisations must be managed to 
ensure compliance with purchasing framework agreements or to change 
purchasing behaviours. 
 
It is important to understand what behaviours are exhibited before attempting to 
explain or change them.  The research has shown that the steady-state NBD-
Dirichlet model can be used to describe and interpret the dynamic changes in 
purchasing behaviours observed in the ureteral and coronary stent cases, 
providing a basis for identifying and monitoring subsequent interventions.  
Systematic deviations from the model are observed, including partitioning into 
heavy and light purchasing segments and excess loyalty resulting from buyer 
repertoires restricted by supplier framework agreements. 
 
The research represents a substantial extension of the Dirichlet model into a 
complex collaborative public procurement context, further extending the 
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generalisability of the NBD-Dirichlet and applying it in the field of purchasing 
and supply chain management.   
 
The research shows how the Dirichlet can improve understanding of purchasing 
patterns in collaborative purchasing environments in order to better target 
purchasing interventions and to monitor the progress of those interventions.  
Delivering sustainable cost savings through collaborative procurement 
arrangements requires established purchasing behaviours to change, for example 
to restrict supplier choice or to introduce new suppliers.  Therefore it is 
important that purchasing managers understand how buyers are likely to react to 
these changes.  Improved understanding leads to better design and monitoring of 
purchasing interventions and to increased savings from collaborative 
procurement activities. 
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Appendix A Stochastic Modelling and Industrial 
Networks - Complementary Views of Organisational Buyer 
Behaviour 
A revised version of this paper was published in Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science. 
 
McCabe, J. and Stern, P., (2009), ‘Stochastic Modelling and Industrial Networks - 
Complementary Views of Organisational Buyer Behavior’, Journal of the Academy 
of Marketing Science, 37 (2): 204-214. 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the common ground between two apparently contrasting 
approaches to the understanding of organizational purchasing behavior; stochastic 
modelling and the IMP (or “markets as networks”) approach.  These two schools of 
inquiry have travelled along parallel tracks for many years but there has never been a 
systematic attempt to analyse the ontological, epistemological and methodological 
similarities between them.   We present a coherent theoretical framework to 
investigate the common ground between stochastic modelling and IMP and 
demonstrate that the two approaches offer complementary insights that can and 
should be exploited in the context of research into organizational purchasing 
behavior. 
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Introduction 
“They [customers] can be screaming for years, but they come back and buy the same 
machine off people [competitors]. And all they do is scream and bitch about them 
while you’re there and then they go out and buy another one.” 
(Sales Executive, distributor of textile machinery, reported in Ellis and Hopkinson 
(2004), p. 18) 
The business network research of the International Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) 
group reflected in the quote above is based on the observation of long-lasted inter-
firm relationships (Hakansson, 1982; Gronroos, 1994; Ford & Hakansson, 2006).  
Buyers may have well-established and durable relationships with several suppliers of 
the same product or service.  Changes in these relationships can be evolutionary, 
with new suppliers gradually taking a greater share of the buyer’s purchases (Gadde 
& Mattsson, 1987; Dubois et al, 2003) or they may be discontinuous when an 
incumbent supplier is displaced by a competitor (Kamp, 2005). 
 
Under these circumstances of single buyer – multiple suppliers, it is also important 
to understand the market structure within which the relationships are embedded in 
order to make sense of observed behaviours.  Consider the quotation above; this 
could be an example of a stable long-term relationship between the incumbent 
supplier and the buyer.  However, the interpretation of the observed behaviours and 
the subsequent analysis of the nature of the buyer-seller relationship should consider 
the prevailing market structure.  A stable relationship in a market where buyers 
regularly switch between competing suppliers (who may all enjoy relationships with 
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the buyer) offers different research opportunities compared to such a relationship in 
a market where loyalty to a single source is the norm. 
 
Stochastic theories of buyer behaviour provide this understanding of market 
structure (Ehrenberg, 1959; Goodhardt et al, 1984; Ehrenberg, 1995) in a way that 
can add context to studies of individual buyer-seller dyads or broader network 
analyses.  For example, under NBD-Dirichlet theory (Goodhardt et al, 1984), 
switching brand or supplier is not viewed as instability or a change in buyer 
preference but rather as an expression of the stable probability that the buyer will 
purchase from a given supplier.  This stable probability is itself an important 
dimension of the buyer-seller relationship and when considered together with the 
probabilities to purchase from other suppliers, it provides valuable insight into the 
competitive dynamics of the network.  There has, however, been almost no analysis 
of repeat purchase patterns in organizational markets despite calls to use stochastic 
techniques “to study the proportion of newly established, continuing and disrupted 
relationships” (Gadde & Mattsson, 1987).   
 
This paper starts to answer Gadde and Mattson’s call demonstrating that stochastic 
modelling offers complementary insights to contemporary industrial network 
research.  We present a coherent theoretical framework to draw out the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological common ground between stochastic modelling 
and IMP in a systematic way, providing a new contribution to the literature. 
 
We show that stochastic modelling and IMP research traditions share important 
assumptions about the nature of buyers and sellers and their interactions.  They share 
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an approach to knowledge creation that intertwines empirical observation and also 
theory development in an evolutionary process.  Both traditions adopt an empirical 
approach to generalizability, employing multiple sets of data to establish that the 
observed and modelled patterns of behaviour can be replicated under different 
conditions or by seeking logical coherence through multiple sources of evidence.  
The implications for management are similar too, highlighting the constraints 
imposed on independent managerial action in a context of network 
interdependencies or apparent “as if random” behaviour. 
 
These similarities are perhaps unexpected as there are some key areas of difference 
between the traditions.  It is instructive to articulate these differences as a 
counterpoint to the similarities that we will develop in the body of the paper.  
 
The first area of difference to consider is the theoretical foundation of each tradition.  
The fundamental assumptions underlying stochastic modelling (for example choice 
theory and bounded rationality) are very different from those utilised in the IMP 
approach (for example theories of power, resource dependence and actor/network 
theory). 
 
Stochastic modelling is most often associated with consumer purchasing behaviour, 
a field of study that has traditionally been seen as distinct from organizational 
purchasing behavior (Wilson, 2000).  In addition, while there have been instances of 
quantitative analysis in IMP research, qualitative approaches have traditionally 
predominated.  In many cases one focal firm in an industry forms the case study in 
order to understand the network. This contrasts with stochastic modelling which 
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typically uses quantitative panel data covering a complete category to develop an 
understanding of the market structure. 
 
The final difference highlighted here concerns the research objectives.  Stochastic 
modelling provides norms and benchmarks against which managers can evaluate 
their market offerings whereas the IMP approach tends to provide a descriptive 
narrative which interprets the underlying causes determining the performance of 
network actors. 
  
These are important differences but the similarities identified in this paper highlight 
an important message for researchers in both stochastic modelling and IMP.  The 
two approaches complement each other and can and should be used together in the 
study of market networks to enhance understanding and prediction of organizational 
purchasing behaviour. This is in contrast to the tendency to compartmentalize each 
approach within a distinct and separate paradigm 
 
The paper proceeds with a brief description of the background to the two 
approaches, highlighting the shared heritage of IMP and stochastic modelling. The 
key concepts of IMP and stochastic modelling are discussed and the traditions are 
compared in terms of their theoretical bases, research objectives, research 
methodology, core assumptions and research outputs.  The paper concludes by 
highlighting the opportunities for the stochastic modelling and IMP approaches to 
complement each other and inform academic research and management practice in 
industrial marketing.   
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Background 
Before embarking on a discussion of these traditions, it is useful to stop and consider 
what is meant by the terms “Stochastic Modelling” and “IMP Approach” as research 
traditions in the context of organizational purchasing behaviour.  A general 
framework for comparison will be presented and will guide the subsequent 
discussion. 
 
Stochastic Modelling 
When it is impractical to include all relevant variables in an analysis or when 
variables may not be measured precisely, it is to be expected that no exact 
relationship will hold between the variables which can be measured.  In such 
circumstances a stochastic relationship can be established by including one or more 
random variables described by a probability distribution (Arrow, 1968).   
 
The stochastic modelling tradition in buyer behaviour research aims to describe the 
patterns of purchase before seeking to explain the observed behaviour.  As 
Cunningham (1956) observes,  
“… the why of brand loyalty behaviour can be effectively attacked by field 
interviewing only after we know its “what”, “where” and “how much””. 
In the stochastic modelling tradition, observed regularities prompt the establishment 
of empirically grounded theory.  The theory is tested more widely under different 
conditions to extend its generalizability and develop it conceptually.  Ehrenberg 
(1994) has termed this approach “Empirical then Theoretical” (EtT) in contrast with 
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what he calls “Theoretical in Isolation” (TiI), the more traditional hypothetico-
deductive approach where a theory is proposed and then tested empirically.   
 
The Empirical then Theoretical (EtT) approach is described in typically 
parsimonious fashion (Ehrenberg, 1994). 
(1) Establish a generalizable empirical pattern 
(2) Develop a (low-level) theoretical model or explanation 
 
Regularities in both purchase incidence and brand choice have been observed and 
documented in consumer and, less frequently, in organizational buyer behaviour 
research (Ehrenberg, 1959; Easton, 1980; Uncles & Ehrenberg, 1990; Stern & 
Ehrenberg, 1995; Pickford & Goodhardt, 2000).  These regularities have been shown 
to occur over a wide range of purchase situations, product classes and time periods, 
to the extent that they become empirically generalizable, that is they become, “a 
pattern or regularity that repeats over different circumstances and that can be 
described simply by mathematical, graphic or symbolic methods” (Bass, 1995). 
 
One such model is the NBD-Dirichlet, an integrated stochastic model of purchase 
incidence and brand choice that has been shown to explain and predict the law-like 
empirical patterns exhibited in repeat purchase behaviours (Goodhardt et al, 1984).   
 
In the NBD-Dirichlet model, each buyer is assumed to have a certain probability of 
making a purchase of a product class and on each purchase occasion a certain 
probability of purchasing a particular brand.  These probabilities vary across the 
population of buyers such that specific purchases occur in an apparently random 
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manner.  This model has been shown to explain observed purchase behaviour in 
markets as diverse as coffee and aviation fuel, prescription drugs and television 
viewing choice (Uncles et al, 1995).  Sharp et al. (2002) draw a distinction between 
repertoire and subscription markets and demonstrate that the NBD-Dirichlet model 
fits both types of market despite marked differences in purchase behaviour.  In 
repertoire markets (typically observed with frequently purchased goods), on any 
given purchase occasion, buyers generally select one brand from a repertoire with a 
very low proportion of 100% loyalty to any particular brand.  Subscription markets 
show much higher incidence of 100% loyal behaviour (Rundle-Thiele & Bennett, 
2001) as buyers typically subscribe to a single supplier for an extended period.  This 
type of behaviour can be seen in some service markets (for example credit card or 
utility supply services) and with infrequently purchased durable goods. 
 
The NBD-Dirichlet theory links, explains and predicts several empirical 
generalizations concerning buying, including the Double Jeopardy effect whereby 
brands with low market share not only have fewer buyers but those buyers also buy 
the brand slightly less frequently than the buyers of bigger brands.  Practical 
applications of the model include auditing the performance of established suppliers 
and assessing the effectiveness of marketing interventions (Ehrenberg & Sharp, 
2000; Ehrenberg et al, 2004). A detailed description of the NBD-Dirichlet model and 
the range of empirical generalizations it yields is outside the scope of this paper but 
can be found in Goodhardt et al. (1984).   
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IMP Approach 
Also known as the Industrial Networks or Markets-as-Networks approaches, the 
IMP tradition emphasizes the embeddedness and interconnectivity of the buyer-
seller relationship, either as a dyad or within an extended network of relationships 
(Gadde & Mattsson, 1987; Ford, 2000).  Mattsson (1997, p. 449) avoids a definition 
but describes “market processes as interactions within relationships and market 
structures as network structures”.     
 
The IMP group research is rooted in observation and empiricism.  The initial study 
of almost 900 buyer-seller relationships across five European countries 
(Cunningham, 1980; Hakansson, 1982) was initiated from a perception that the then 
current theories of buying and selling behaviour did not adequately describe 
observed behaviours, in particular the importance of buyer-seller interaction in the 
context of long term relationships (Hakansson & Wootz, 1979). 
 
This early inductive research sought to describe  
 
“the pattern of dependencies between companies, the evolution of their 
dealings over time, the adaptations that each made to meet the requirements 
of the other party, and the inter-organizational person contact that took 
place” (Turnbull et al, 1996).   
 
Four key elements emerged from this study (Turnbull et al, 1996; Ford, 2004): 
 buyers are heterogeneous and individually significant to their suppliers 
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 buyers and sellers interact to develop an offering which may be complex and 
highly adapted 
 transactions are not isolated events but episodes embedded in a relationship 
where previous experiences and expectations have a significant impact 
 Analysis of the selling or purchasing process independently of each other 
provides an inadequate explanation of what happened between buyers and 
sellers.  The unit of analysis must be the relationship. 
 
A discussion of the IMP research and the Interaction Model that developed from the 
research can be found in Håkansson (1982) and Cunningham (1980). 
 
The networks approach has developed as the analysis moved beyond the buyer-seller 
dyadic relationship to consider the network of relationships within which a focal 
firm or individual relationship is located.  The Actors – Activities – Resources 
(AAR) model is the primary analytical framework encountered in the study of 
industrial networks (Hakansson & Johanson, 1992).  Actors are those who interact 
within relationships, perform activities and control resources.  Activities refer to the 
combination, development, exchange or creation of resources by actors.  Resources 
are the means by which actors carry out network activities.  The AAR model has 
also been extended to recognize that the mental models (schemas, network pictures) 
held by individuals and organisations have a key role in the understanding of 
behaviour in networks (Welch & Wilkinson, 2002; Henneberg et al, 2006). 
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Comparison of Stochastic Modelling and IMP  
Both Stochastic Modelling and IMP have long intellectual pedigrees, yet until now 
there has been no specific theoretical and managerial comparison between them, 
although a few researchers have called for the complementary practical application 
of both approaches.  For example, in an early application of stochastic modelling in 
industrial markets (Easton, 1980) concluded that understanding the dynamics of 
industrial markets would add value to the study of organizational buying behaviour.  
Similarly Gadde and Mattson (1987) highlight the need for network level analyses to 
study sourcing strategies (many or few suppliers) and to identify any clustering of 
suppliers (i.e. which suppliers compete with which).  While these papers suggest 
practical applications of stochastic modelling to inform the study of industrial 
networks, they do not present a coherent theoretical framework for the adoption of 
such a multi-methodological approach.  Brennan (2006) provides such a comparison 
of evolutionary economics with the markets-as-networks tradition, and in particular 
the use of dynamic simulation modelling and historical studies to extend the 
understanding of industrial networks.  However, in this analysis Brennan makes no 
mention of the rich tradition of stochastic modelling of buyer behaviour. 
Framework for Comparison 
Möller (1994) and Easton (1995a) both present frameworks for the metatheoretical 
analysis of different research traditions.  They argue that any such framework should 
allow analysis of the ontological and epistemological basis for each tradition as it is 
the similarities or differences between these beliefs that will be the determinants of 
commensurability.  The cognitive aims, the methods used and the disciplinary 
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foundations of the particular research tradition should also be assessed (Anderson, 
1986).  Assumptions concerning the nature of the market, of buyers and sellers and 
the nature of exchange will influence the comparison.  Finally, the outputs of the 
research and the managerial implications can be considered (Mattsson, 1997).   
 
Table 1 summarizes the comparison of the two traditions in terms of their 
disciplinary foundations, research objectives, research methodology, core 
assumptions and research outputs.  These five dimensions are based on the 
framework used by Möller (1994) to carry out a comparison of transaction cost, 
political-economy, interaction and network approaches to interorganizational 
marketing exchange.  The relation between the dimensions and Möller’s framework 
is shown in the table. 
 
Before considering in more detail the theoretical and methodological stances 
adopted by the stochastic modelling and IMP traditions it is instructive to consider 
the evolution of these schools of inquiry.  Of course, shared experiences are no basis 
for seeking metatheoretical common ground but they do help in developing an 
understanding of the priorities and values of those who have advocated these 
approaches, often over periods of many decades. 
 288 
 Stochastic Modelling IMP Approach 
Disciplinary Foundations 
 
[Disciplinary background, 
Ontological assumptions and view 
of human nature (Moller, 1994)] 
 
 
Stochastic choice theory 
Bounded rationality 
Schumpeterian economics 
 
Transaction costs theory 
Theories of power 
Resource dependence theory 
Social exchange theory 
Social network theory 
Relational contracting theory 
Contingency theory 
Actor/network theory 
New institutional economics 
 
Research Objectives 
 
[Theoretical emphasis, Basic 
goals, Driving force (Moller, 1994)] 
 
Descriptive 
Development of explanatory theory from 
empirical generalizations 
Predictive 
Descriptive 
Exploratory 
Explanatory 
Interpretive 
 
Research Methodology 
 
[Methodological orientations, 
Research methods, Level and unit 
of analysis (Moller, 1994)] 
 
  
a) Unit of Analysis 
 
Purchase occasion Relationship and Network 
b) Mode of Analysis Quantitative Quantitative and Qualitative Mixed methods / 
Case study / Discourse Analysis 
 
c) Data sources Multiple, long term purchasing/sales records Multiple interview, archival data; long term 
purchasing/sales records 
 
d) Boundaries Quasi closed system Difficult to define network boundaries, open 
system 
 
e) Measurement Purchase occasion readily defined Qualitative / Quantitative (survey, historical 
analysis) 
 
f) Parsimony Simple inputs “Thick” descriptions complex and detailed 
 
g) Testing Replication “Unassailability” 
 
h) Predominant mode of 
inference 
 
Inductive / Abductive Inductive / Abductive 
Core Assumptions 
 
[Focus on structure vs process 
(Moller, 1994)] 
 
  
a) Nature of Buying 
Organisations 
Heterogeneous with regard to purchase 
incidence and supplier choice 
Heterogeneous with regard to purchase 
incidence and supplier choice 
 
b) Market Structure Multiple interactions between buyers and 
suppliers with varying degrees of sole loyalty 
 
Network entities active participants in buying 
process 
Multiple participants in buying process with 
varying degrees of independence and 
interdependence 
 
c) Dynamics Static short term, Dynamic long term Static short term, Dynamic long term 
 
d) Partitioning Non-partitioned Non-partitioned – customer as individual 
 
e) Impact of previous 
buying decisions 
 
Zero order Non-zero order 
f) Influences on 
Behaviour 
 
Many and variable Relationships (buyer-seller dyad) and other 
network relationships 
Outputs and implications for 
marketing management 
 
[Policy aims  (Moller, 1994)] 
Flexible description of market structure 
Empirically grounded theory 
Norms and benchmarks 
 
Descriptive narrative 
Causal mechanisms 
Interpretation 
Focus on managing relationships 
 
Table 1  Comparison of Research Traditions
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A shared heritage 
There are many similarities between the paths taken by the IMP group and the 
Empirical-then-Theoretical tradition in stochastic modelling.  Both traditions are 
rooted in empirical observation, with the research intended not to test a model 
but to lead to the formulation of a model (Cunningham, 1980).  Both traditions 
have had to contend with being seen as “mere description” (Wensley, 1995; 
Rossiter, 1994).  While this perception is commonly conflated with a perceived 
lack of normative prescription for management it should be noted that the NBD-
Dirichlet model has demonstrated success in predicting and explaining many 
aspects of consumer behaviour using only penetration, purchase frequency and 
market share as inputs (Bhattacharya, 1997) as well as assisting decision 
making, notably in brand performance auditing, market partitioning, new brand 
planning and analysis of market dynamics (Ehrenberg & Sharp, 2000).  Both 
traditions have also been forged in geographically concentrated, relatively tight-
knit research communities that have had to fight to be heard within the 
marketing establishment (Ehrenberg, 1994; McLoughlin & Horan, 2002; Cova 
& Salle, 2003).  Wensley (1995) introduces the “Ehrenberg” test to denote the 
avoidance of mention of stochastic modelling in marketing texts and identifies a 
similar absence of network thinking in these textbooks. 
 
The comparison framework presented in Table 1 summarizes the challenges that 
IMP and Stochastic Modelling research posed to the contemporary theoretical 
approaches, in particular relating to the core assumptions about the market 
structure and the nature of participants in the market.  These challenges echo the 
key findings of the initial IMP research (see Section IMP Approach), including a 
focus on the relationship rather than the discrete purchase; buyer-seller 
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interaction rather than isolated action by either buyer or seller; market 
participants as individually significant to each other rather than atomistic and 
able to be aggregated into homogeneous segments (Hakansson, 1982; Ford & 
Hakansson, 2006).  The nature of these contrasting assumptions is developed 
further in the discussion section. 
 
As research into markets and marketing has evolved, these challenges may not 
appear quite so clear cut as they did when the IMP group and Stochastic 
Modelling researchers were first struggling to make themselves heard.  
Relationship marketing has now been embraced by the marketing 
“establishment”, hailing it as a “new paradigm” (Pine et al, 1995; Wensley, 
1995).  Individual learning relationships with customers explicitly recognize the 
individual significance of buyer and seller in a one to one relationship (Peppers 
et al, 1999).  Cova and Salle (2003) highlight developments in consumer 
marketing, including the concept of tribes as groups forged by interdependence 
of their members (sounding rather like networks defined by interactions between 
actors) rather than homogeneous “segments”.  
 
However a key challenge to marketing orthodoxy remains.  This has been 
described in “the myth of independence” and “the myth of action” (Ford et al, 
2003).  Buyers and sellers are interdependent and interact between themselves 
and with others in the network, often in unpredictable ways that constrain both 
managerial autonomy and the ability to act independently.  As Ford and 
Håkansson (2006, p.250) put it: 
“Interaction emphasises that the processes that occur between 
organisations are beyond the complete control of any individual actor.  
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Interaction is not the outcome of the factors that drive a single action by 
a single actor.  Instead, it is a process in which the effects of any action 
are affected by how that action is perceived and reacted to by the 
counterparts.” 
 
In a similar way the concept of “as if random” buying behaviour in the 
stochastic modelling tradition highlights the constraints on managers’ ability to 
influence behaviours in steady markets.  Many factors influence an individual 
purchase decision; certainly too many factors to model rigorously and in most 
cases, outside the marketing manager’s control.  Stochastic theories of behaviour 
accommodate this uncertainty by modelling purchase behaviour probabilistically 
(Goodhardt et al, 1984).   
Discussion 
Our contribution up to this point has been to demonstrate the developmental 
similarities between Stochastic Modelling and IMP traditions and to introduce 
the comparison framework. We now go further using Table 1 to highlight other 
key areas where the two approaches share common ground.  These are 
summarized below and the arguments developed further in the following 
sections. 
1. Disciplinary foundations 
2. Research objectives 
3. Research methodology 
4. Core assumptions 
5. Implications for marketing management 
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 Disciplinary foundations 
Stochastic modelling emphasizes the empirical in order to develop theoretical 
bases for observed behaviour.  In the case of the NBD-Dirichlet, the theory 
states that the variation in purchase incidence (i.e. the number of purchases made 
by an individual purchaser in a specified time period) and the variation in vendor 
choice (i.e. the choices of supplier made by an individual purchaser each time 
they make a purchase) are of a steady state stochastic form (the Dirichlet).  
Theories to explain this stochastic behaviour have echoes of evolutionary 
economics (Brennan, 2006) with the importance of bounded rationality and 
decision rules (routines) based on satisficing rather than maximizing behaviour.  
In Dirichlet markets consumers are assumed to purchase from a repertoire of 
brands (bounded rationality) with fixed brand choice (routine).  
 
IMP research draws on a number of disciplines and theoretical foundations 
including transaction cost theory, political science and theories of power, (inter-) 
organizational theory, resource dependence theory, social exchange and social 
network theory, behavioral theory, systems theory and relational contracting 
theory (Moller, 1994; Mattsson, 1997; Eiriz & Wilson, 2006; Mattsson & 
Johanson, 2006).  Although this range of theoretical antecedents has been 
characterized as highlighting the “looseness” of much network research 
(Wensley, 1995), the alternative view of Brennan (2006) propounding the 
strength of intellectual flexibility demonstrated by the IMP tradition is more 
aligned with the views expressed here.   
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Research objectives 
The primary objective in both Stochastic Modelling and IMP is to describe, 
interpret and explain observed regularities in buyer behaviour.  Dubois and 
Gadde (2002) describe this as an abductive approach, starting with observation 
and developing descriptive and explanatory theory.  Ehrenberg (1994) terms it 
Empirical then Theoretical (EtT).  Just as the NBD-Dirichlet model was 
developed to describe the patterns observed repeatedly in consumer behaviour, 
so the Interaction and Actors-Activities-Resources (AAR) models were 
developed by the IMP group to describe the persistent long-term relationships 
observed in organizational behaviour.  This data first approach may be criticised 
as being atheoretical but it is important to note that data is not collected 
independently of theory.  Both Ehrenberg (1994) and Dubois and Gadde (2002) 
emphasize the creative nature of the scientific process where data and theory are 
interdependent.  Observed regularities in the data prompt the establishment of 
empirically grounded theory.  This theory is tested more widely under different 
conditions to extend the generalizability of the theory and to develop it 
conceptually.   
 
This shared focus on empirically grounded theory also contributes to the 
common ground between the two schools of enquiry, setting them apart from 
research that is focused on developing and testing new theory (Barwise, 1995).  
Well established empirical generalisations that hold over many sets of data, 
across different populations and purchasing situations have tremendous 
predictive power and form a solid foundation for higher level theory and 
explanation. 
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This has happened with the IMP group as the study of markets as networks has 
evolved to become more explicitly explanatory and interpretive, studying 
interactions and relationships through the subjective interpretations of the actors 
(and researchers) (Ellis & Hopkinson, 2004).  These developments can be seen 
as a natural progression towards deeper understanding, building on the work of 
the early IMP researchers while remaining within the IMP tradition.  Similarly, 
the NBD-Dirichlet is now so well established that researchers can build on it by 
examining the nature of deviations from the expected norms (Bhattacharya, 
1997).  
 
 Research methodology 
We have already noted that the unit of analysis in the IMP research tradition is 
the relationship; understanding the interaction between buyer and seller over an 
extended series of “episodes”.  Stochastic modelling of repeat purchase 
behaviour also considers the temporal nature of the relationship and studies a 
subset of episodes, the occasions on which a buyer makes a purchase of a 
particular product.  Rather than focusing on a single transaction, Stochastic 
Modelling and IMP focus on a longitudinal series of exchanges.  This provides 
the opportunity to study the evolution of purchasing behaviour and the dynamic 
development of the network within which this behaviour occurs (Gadde & 
Mattsson, 1987; Dubois et al, 2003). 
 
Easton (1995a) provides a useful overview of research methodologies for 
industrial networks, noting the difficulty of sampling the network for survey 
based research and the use of archival data (sales / purchasing records) for 
analysis of exchange links within networks.  The predominant method of study 
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in IMP research has been interpretative through the medium of case studies 
(Easton, 1998) although there are notable instances of quantitative research in 
the IMP tradition.  Indeed this analysis has been in part prompted by 
longitudinal studies considering the patterns of relationship activity around a 
focal firm (Gadde & Mattsson, 1987; Dubois et al, 2003; Kamp, 2005).   
 
Generalizability is central to the process of knowledge creation and as such it is 
an important aspect of any comparative analysis of research traditions.  
Alternative research methodologies give rise to knowledge claims that can be 
seen as incommensurable.  Blair and Zinkhan (2006) note three routes to 
generalizability; theoretical; probabilistic and empirical.  We have already seen 
that Stochastic Modelling and IMP research both rely on empirical 
generalization – the extent to which the research findings can be replicated in 
different situations (products, countries, relationships).  This approach requires 
multiple sources of evidence – Many Sets of Data (MSoD) (Ehrenberg, 1995).  
This is in contrast to much marketing research that adopts a probabilistic 
approach to generalizability, requiring representative samples and based on best 
fit statistical significance tested on a single set of data.   
 
The generalizability of the single case study relies on the unassailability of the 
causal explanation of the observed phenomenon (Downward et al, 2002).  
However it is not clear what constitutes “unassailability”.  Easton (1998, p.81) 
suggests that the answer may lie in the way in which case research is conducted:  
“… to be inquisitive, to look for the roots of things, to disentangle complexities 
and to conceptualize and reconceptualise, test and retest, to be both rigorous and 
 296 
creative and above all to seek for the underlying reality through the thick veil 
which hides it.”  
 
 Easton himself has noted that this logic leads to multiple sources of evidence 
(data) (Easton, 1995a).  It is perhaps a stretch too far to relate this to Ehrenberg’s 
MsoD but there is a clear overlap with empirical generalization by replication 
with many sets of data.  This is a distinct contrast with probabilistic 
generalization using single sets of data (SsoD).   
 
Core assumptions 
Both Stochastic Modelling and IMP start from the assumption that all customers 
are different.  They differ in their frequency of purchase and they differ in their 
purchase choices.  Both traditions identify constraints on the scope of 
managerial action to influence buyer behaviour, as a result of the 
interdependence between network actors or the “as if random” nature of 
purchase behaviour as described by the NBD- Dirichlet model.   
 
The observation that many firms interacted in long-term durable relationships 
stimulated the empirical research programme in the early 1980s that would 
become the International Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) group (Hakansson, 
1982; Ford & Hakansson, 2006).  These researchers took the relationship 
between buyer and seller as the unit of analysis and viewed the purchase 
transaction as just one episode within an extended series of interactions.  This 
approach identified buyers and suppliers as active participants in the purchasing 
process and recognised that in many cases organizational buyers are 
heterogeneous and individually significant to their suppliers (Hakansson, 1982; 
Gronroos, 1994; Ford & Hakansson, 2006).   
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In a similar way, stochastic theories of buyer behaviour developed from 
observations of unexpected regularities in consumer purchasing behaviour 
(Ehrenberg, 1988).  The notion that consumer buying behaviour varies 
stochastically (i.e. as if at random) also challenges econometric models based on 
assumptions of optimising behaviour in rational consumers.  A switch of 
supplier is not seen as a change in attitude, preference or perceived utility but as 
an expression of the stable probability that the buyer will purchase from a 
particular supplier.  Like the IMP research, a stochastic modelling approach to 
the study of buyer behaviour assumes heterogeneity with respect to purchase 
incidence and brand choice across the population of consumers (heterogeneity 
that can be described by a probability distribution) and considers purchasing 
behaviours over a series of transactions (Ehrenberg, 1959; Goodhardt et al, 
1984; Ehrenberg, 1995).  The on-going propensities to purchase from specific 
suppliers over an extended period can be considered as defining aspects of the 
relationships between the buyer and seller(s). 
 
Implications for marketing management 
Both IMP and Stochastic Modelling highlight the difficulties of independent 
action by the marketing manager in a complex, self-organizing business network 
(Ritter et al, 2004).  In NBD-Dirichlet markets, brands differ little in loyalty 
measures (purchase frequency, share of category requirements) even though 
market share and penetration usually vary greatly between brands.  This implies 
that marketing interventions may affect penetration and market share but are 
likely to have little lasting effect on either loyalty or the buyer’s ongoing 
purchase incidence and supplier choice probabilities (Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  In 
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their analysis of the market for ready mixed concrete, Pickford and Goodhardt 
(2000) suggest that relationship marketing interventions (especially in industrial 
markets) ought to be focused on keeping the brand in the repertoire of split-loyal 
customers rather than used as a strategy for growth.   In a similar way, IMP 
stresses that managerial independence is circumscribed by interaction between 
buyers and sellers and the extended network.  This interdependence requires 
managers to understand the complexity and evolutionary nature of network 
relationships in order to maintain and develop their network position (Ford et al, 
2003; Ritter et al, 2004).  
 
The predictive power of stochastic models of buyer behaviour provides a 
quantitative context for analysis of the buyer seller relationship and of the 
interlocking network of relationships within which any individual transaction is 
made.  The marketing manager can compare actual behaviour in the relationship 
against the probability of a repeat purchase being made.  The likelihood of sole 
loyalty, when an organization fulfils all its requirements for a particular product 
from a single supplier, can be estimated and compared against observed levels of 
such behaviour (Ehrenberg et al, 2004).  The expected repeat purchase 
probability is used as a benchmark to assess the effectiveness of customer 
retention or relationship strengthening interventions (Ehrenberg & Sharp, 2000).  
An analysis of buyer behavior using stochastic modelling techniques allows the 
account manager to estimate the expected probability of making a successful 
sale against an incumbent competitor.  This is then be used to inform strategic 
decision-making, for example the selection of new markets and the mode of 
market entry.    
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If the frequency of purchase does not vary much between suppliers, then 
strategies to increase “share of wallet” by encouraging existing customers to buy 
more of the same product are unlikely to be successful.  Companies wanting to 
grow in such markets would be well advised to focus on increasing market share 
by acquiring new customers and increasing penetration (Uncles & Ehrenberg, 
1990).   
 
How does the sales executive know that they are operating in a NBD-Dirichlet 
market?  There is no industrial equivalent to the consumer panel data that has 
allowed the NBD-Dirichlet to be generalized across more than fifty different 
product categories.  This points to a further implication for management – the 
need to systematically collect, analyse and share data and support research into 
patterns of buyer behaviour in organizational markets.  As a preliminary step, 
the executive should ask why the market in which their company operates 
should deviate from Dirichlet norms. 
 
Conclusions and implications for further research  
Any comparative analysis of research traditions must pass the “so what” test.  Is 
it a worthwhile comparison to make?  In the case of stochastic modelling and 
IMP, we have shown that far from being stranded on either side of a spurious 
quantitative / qualitative divide, the two traditions have much in common.  They 
share a common heritage; they share many assumptions about market structure 
and the scope for independent action by marketing managers; they have a shared 
objective in describing and explaining markets as they are.  This paper presents 
a coherent theoretical framework to draw out the ontological, epistemological 
and methodological similarities between IMP and stochastic modelling. 
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A further test of relevance is to what extent this comparison adds to the 
understanding of markets.  Using stochastic modelling to observe and model 
organizational behaviour gives market structure context to interaction and 
network studies.  Easton (1992) notes that the extent to which actions are 
constrained by interdependence between members of the network will determine 
the extent to which behaviours are structured or stochastic.  Less 
interdependence should mean less structure and more as-if-random behaviour.  
Campbell (1985) suggests that where transactions are infrequent, relationships 
are likely to be more independent.  In the same way that dimensions of 
independence and interdependence have been used to describe organisational 
markets, consumer markets have been characterized as repertoire and 
subscription (Sharp et al, 2002).  Consumers in repertoire markets purchase from 
a repertoire of brands, switch brands regularly and show low levels of “sole” 
loyalty.  In subscription markets (e.g. credit cards, utility supplies), the levels of 
“sole” loyalty are much higher.  Modelling of behaviour in different buying 
situations may expose repertoire and subscription behaviour in industrial 
markets, related to purchase frequency and the degree of interdependence 
between buyer and seller.  If the nature of the relationship will differ between 
subscription and repertoire markets, so the study of the relationship should be 
informed by an understanding of the market structure.      
 
The first direction for further research must be to establish to what extent models 
of purchasing behaviour such as the NBD-Dirichlet actually hold for 
organizational markets, especially low purchase frequency products such as 
capital equipment.  This will require analysis of purchase behaviours for 
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different industrial markets over an extended period of time.  As an example, the 
ideas in this paper are currently being developed into an empirical study that will 
assess the extent to which the NBD-Dirichlet holds in a range of organizational 
purchasing situations and whether these can be described as repertoire or 
subscription markets. 
 
A second research direction will be to use stochastic analysis to determine the 
nature of the interactions within a relationship and to compare the interactions in 
competing relationships.  Managing interactions in complex, self organizing 
relationships requires an understanding of relationship conditions such that 
managerial interventions are appropriate to the prevailing conditions in the 
relationship (Ritter et al, 2004).  The opportunity to quantify and benchmark 
relationship “quality” will provide a parsimonious description of performance in 
a complex business network and will be useful measure against which to judge 
the effectiveness of management action, to isolate the interventions that may be 
determinants of relationship quality and to predict the impact of proposed 
interventions. 
 
The establishment of generalizations about the behaviour of firms, relationships 
and networks also lays a foundation for the construction of simulation models, 
another potential research direction for researchers into inter-organisational 
behaviour in complex business networks (Wilkinson & Young, 2005).  Agent 
based models simulate how networks and structures arise from individual 
behaviors and may be used to investigate how regular patterns such as those 
described by the NBD-Dirichlet come about or they can use those regular 
patterns to model behaviours in the simulation.  Such models become effective 
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tools for experimental research, for teaching and learning and for decision 
making. 
 
By combining the approaches in this way, the IMP tradition gains from insights 
into market structure and stochastic modelling gains from a rich contextual 
framework to make sense of the observed patterns and regularities.  The use of 
descriptive statistics to identify patterns that guide subsequent sociological 
research has a long and distinguished history, stretching from Durkheim’s 
classic research on suicide in the late nineteenth century (Benton & Craib, 2001; 
Mingers, 2003).  An example of this complementarity is provided by Gadde and 
Mattsson (1987) who propose a longitudinal analysis similar to the repeat 
buying analysis carried out on consumer panel data in order to describe stability 
and change in network relationships – “to study the proportion of newly 
established, continuing and disrupted relationships”.  Their aim is exploratory; 
the language could be Ehrenbergian (new buyers, repeat buyers, lapsed buyers) 
– the approach is EtT. 
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Appendix B Abbreviations and Notation 
AAR Actors Activities Resources
B2B Business to Business
B2C Business to Consumer
BG-NBD Beta Geometric Negative Binomial Distribution
BMS Bare Metal Stent
C2C Consumer to Consumer
CCT Compulsory Competitive Tendering
CEP Centre for Evidence-Based Purchasing
CLV Customer Lifetime Value
CMU Commercial Medicines Unit
CNBD Condensed Negative Binomial Distribution
CPH Collaborative Procurement Hub
CRiSPS Centre for Research in Strategic Purchasing and Supply
CSU Commercial Support Unit
DCA Discrete Choice Analysis
DES Drug Eluting Stent
EtT Empirical then Theoretical
FDD Frequency Dependent Dirichlet
GP General Practitioner
IMP Industrial Marketing and Purchasing
MAD Mean Absolute Deviation
MBG-NBD Modified Beta Geometic Negative Binomial Distribution
MLH Maximum Likelihood Hierarch
NBD Negative Binomial Distribution
NHS National Health Service
NICE National Institute of Clinical Excellence
O Observed Values (used in Tables)
OGC Office of Government Commerce
OGCbs Office of Government Commerce buying solutions
PASA Purchasing and Supply Agency
PCT Primary Care Trust
SCEP Supply Chain Excellence Programme
SCR Share of Category Requirements
SHA Strategic Health Authority
T Theoretical Values (used in Tables)
TiI Theoretical in Isolation
VCT Voluntary Competitive Tendering
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Selected mathematical notation used in the thesis 
 
B Category Penetration
b Individual Supplier Penetration
D XY Duplication Coefficient
k Exponent of the NBD
M Average number of purchases of the category per individual
m
Average number of purchases of a particular supplier per individual (m  = 
b x w )
p r Probability of making r  purchases (where r  is a non-negative integer)
p r|n
Probability of making r purchases of a supplier, conditional on making n 
purchases of the category
S Dirichlet switching parameter
T Time period based on base period for analysis
W Category Purchase Frequency
w Individual Supplier Purchase Frequency
 Beta distribution parameter
 Beta distribution parameter
 Long run average purchase frequency (Poisson mean)
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Appendix C Interview Questions and Transcript 
Outline for CPH meeting 
 
1. Introduction – background.  What is Dirichlet.  How is it used 
2. Data – what was analysed & how was it done 
3. Findings 
4. Ureteral stents – show market share chart and identify transitions 
5. Each period show penetration / PF, SCR numbers for whole population 
& heavy population.  
6. Show duplication of purchase (whole population & heavies) 
7. Conclusions – identify scope for intervention, track progress.  New 
buyers.  Duplications.  Supplier development.  Penetration vs Frequency.  
Contingent factors (growth) 
 
 
Questions 
1. Does dataset include supplies for private treatments? 
2. Nature of interventions in 2006/7 – reduce supply base, preferred (only) 
supplier agreements, price/volume based 
3. How these sustained – evidence of creep back in coronary stent data 
4. Extent of reporting 
5. Nature of cost centres – high volume “standardised” vs low volume 
variable.  What about teaching / research / variety seeking? 
6. What interventions were made w.r.t. Cook in 2007 / 2008 
7. Conscious decision to “turn” heavy purchasers? 
8. New entrants – actual new entrants or changes in reporting population? 
9. Increase in purchase frequency (Cook) in 2007? 
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Interview Transcript (extract) 7 October 2010 
 
Rachel 
‘we had to spend quite a significant amount of time in getting the engagement 
with our customers and also with the suppliers before we actually formerly go to 
tender’  
 
JMcC 
‘yeah’  
 
Rachel 
‘so we could spend up to a year talking to trusts about how we are going to 
structure this, what they want to get out of it, what levels of commitment are we 
talking about and then on the supplier side it’s important that they understand 
what we are trying to achieve so that they’re in a position so they can submit 
their best offers’  
 
JMcC 
‘yeah’  
 
Rachel 
so we need them to understand not only the objective but who’s involved and 
why are we doing it and what our expectations are’  
 
JMcC 
‘yeah’  
 
Rachel 
‘so we do all of that up front so that when we go to tender it’s not a surprise they 
are all who expecting it and we awarded the framework August 08 so that was 
when the prices under the framework commenced but we had seen some 
movement before then, cause what you find is when you start to talk to suppliers 
and start to talk to customers about the fact that we are going to do a project you 
immediately start to see prices change’  
 
JMcC 
‘yeah’  
 
Rachel 
‘because people / the suppliers are trying to get trust commitment and trying to 
undermine the process and so our stake in the ground -  previous price paid you 
only start the project like in 2007 because then you start to influence the market 
and you start to see fluctuation and the prices do drop’  
 
JMcC 
yeah, and was that early 2007?’  
 
Rachel 
‘it would probably /it would have been mid to late because the award was in 
August so we would have started that probably September  / October time’ 
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‘yeah, ok’ ‘so it would be interesting to see in terms of your data what was 
happening around then’  
 
JMcC 
‘right’  
 
Rachel 
‘and then we awarded the framework in August 08 and we’ve delivered about 
three million pounds worth of savings to date since then’   
 
JMcC 
‘just in the cardiac?’  
 
Rachel 
‘yes just on stents and cath lab consumerables and we have just negotiated a 
twelve month extension on that and got further savings’  
 
JMcC 
yeah’  
 
Rachel 
‘yeah so it’s been very successful.   
 
JMcC 
‘interesting, so three millions savings from August 08’  
 
Rachel 
‘yeah’   
 
JMcC 
‘the data I looked at goes upto March 09 so I can only see a little bit of that but 
there’s been a lot of activity before that’   
 
Rachel 
‘I can imagine’  
 
JMcC 
‘so it could be interesting to look at that and before the project started did 
individual trusts have their own agreements with suppliers’  
 
Rachel 
‘yeah individuals trusts would have negotiated locally and would have had 
individual contracts in place and there would have been discussion across the 
cardiac network about prices I’m sure, because cardiac networks do look at the 
commercial aspects as well as the clinical side and / but no there would have 
been a lot of disparity in prices across the trusts’  
 
JMcC 
‘yes’  
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Rachel 
‘hugely’  
 
JMcC 
‘yeah and was there any terms in the decision making in terms of which 
suppliers to use or any guidance or / I presuming that would have been discussed 
in the cardiac network….’  
 
Rachel 
‘yeah that’s where the network come in, the consultants individually have 
ultimate decision over what they can use which might not necessarily be the 
right course of action but the network do come together and they do talk about 
what they each use and that has generated some standardisation just through 
those discussions but they each have the decision over what happens, our role is 
to provide evidence that alternatives are clinically acceptable and it’s for them to 
assess whether that evidence is accurate and to discuss with us whether it’s / 
whether they could change’  
 
JMcC 
‘yeah’  
 
Rachel 
‘so we kind of do the commercial analysis and they help us do the clinical 
assessment’  
 
 
 309 
References 
Anderson, J. C., Hakansson, H. and Johanson, J. (1994) Dyadic Business 
Relationships Within a Business Network Context. Journal of Marketing, 58 (4): 
1-15. 
Anderson, M. G. and Katz, P. B. (1998) Strategic Sourcing. International 
Journal of Logistics Management, 9 (1): 1-13. 
Anderson, P. F. (1986) On Method in Consumer Research: A Critical Relativist 
Perspective. Journal of Consumer Research, 13 (September): 155-173. 
Anderson, P. F. and Chambers, T. M. (1985) A Reward / Measurement Model of 
Organizational Buying Behavior. Journal of Marketing, 49 (Spring): 7-23. 
Anonymous (2009a) Annual Report 2008/2009.  
Anonymous (2009b) Report to the Trust Board.  
Arrow, K. J. (1968) Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences. In: Brodbeck, 
M. eds. Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. New York: 
Macmillan: 635-667. 
Autry, C. W. and Golicic, S. L. (2010) Evaluating Buyer-Supplier Relationship-
Performance Spirals: A Longitudinal Study. Journal of Operations 
Management, 28 (2): 87-100. 
Bakker, E. and Walker, H. (2008) Collaborative Procurement in Local 
Government. Centre for Research in Strategic Purchasing and Supply, 
Univeristy of Bath School of Management.  
Bakker, E., Walker, H. and Harland, C. (2006a) Organising for Collaborative 
Procurement:An Initial Conceptual Framework. In: Thai, K. and Piga, G. eds. 
Advancing Public Procurement: Practices, Innovation and Knowledge-Sharing. 
Boca Raton, FL: Academic Press: 14-44.  
 310 
Bakker, E., Walker, H., Harland, C. and Warrington, J. (2006b) The Effect of 
Collaborative Purchasing Structures on Managing Cooperation. Proceedings of 
the 15th Annual IPSERA Conference, San Diego (United States).  
Baldinger, A. L. and Rubinson, J. (1997) In Search of the Holy Grail: A 
Rejoinder. Journal of Advertising Research, 37 (1): 18-20. 
Barclay, D. W. (1992) Organizational Buying Outcomes and Their Effects on 
Subsequent Decisions. European Journal of Marketing, 24 (4): 48-64. 
Barwise, P. (1995) Good Empirical Generalizations. Marketing Science, 14 (3): 
G29-G35. 
Bass, F. M. (1969) A New Product Growth Model for Consumer Durables. 
Management Science, 15 (January): 215-227. 
Bass, F. M. (1974) The Theory of Stochastic Preference and Brand Switching. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 11 (February): 1-20. 
Bass, F. M. (1995) Empirical Generalizations and Marketing Science: A 
Personal View. Marketing Science, 14 (3 Part 2 of 2): G6-G19. 
Bass, F. M., Jeuland, A. and Gordon P. Wright (1976) Equilibrium Stochastic 
Choice and Market Penetration Theories: Derivations and Comparisons. 
Management Science, 22 (10): 1051-1063. 
Bass, F. M. and Pilon, T. L. (1980) A Stochastic Brand Choice Framework for 
Econometric Modeling of Time Series Market Share Behavior. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 17 (4): 486-497. 
Bass, F. M. and Wind, J. (1995) Introduction to the Special Issue: Empirical 
Generalizations in Marketing. Marketing Science, 14 (3 Part 2 of 2): G1-G5. 
Batislam, E. P., Denizel, M. and Filiztekin, A. (2007) Empirical Validation and 
Comparison of Models for Customer Base Analysis. International Journal of 
Research in Marketing, 24 (3): 201-209. 
 311 
Beamon (1998) Supply Chain Design and Analysis: Models and Methods. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 55 (3): 281-294. 
Bemmaor, A. (1994) Commentary on "Theory or Well-Based Results: Which 
Comes First?". In: Laurent, G., Lilien, G. L. and Pras, B. eds. Research 
Traditions in Marketing. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 109-115. 
Bennett, R., Hartel, C. E. J. and McColl-Kennedy, J. R. (2005) Experience as a 
Moderator of Involvement and Satisfaction on Brand Loyalty in a Business-to-
Business Setting. Industrial Marketing Management, 34 (1): 97-107. 
Bensaou, M. (1999) Portfolios of Buyer-Supplier Relationships. Sloan 
Management Review, 40 (Summer): 35-44. 
Benton, T. and Craib, I. (2001) Philosophy of Social Science. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
Bhattacharya, C. B. (1997) Is Your Brand's Loyalty Too Much, Too Little, or 
Just Right?: Explaining Deviations in Loyalty From the Dirichlet Norm. 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 14 (5): 421-435. 
Biemans, W. G. and Brand, M. J. (1995) Reverse Marketing: A Synergy of 
Purchasing and Relationship Management. International Journal of Purchasing 
and Materials Management, 31 (3): 29-37. 
Blair, E. and Zinkhan, G. (2006) Nonresponse and Generalizability in Academic 
Research. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 34 (1): 4-7. 
Bonner, J. M. and Calantone, R. J. (2005) Buyer Attentiveness in Buyer-
Supplier Relationships. Industrial Marketing Management, 34 (1): 53-61. 
Bowman, D. and Lele-Pingle, S. (1997) Buyer Behavior in Business-to-Business 
Services: The Case of Foreign Exchange. International Journal of Research in 
Marketing, 14 (5): 499-508. 
Brand, M. J. and Leeflang, P. S. H. (1994) Research on Modeling Industrial 
Markets. In: Laurent, G., Lilien, G. L. and Pras, B. eds. Research Traditions in 
Marketing. Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 231-261. 
 312 
Brennan, R. (2006) Evolutionary Economics and the Markets-as-Networks 
Approach. Industrial Marketing Management, 35 (7): 829-838. 
Brinkmann, J. and Voeth, M. (2007) An Analysis of Buying Center Decisions 
Through the Salesforce. Industrial Marketing Management, 36 (7): 998-1009. 
Bubb, P. L. and van Rest, D. J. (1973) Loyalty as a Component of the Industrial 
Buying Decision. Industrial Marketing Management, 3 (1): 25-32. 
Burke, G., J., Carrillo, J. E. and Vakharia, A. J. (2007) Single versus Multiple 
Supplier Sourcing Strategies. European Journal of Operational Research, 182 
(1): 95-112. 
Caldwell, N., Walker, H., Harland, C., Knight, L., Zheng, J. and Wakely, T. 
(2005) Promoting Competitive Markets: The Role of Public Procurement. 
Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 11 (5 - 6): 242-251. 
Campbell, N. C. G. (1985) An Interaction Approach to Organizational Buying 
Behavior. Journal of Business Research, 13 (1): 35-48. 
Chapman, T. L., Gupta, A. and Mango, P. D. (1998) Group Purchasing is not a 
Panacea for US Hospitals. The McKinsey Quarterly, 1998 (1): 160-165. 
Chatfield, C. and Goodhardt, G. (1975) Results Concerning Brand Choice. 
Journal of Marketing Science, XII (February): 110-113. 
Chatfield, C. and Goodhardt, G. J. (1970) The Beta-Binomial Model for 
Consumer Purchasing Behaviour. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series 
C (Applied Statistics), 19 (3): 240-250. 
Chatfield, C. and Goodhardt, G. J. (1973) A Consumer Purchasing Model with 
Erlang Inter-Purchase Time. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 68 
(344): 828-835. 
Cheung, M. Y. S. and Turnbull, P. W. (1998) A Review of the Nature and 
Development of Inter-Organisational Relationships: A Network Perspective. In: 
Naude, P. and Turnbull, P. W. eds. Network Dynamics in International 
Marketing. Oxford: Elsevier Science: 42-69. 
 313 
Choffray, J.-M. and Lilien, G. L. (1978) Assessing Response to Industrial 
Marketing Strategy. Journal of Marketing, 42 (2): 20-31. 
Cleverley, W. O. and Nutt, P. C. (1984) The Effectiveness of Group-Purchasing 
Organizations. Health Services Research, 19 (1): 65-81. 
Cohen, A. (2002) Strength in Numbers. Supply Management, 7 (5): 28-29. 
Costantino, N. and Pellegrino, R. (2010) Choosing between Single and Multiple 
Sourcing Based on Supplier Default risk: A Real Options Approach. Journal of 
Purchasing & Supply Management, 16 (1): 27-40. 
Cousins, P. D. (1999) Supply Base Rationalisation: Myth or Reality? European 
Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 5 (3-4): 143-155. 
Cova, B. and Salle, R. (2003) When IMP-Don Quixote Tilts his Lance Against 
the Kotlerian Windmills: BtoB Marketing Deeply Changed Dring the Last 25 
Years, BtoC Marketing Too. Proceedings of the 19th Annual IMP Conference, 
Lugano, Switzerland.  
Cox, A., Chicksand, D. and Ireland, P. (2005) Sub-Optimality in NHS Sourcing 
in the UK: Demand-Side Constraints on Supply-Side Improvement. Public 
Administration, 83 (2): 367-392. 
Croom, S. and Brandon-Jones, A. (2007) Impact of e-Procurement: Experiences 
from Implementation in the UK Public Sector. Journal of Purchasing & Supply 
Management, 13 (4): 274-293. 
Cunningham, M. T. (1980) International Marketing and Purchasing of Industrial 
Goods - Features of a European Research Project. European Journal of 
Marketing, 14 (5/6): 322-328. 
Cunningham, M. T. and Kettlewood, K. (1976) Source Loyalty in the Freight 
Transport Market. European Journal of Marketing, 10 (1): 60-79. 
Cunningham, R. (1956) Brand Loyalty - What, Where, How Much? Harvard 
Business Review, 1956 (34): 116-128. 
 314 
Dacko, S., G. (2008) The Advanced Dictionary of Marketing: Putting Theory to 
Use. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dall'Olmo Riley, F., Ehrenberg, A. S. C., Castleberry, S. B., Barwise, T. P. and 
Barnard, N. R. (1997) The Variability of Attitudinal Repeat-Rates. International 
Journal of Research in Marketing, 14 (5): 437-450. 
de Belder, M. A. (2008) NICE Guidelines For the Use of Drug-Eluting Stents: 
How Do We Establish Worth? Heart, 94 (12): 1646-1652. 
Department of Health (2009a) The Statement of NHS Accountability. [online] 
Available from: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digit
alasset/dh_093418.pdf (Accessed 27 September 2010). 
Department of Health (2009b) Necessity - not Nicety. [online] Available from: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digit
alasset/dh_098874.pdf (Accessed 26 September 2010). 
Department of Health (2009c) Departmental Report 2009. [online] Available 
from: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digit
alasset/dh_100819.pdf (Accessed 27 September 2010). 
Department of Health (2010a) Commercial Skills for the NHS. [online] 
Available from: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPoli
cyAndGuidance/DH_113744 (Accessed 1/12/2010). 
Department of Health (2010b) The NHS Constitution. [online] Available from: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPoli
cyAndGuidance/DH_113613 (Accessed 26 September 2010). 
Dick, A. S. and Basu, K. (1994) Customer Loyalty: Toward an Integrated 
Conceptual Framework. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 22 (2): 
99-113. 
 315 
Dillon, W. R. and Gupta, S. (1996) A Segment-Level Model of Category 
Volume and Brand Choice. Marketing Science, 15 (1): 38-59. 
Doucette, W. R. (1997) Influences on Member Commitment to Group 
Purchasing Organizations. Journal of Business Research, 40 (3): 183-189. 
Downward, P., Finch, J. H. and Ramsay, J. (2002) Critical Realism, Empirical 
Methods and Inference: A Critical Discussion. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 26 (4): 481-500. 
Doyle, P. (1995) Marketing in the New Millennium. European Journal of 
Marketing, 29 (13): 23-41. 
Dubois, A. and Araujo, L. (2007) Case Research in Purchasing and Supply 
Management: Opportunities and Challenges. Journal of Purchasing & Supply 
Management, 13 (3): 170-181. 
Dubois, A. and Gadde, L.-E. (2002) Systematic Combining: An Abductive 
Approach to Case Research. Journal of Business Research, 55 (7): 553-560. 
Dubois, A., Gadde, L.-E. and Mattsson, L.-G. (2003) Change and Continuity in 
the Supplier Base: A Case Study of a Manufacturing Firm 1964-2002. Journal 
of Customer Behaviour, 2 (3): 409-432. 
Dunn, R., Reader, S. and Wrigley, N. (1983) An Investigation of the 
Assumptions of the NBD Model as Applied to Purchasing at Individual Stores. 
Applied Statistics, 32 (3): 249-259. 
Dwyer, F. R., Schurr, P. H. and Oh, S. (1987) Developing Buyer-Seller 
Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 51 (2): 11-27. 
Easton, G. (1980) Stochastic Models of Industrial Buying Behaviour. Omega, 8 
(1): 63-69. 
Easton, G. (1992) Industrial Networks: A Review. In: Axelsson, B. and Easton, 
G. eds. Industrial Networks: A new View of Reality. London: Routledge: 3-27. 
 316 
Easton, G. (1995a) Methodology and Industrial Networks. In: Moller, K. and 
Wilson, D. eds. Business Marketing: An Interaction and Network Perspective. 
Norwell USA: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 411-491. 
Easton, G. (1995b) Comments on Wensley's "A Critical Review of Marketing: 
Market Networks and Interfirm Relationships". British Journal of Management, 
6 (December): S83-S86. 
Easton, G. (1998) Case Research as a Methodology for Industrial Networks; A 
Realist Apologia. In: Naude, P. and Turnbull, P. W. eds. Network Dynamics in 
International Marketing. Oxford: Elsevier Science: 73-87. 
Easton, G. and Araujo, L. (1986) Networks, Bonding and Relationships in 
Industrial Markets. Industrial Marketing and Purchasing, 1 (1): 8-25. 
Ehrenberg, A. (1997) In Search of Holy Grails: Two Comments. Journal of 
Advertising Research, 37 (1): 9-12. 
Ehrenberg, A. and Sharp, B. (2000) Managerial Uses of Descriptive Marketing 
Models - The Case of the Dirichlet. ANZMAC 2000 Visionary Marketing for the 
21st Century: Facing the Challenge, Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia 296-
301. 
Ehrenberg, A. S. C. (1959) The Pattern of Consumer Purchases. Applied 
Statistics, 8 (1): 26-41. 
Ehrenberg, A. S. C. (1988) Repeat-Buying: Facts, Theory and Applications. 
London: Edward Arnold (Griffin). 
Ehrenberg, A. S. C. (1991) New Brands and the Existing Market. Journal of the 
Market Research Society, 33 (4): 285-299. 
Ehrenberg, A. S. C. (1994) Theory or Well-Based Results: Which Comes First? 
In: Laurent, G., Lilien, G. L. and Pras, B. eds. Research Traditions in Marketing. 
Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 79-105. 
Ehrenberg, A. S. C. (1995) Empirical Generalisations, Theory, and Method. 
Marketing Science, 14 (3 Part 2 of 2): G20-G28. 
 317 
Ehrenberg, A. S. C. and Bound, J. A. (1993) Predictability and Prediction. 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society A, 156 (2): 167-206. 
Ehrenberg, A. S. C., Hammond, K. and Goodhardt, G. J. (1994) The After-
Effects of Price-Related Consumer Promotions. Journal of Advertising 
Research, 34 (4): 11-21. 
Ehrenberg, A. S. C., Uncles, M. D. and Goodhardt, G. J. (2004) Understanding 
Brand Performance Measures: Using Dirichlet Benchmarks. Journal of Business 
Research, 57 (12): 1307-1325. 
Eiriz, V. and Wilson, D. (2006) Research in Relationship Marketing: 
Antecedents, Traditions and Integration. European Journal of Marketing, 40 
(3/4): 275-291. 
Elberse, A. (2007) A Taste for Obscurity? An Individual-Level Examination of 
"Long Tail" Consumption. Harvard Business School Working paper No. 08-008, 
August 2007.  
Elhauge, E. (2002) The Exclusion of Competition for Hospital Sales through 
Group Purchasing Organizations. [online] Available from: 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/gpo_report_june_02.pdf 
(Accessed 2 November 2010). 
Ellis, N. and Hopkinson, G. (2004) Talking of Talk ... Does it Matter? 
Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Industrial Marketing and 
Purchasing Group, Copenhagen.  
Emberson, C. and Storey, J. (2006) Buyer-Supplier Collaborative Relationships: 
Beyond the Normative Accounts. Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 
12 (5): 236-245. 
Essig, M. (2000) Purchasing Consortia as Symbiotic Relationships: Developing 
the Concept of "Consortium Sourcing". European Journal of Purchasing and 
Supply Management, 6 (1): 13-22. 
 318 
Fader, P., S., Hardie, B., G. S. and Lee, K. L. (2005) "Counting Your 
Customers" the Easy Way: An Alternative to the Pareto/NBD Model. Marketing 
Science, 24 (2): 275-284. 
Fader, P. S. and Schmittlein, D. C. (1993) Excess Behavioral Loyalty for High-
Share Brands: Deviations from the Dirichlet Model for Repeat Purchasing. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 30 (November): 478-493. 
Fern, E. F. and Brown, J. R. (1984) The Industrial/Consumer Marketing 
Dichotomy: A Case of Insufficient Justification. The Journal of Marketing, 48 
(2): 68-77. 
Ford, D. (2000) Understanding Business Markets: Interaction, Relationships 
and Networks. London: Thomson Learning. 
Ford, D. (2004) The IMP Group and International Marketing. International 
Marketing Review, 21 (2): 139-141. 
Ford, D., Gadde, L.-E., Hakansson, H. and Snehota, I. (2003) Managing 
Business Relationships. Chichester: John Wiley. 
Ford, D. and Hakansson, H. (2006) IMP - Some Things Achieved: Much More 
to Do. European Journal of Marketing, 40 (3/4): 248-258. 
Ford, D., Hakansson, H. and Johanson, J. (1986) How do Companies Interact? 
Industrial Marketing and Purchasing, 1 (1): 26-41. 
Frohlich, M. T. and Dixon, J. R. (2006) Reflections on Replication in OM 
Research and this Special Issue. Journal of Operations Management, 24 (6): 
865-867. 
Gadde, L.-E. and Mattsson, L.-G. (1987) Stability and Change in Network 
Relationships. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 4 (1): 29-41. 
Galloway, M. (2009) The ACP Guide to the Structure of the NHS in the United 
Kingdom. [online] Available from: http://www.pathologists.org.uk/publications-
page/NHS10.pdf (Accessed 27 September 2010). 
 319 
Gee, R., Coates, G. and Nicholson, M. (2008) Understanding and Profitably 
Managing Customer Loyalty. Marketing Intelligence & Planning, 26 (4): 359-
374. 
Gensch, D. H. (1987) A Two-Stage Disaggregate Attribute Choice Model. 
Marketing Science, 6 (3): 223-239. 
Gershon, P. (2004) Releasing Resources to the Front Line, Independent Review 
of Public Sector Efficiency. [online] Available from: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/efficiency_review120704.pdf (Accessed 27 September 2010). 
Goodhardt, G. J., Ehrenberg, A. S. C. and Chatfield, C. (1984) The Dirichlet: A 
Comprehensive Model of Buying Behaviour. Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, 147 (5): 621-655. 
Gronroos, C. (1994) Quo Vadis, Marketing? Toward a Relationship Marketing 
Paradigm. Journal of Marketing Management, 10 347-360. 
Guadagni, P. M. and Little, J. D. C. (1983) A Logit Model of Brand Choice 
Calibrated on Scanner Data. Marketing Science, 2 (3): 203-238. 
Gummesson, E. and Polese, F. (2009) B2B is not an Island! Journal of Business 
& Industrial Marketing, 24 (5/6): 337-350. 
Hahn, C. K., Kim, K. H. and Kim, J. S. (1986) Costs of Competition: 
Implications for Purchasing Strategy. Journal of Purchasing and Materials 
Management, 22 (3): 2-7. 
Hakansson, H. (1982) International Marketing and Purchasing of Industrial 
Goods. Chichester: John Wiley. 
Hakansson, H. and Johanson, J. (1992) A Model of Industrial Networks. In: 
Axelsson, B. and Easton, G. eds. Industrial Networks: A New View of Reality. 
London: Routledge: 28-34. 
 320 
Hakansson, H. and Snehota, I. (1998) The Burden of relationships or Who's 
Next. In: Naude, P. and Turnbull, P. W. eds. Network Dynamics in International 
Marketing. Oxford: Elsevier Science: 16-25. 
Hakansson, H. and Wootz, B. (1979) A Framework of Industrial Buying and 
Selling. Industrial Marketing Management, 8 (1): 28-39. 
Hallen, L., Johanson, J. and Seyed-Mohamed, N. (1991) Interfirm Adaptation in 
Business Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 55 (2): 29-37. 
Harland, C., Bakker, E., Caldwell, N., Phillips, W. and Walker, H. (2005) The 
Changing Role of Public Procurement - Executive Report from the Second 
International Research Study of Public Procurement. Centre for Research in 
Strategic Purchasing and Supply, University of Bath School of Management.  
Harland, C., Rudd, A., Knight, L., Forrest, S. and Bakker, E. (2007) 
Procurement in the English National Health Service. In: Knight, L., Harland, C., 
Telgen, J., Thai, K. V., Callender, G. and McKen, K. eds. Public Procurement. 
International cases and commentary. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge: 42-59.  
Heide, J. B. and Weiss, A. M. (1995) Vendor Consideration and Switching 
Behavior for Buyers in High-Technology Markets. Journal of Marketing, 59 (3): 
30-43. 
Hendrick, T. E. (1997) Purchasing Consortiums: Horizontal Alliances Among 
Firms Buying Common Goods and Services. CAPS Report, Tempe.  
Henneberg, S. C., Mouzas, S. and Naude, P. (2006) Network Pictures: Concepts 
and Representations. European Journal of Marketing, 40 (3/4): 408-429. 
Hunt, S. D. (1983) General Theories and the Fundamental Explananda of 
Marketing. Journal of Marketing, 47 (4): 9-17. 
Jacoby, J. (1971) A Model of Multi-Brand Loyalty. Journal of Advertising 
Research, 11 (3): 25-31. 
Jarvis, L. P. and Wilcox, J. B. (1977) True Vendor Loyalty or Simply Repeat 
Purchase Behavior? Industrial Marketing Management, 6 (1): 9-14. 
 321 
Jeuland, A. P., Bass, F. M. and Wright, G. P. (1980) A Multibrand Stochastic 
Model Compounding Heterogeneous Erlang Timing and Multinomial Choice 
Processes. Operations Research, 28 (2): 255-277. 
Johnson, P. F. (1999) The Pattern of Evolution in Public Sector Purchasing 
Consortia. International Journal of Logistics: Research and Applications, 2 (1): 
57-73. 
Johnston, W. J. and Spekman, R. E. (1982) Industrial Buying Behavior: A Need 
for an Integrative Approach. Journal of Business Research, 10 (2): 135-146. 
Jones, J. M. and Zufryden, F. S. (1980) Adding Explanatory Variables to a 
Consumer Purchase Behavior Model: An Exploratory Study. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 17 (3): 323-334. 
Kahn, B. E., Kalwani, M. U. and Morrison, D. G. (1988) Niching Versus 
Change-of-Pace Brands: Using Purchase Frequencies and Penetration Rates to 
Infer Brand Positioning. Journal of Marketing Research, XXV (November): 384 
- 390. 
Kamp, B. (2005) Formation and Evolution of Buyer-Supplier Relationships: 
Conceiving Dynamism in Actor Composition of Business Networks. Industrial 
Marketing Management, 34 (7): 658-668. 
Kearns, Z. (2009) Dirichletvb. [online] Available from: http://marketing-
bulletin.massey.ac.nz/V20/Dirichlet%20vb.xls (Accessed 11 December 2010). 
Kearns, Z. and Lewis, T. (2000) An Empirical Comparison of Dirichlet 
Software. ANZMAC 2000 Visionary Marketing for the 21st Century: Facing the 
Challenge, Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia.  
Knight, L., Caldwell, N., Harland, C. and Telgen, J. (2003) Academic Report 
From the First International Research Study on Public Procurement. Centre for 
Research in Strategic Purchasing and Supply, University of Bath.  
Kotler, P. (1991) Marketing Management. 7e. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc. 
 322 
Kraljic, P. (1983) Purchasing Must Become Supply Management. Harvard 
Business Review, 61 (5): 109-117. 
Krause, D. R. and Ellram, L. M. (1997) Success Factors in Supplier 
Development. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management, 27 (1): 39-52. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Laing, A. and Cotton, S. (1997) Patterns of Inter-Organizational Purchasing, 
Evolution of Consortia-Based Purchasing Amongst GP Fundholders. European 
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 3 (2): 83-91. 
Lakatos, I. (1978) Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programs. In: Worrall, J. and Currie, G. eds. The Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programs: Imre Lakatos Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 8-101. 
Lakatos, I. (2003) Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes. In: Delanty, G. and Strydom, P. eds. Philosophies of Social 
Science. Maidenhead England: Open University Press: 78-80. 
Lam, D. and Mizerski, R. (2009) An Investigation into Gambling Purchases 
Using the NBD and NBD-Dirichlet Models. Marketing Letters, 20 (3): 263-276. 
Leckenby, J. D. and Kishi, S. (1984) The Dirichlet Multinomial Distribution as a 
Magazine Exposure Model. Journal of Marketing Research, XXI (February): 
100-106. 
Lehmann, D. R. and O'Shaughnessy, J. (1974) Difference in Attribute 
Importance for Different Industrial Products. Journal of Marketing, 38 (2): 36-
42. 
Leong, S. L. (1985) Metatheory and Metamethodology in Marketing: A 
Lakatosian Reconstruction. Journal of Marketing, 49 (Fall): 23-40. 
 323 
Li, F., Habel, C. and Rungie, C. (2009) Using Polarization to Reveal Systematic 
Deviations in Dirichlet Loyalty Estimation. Marketing Bulletin, 20 (1): 1-15. 
Li, S., Madhok, A., Plaschka, G. and Verma, R. (2006) Supplier-Switching 
Inertia and Competitive Asymmetry: A Demand-Side Perspective. Decision 
Sciences, 37 (4): 547-576. 
Lindsay, R. M. and Ehrenberg, A. S. C. (1993) The Design of Replicated 
Studies. The American Statistician, 47 (3): 217-228. 
Loader, K. (2010) Is Local Authority Procurement 'Lean'? An Exploration to 
Determine if 'Lean' Can Provide a Useful Explanation of Practice. Journal of 
Purchasing & Supply Management, 16 (1): 41-50. 
London Procurement Programme (2010) Cardiac Stents. [online] Available 
from: 
http://www.lpp.nhs.uk/page.asp?fldArea=2&fldMenu=5&fldSubMenu=2&fldK
ey=30 (Accessed 26 November 2010). 
Macé, S. and Neslin, S. A. (2004) The Determinants of Pre- and Postpromotion 
Dips in Sales of Frequently Purchased Goods. Journal of Marketing Research, 
41 (3): 339-350. 
Mattsson, L.-G. (1997) "Relationship Marketing" and the Markets-as-Networks 
Approach" - A Comparative Analysis of Two Evolving Streams of Research. 
Journal of Marketing Management, 13 (5): 447-461. 
Mattsson, L.-G. and Johanson, J. (2006) Discovering Market Networks. 
European Journal of Marketing, 40 (3/4): 259-274. 
McCabe, J. and Stern, P. (2009) Stochastic Modelling and Industrial Networks 
— Complementary Views of Organisational Buyer Behavior. Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 37 (2): 204-214. 
McCay, L. and Jonas, S. (2009) A Junior Doctor's Guide to the NHS. [online] 
Available from: http://group.bmj.com/group/affinity-and-society-
publishing/NHS%20Guide.pdf (Accessed 27 September 2010). 
 324 
McCue, C. and Prier, E. (2006) Using Agency Theory to Model Cooperative 
Public Purchasing. In: Thai, K. and Piga, G. eds. Advancing Public 
Procurement: Practices, Innovation and Knowledge-Sharing. Boca Raton, FL: 
Academic Press: 45-71. 
McLoughlin, D. and Horan, C. (2002) Markets-as-Networks: Notes on a Unique 
Understanding. Journal of Business Research, 55 (7): 535-543. 
McPhee, W. N. (1963) Formal Theories of Mass Behavior. New York: Free 
Press. 
Mela, C. F., Jedidi, K. and Bowman, D. (1998) The Long-Term Impact of 
Promotions on Consumer Stockpiling Behavior. Journal of Marketing Research, 
35 (2): 250-262. 
Miles, M. B. and Huberman, A. M. (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis: An 
Expanded Sourcebook. 2. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Mingers, J. (2003) The Place of Statistical Modelling in Management Science: 
Critical Realism and Multimethodology. Working Paper No.45, University of 
Kent, Canterbury Business School.  
Moller, K. E. K. (1994) Interorganizational Marketing Exchange: 
Metatheoretical Analysis of Current Research Approaches. In: Laurent, G., 
Lilien, G. L. and Pras, B. eds. Research Traditions in Marketing. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers: 347-372. 
Moller, K. K. E. (1985) Research Strategies in Analysing the Organzational 
Buying Process. Journal of Business Research, 13 (1): 3-17. 
Morris, M. H. and Holman, J. L. (1988) Source Loyalty in Organizational 
Markets: A Dyadic Perspective. Journal of Business Research, 16 (2): 117-131. 
Morrison, D. G. (1969) Conditional Trend Analysis: A Model That Allows For 
Nonusers. Journal of Marketing Research, 6 (3): 342-346. 
 325 
Morrison, D. G. and Schmittlein, D. C. (1988) Generalizing the NBD Model for 
Customer Purchases: What Are the Implications and Is It Worth the Effort? 
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 6 (2): 145-159. 
Murray, J. G., Rentell, P. G. and Geere, D. (2008) Procurement as a Shared 
Service in English Local Government. International Journal of Public Sector 
Management, 21 (5): 540-555. 
Myers, M. D. and Newman, M. (2007) The Qualitative Interview in IS 
Research: Examining the Craft. Information and Organization, 17 (1): 2-26. 
Neslin, S. A., Henderson, C. and Quelch, J. (1985) Consumer Promotions and 
the Acceleration of Product Purchases. Marketing Science, 4 (2): 147-165. 
NHS (2009) About the NHS. [online] Available from: 
http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/about/Pages/overview.aspx (Accessed 
26 September 2010). 
NICE (2008) TA152 Drug-eluting Stents for the Treatment of Coronary Artery 
Disease. [online] Available from: 
http://www.nice.org.uk/nicemedia/live/12013/41262/41262.pdf (Accessed 4 
November 2010). 
Nollet, J. and Beaulieu, M. (2003) The Development of Group Purchasing: An 
Empirical Study in the Healthcare Sector. Journal of Purchasing & Supply 
Management, 9 (1): 3-10. 
Nollet, J. and Beaulieu, M. (2005) Should an Organisation Join a Purchasing 
Group. Supply Chain Management, 10 (1): 11-17. 
Noordewier, T. G., John, G. and Nevin, J. R. (1990) Performance Outcomes of 
Purchasing Arrangements in Industrial Buyer-Vendor Relationships. Journal of 
Marketing, 54 (4): 80-93. 
Norman, H., Romaniuk, J. and Riebe, E. (2005) 100% Brand Loyals Exposed. 
The R&D Initiative, 16.  
 326 
Office of Government Commerce (2010) Why is Collaboration Vital? [online] 
Available from: 
http://www.ogc.gov.uk/categories_of_spend_why_is_collaboration_vital.asp 
(Accessed 28 October 2010). 
Ogden, J. A. (2006) Supply Base Reduction: An Empirical Study of Critical 
Success Factors. The Journal of Supply Chain Management, 42 (4): 29-39. 
Oliver, R. L. (1999) Whence Consumer Loyalty? Journal of Marketing, 63 (4 
Special Issue): 33-44. 
Owens Swift, C. and Coe, B. J. (1994) Sourcing Preference Scale: Measuring 
Preferences of Purchasing Managers for Single Sourcing or Multiple Sourcing 
of Products. Industrial Marketing Management, 23 (2): 171-180. 
Pare, V. and Dawes, J. (2008) Do all Private Label Brands Exhibit Excess 
Loyalty? Proceedings of the ANZMAC 2008 Conference, Sydney, Australia.  
Patterson, J. L., Forker, L. B. and Hanna, J. B. (1999) Supply Chain Consortia: 
The Rise of Transcendental Buyer-Supplier Relationships. European Journal of 
Purchasing and Supply Management, 5 (2): 85-93. 
Peppers, D., Rogers, M. and Dorf, B. (1999) Is Your Company Ready for One-
to-One Marketing? Harvard Business Review, 77 (1): 151-160. 
Peter, J. P. and Olson, J. C. (1983) Is Science Marketing? Journal of Marketing, 
47 (4): 111-125. 
Peter, S. F., Bruce, G. S. H. and Ka Lok, L. (2005) "Counting Your Customers" 
the Easy Way: An Alternative to the Pareto/NBD Model. Marketing Science, 24 
(2): 275-284. 
Pettigrew, A. M. (1975) The Industrial Purchasing Decision as a Political 
Process. European Journal of Marketing, 9 (1): 4-19. 
Phillips, W., Harland, C. and Telgen, J. (2008) Building Public Procurement 
Capacity and Capability - Academic Report from the Third International 
 327 
Research Study on Public Procurement. Centre for Research in Strategic 
Purchasing and Supply, University of Bath.  
Pickford, C. and Goodhardt, G. (2000) An Empirical Study of Buying Behaviour 
in an Industrial Market. Academy of Marketing Annual Conference, Derby, UK.  
Pine, B. J., Peppers, D. and Rogers, M. (1995) Do You Want to Keep Your 
Customers Forever? Harvard Business Review, 1995 (March-April): 103-114. 
Popkowski Leszczyc, P. T. L. and Bass, F. M. (1998) Determining the Effects of 
Observed and Unobserved Heterogeneity on Consumer Brand Choice. Applied 
Stochastic Models and Data Analysis, 14 (2): 95-115. 
Preis, M. W. (2003) The Impact of Interpersonal Satisfaction on Repurchase 
Decisions. The Journal of Supply Chain Management, 39 (3): 30-38. 
Quayle, M. (2001) Purchasing in the UK and Switzerland:An Empirical Study of 
Sourcing Decisions. European Business Review, 13 (1): 42-59. 
Quintens, L., Pauwels, P. and Matthyssens, P. (2006) Global Purchasing:State of 
the Art and Research Directions. Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 
12 (4): 170-181. 
Rauyruen, P. and Miller, K. E. (2007) Relationship Quality as a Predictor of 
B2B Customer Loyalty. Journal of Business Research, 60 (1): 21-31. 
Reichheld, F. and Sasser, W. E., Jr. (1990) Zero Defections: Quality Comes to 
Services. Harvard Business Review, 68 (September/October): 105-111. 
Ritter, T., Wilkinson, I. and Johnston, W. (2004) Managing in Complex 
Business Networks. Industrial Marketing Management, 33 (3): 175-183. 
Robinson, P., Faris, C. and Wind, Y. (1967) Industrial Buying and Creative 
Marketing. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. 
Rokkan, A. I. and Buvik, A. (2003) Inter-Firm Cooperation and the Problem of 
Free Riding Behavior: An Empirical Study of Voluntary Retail Chains. Journal 
of Purchasing & Supply Management, 9 (5 - 6): 247-256. 
 328 
Rossiter, J. R. (1994) Commentary on Theory or Well-Based Results: Which 
Comes First? In: Laurent, G., Lilien, G. L. and Pras, B. eds. Research traditions 
in marketing. Boston: Kluwer: 116-122. 
Rundle-Thiele, S. and Bennett, R. (2001) A Brand For All Seasons? A 
Discussion of Brand Loyalty Approaches and Their Applicability For Different 
Markets. Journal of Product & Brand Management, 10 (1): 25-37. 
Schmittlein, D. C., Morrison, D. G. and Colombo, R. (1987) Counting Your 
Customers: Who Are They and What Will They Do Next? Management Science, 
33 (1): 1-24. 
Schmittlein, D. C. and Peterson, R. A. (1994) Customer Base Analysis: An 
Industrial Purchase Process Application. Marketing Science, 13 (1): 41-67. 
Schotanus, F. and Telgen, J. (2007) Developing a Typology of Organisational 
Forms of Cooperative Purchasing. Journal of Purchasing & Supply 
Management, 13 (1): 53-68. 
Schotanus, F., Telgen, J. and de Boer, L. (2010) Critical Success Factors for 
Managing Purchasing Groups. Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 16 
(1): 51-60. 
Schunn, C. D. and Wallach, D. (2001) Evaluating Goodness of Fit in 
Comparison of Models to Data. University of Pittsburgh.  
Seth, A., Momaya, K. and Gupta, H. M. (2005) An Exploratory Investigation of 
Customer Loyalty and Retention in Cellular Mobile Communication. Journal of 
Services Research, Special Issue (December): 173-185. 
Sharp, B. and Driesener, C. (2000) The Dirichlet's Buyer Behaviour 
Assumptions Really Do Matter. ANZMAC 2000 Visionary Marketing for the 
21st Century: Facing the Challenge, Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia.  
Sharp, B., Wright, M. and Goodhardt, G. (2002) Purchase Loyalty is Polarised 
into either Repertoire or Subscription Patterns. Australasian Marketing Journal, 
10 (3): 7-20. 
 329 
Sheth, J. N. (1973) A Model of Industrial Buyer Behaviour. Journal of 
Marketing, 37 (October): 50-56. 
Sheth, J. N. (1977) Recent Developments in Organizational Buying Behavior. 
In: Woodside, A. G., Sheth, J. N. and Bennett, P. D. eds. Consumer and 
Industrial Buying Behavior. New York: Elsevier North-Holland: 17-34. 
Sheth, J. N. (2002) The Future of Relationship Marketing. Journal of Services 
Marketing, 16 (7): 590-592. 
Shoemaker, R. W., Staelin, R., Kadane, J. B. and Shoaf, F. R. (1977) Relation of 
Brand Choice to Purchase Frequency. Journal of Marketing Research, 14 (4): 
458-468. 
Silverman, D. (1997) Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing 
Talk, Text and Interaction. 2. London: Sage. 
Singh, J., Ehrenberg, A. S. C. and Goodhardt, G. (2008) Measuring Customer 
Loyalty to Product Variants. International Journal of Market Research, 50 (4): 
513-532. 
Singh, J., Hand, C. and Chen, H. (2009) Differentiation in a Branded 
Commodity Category: Tapping into Behavioural Data. Proceedings of ANZMAC 
2009 Sustainable Management and Marketing Conference, Monash University, 
Melbourne, Australia.  
Smith, D. and Taylor, R. (1985) Organisational Decision Making and Industrial 
Marketing. European Journal of Marketing, 19 (7): 56-71. 
Soderlund, M., Vilgon, M. and Gunnarsson, J. (2001) Predicting Purchasing 
Behavior on Business-to-Business Markets. European Journal of Marketing, 35 
(1/2): 168-181. 
Spiteri, J. M. and Dion, P. A. (2004) Customer Value, Overall Satisfaction, End-
User Loyalty, and Market Performance in Detail Intensive Industries. Industrial 
Marketing Management, 33 (8): 675-687. 
Stern, P. (1994) Patterns of Prescribing, PhD Thesis, University of London. 
 330 
Stern, P. and Ehrenberg, A. S. C. (1995) The Market Performance of 
Pharmaceutical Brands. Marketing and Research Today, (November): 285-292. 
Stern, P. and Hammond, K. (2004) The Relationship Between Customer Loyalty 
and Purchase Incidence. Marketing Letters, 15 (1): 5-19. 
Tella, E. and Virolainen, V.-M. (2005) Motives Behind Purchasing Consortia. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 93-94, 161-168. 
Turnbull, P., Ford, D. and Cunningham, M. (1996) Interaction, Relationships 
and Networks in Business Markets; An Evolving Perspective. Journal of 
Business and Industrial Marketing, 11 (3/4): 44-62. 
Uncles, M., Ehrenberg, A. and Hammond, K. (1995) Patterns of Buyer 
Behavior: Regularities, Models, and Extensions. Marketing Science, 14 (3): 
G71-G78. 
Uncles, M. and Kwok, S. (2003) Toothpaste Purchasing in China: Patterns of 
Buyer Behaviour. Proceedings of the ANZMAC 2003 Conference, Adelaide, 
Australia.  
Uncles, M. and Laurent, G. (1997) Editorial. International Journal of Research 
in Marketing, 14 (5): 399-404. 
Uncles, M. D. (1989) BUYER: Buyer Behaviour Software. CMaC Report, 
London Business School.  
Uncles, M. D., Dowling, G. R. and Hammond, K. (2003) Customer Loyalty and 
Customer Loyalty Programs. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 20 (4): 294-316. 
Uncles, M. D. and Ehrenberg, A. S. C. (1990) Industrial Buying Behaviour: 
Aviation Fuel Contracts. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 7 (1): 
57-68. 
Vereecke, A. and Muylle, S. (2006) Performance Improvement Through Supply 
Chain Collaboration in Europe. International Journal of Operations and 
Production Management, 26 (11): 1176-1198. 
 331 
Vigoroso, M. (1998) Buying Consortiums Suit Some, Not All. Purchasing, 125 
(2): 18-19. 
Vyas, N. and Woodside, A. G. (1984) An Inductive Model of Industrial Supplier 
Choice Processes. The Journal of Marketing, 48 (1): 30-45. 
Wagner, U. and Taudes, A. (1986) A Multivariate Polya Model of Brand Choice 
and Purchase Incidence. Marketing Science, 5 (3, Summer): 219-244. 
Walker, H., Harland, C., Knight, L., Uden, C. and Forrest, S. (2008) Reflections 
on Longitudinal Action Research with the English National Health Service. 
Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management, 14 (2): 136-145. 
Walker, H., Knight, L. and Harland, C. (2006) Outsourced Services and 
'Imbalanced' Supply Markets. European Management Journal, 24 (1): 95-105. 
Webster, F. E., Jr. and Wind, Y. (1972) A General Model for Understanding 
Organisational Buying Behaviour. Journal of Marketing, 36 (April): 12-19. 
Welch, C. and Wilkinson, I. (2002) Idea Logics and Network Theory in 
Business Marketing. Journal of Business to Business Marketing, 8 (3): 27-48. 
Wensley, R. (1995) A Critical Review of Research in Marketing. British Journal 
of Management, 6 (December): S63-S82. 
Wilkinson, I. F. and Young, L. C. (2005) Towards a Normative Theory of 
Normative Marketing Theories. Marketing Theory, 5 (4): 363-396. 
Wilson, D. F. (2000) Why Divide Consumer and Organizational Buyer 
Behaviour? European Journal of Marketing, 34 (7): 780-796. 
Wind, Y. (1970) Industrial Source Loyalty. Journal of Marketing Research, 7 
(4): 450-457. 
Wind, Y. J. (2006) Blurring the Lines: Is There a Need to Rethink Industrial 
Marketing? Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 21 (7): 474-481. 
Wright, M. and Kearns, Z. (1998) Progress in Marketing Knowledge. Journal of 
Empirical Generalisations in Marketing Science, 3 (1).  
 332 
Wright, M., Sharp, A. and Sharp, B. (2002) Market Statistics for the Dirichlet 
Model: Using the Juster Scale to Replace Panel Data. International Journal of 
Research in Marketing, 19 (1): 81-90. 
Yanamandram, V. and White, L. (2006) Switching Barriers in Business-to-
Business Services: A Qualitative Study. International Journal of Service 
Industry Management, 17 (2): 158-192. 
Yim, C. K. B. and Kannan, P. K. (1999) Consumer Behavioral Loyalty: A 
Segmentation Model and Analysis. Journal of Business Research, 44 (2): 75-92. 
Young, L. and Denize, S. (1995) A Concept of Commitment: Alternative Views 
of Relational Continuity in Business Service Relationships. Journal of Business 
& Industrial Marketing, 10 (5): 22-37. 
 
 
 
